The Decline of Democracy: How the State Uses Control of Food Production to Undermine Free Society by ELLIS, ALICIA N. (Author) et al.
 
 
The Decline of Democracy:  
How the State Uses Control of Food Production to Undermine Free Society 
by 
Alicia N. Ellis 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2019 by the  
Graduate Supervisory Committee: 
Cameron Thies, Chair 
Carolyn Warner 
Henry Thomson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
May 2019
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores the underlying dynamics of democracies in the context of 
underdevelopment, arguing that when society has not attained a substantial degree of 
economic independence from the state, it undermines democratic quality and stability. 
Economic underdevelopment and political oppression are mutually reinforcing, and both 
are rooted in the structure of the agriculture sector, the distribution of land, and the rural 
societies that emerge around this order. These systems produce persistent power 
imbalances that militate toward their continuance, encourage dependency, and foster the 
development of neopatrimonialism and corruption in the government, thereby weakening 
key pillars of democracy such as accountability and representativeness. Through 
historical analysis of a single case study, this dissertation demonstrates that while this is 
partly a result of actor choices at key points in time, it is highly influenced by structural 
constraints embedded in earlier time periods. I find that Ghana’s historical development 
from the colonial era to present day closely follows this trajectory.  
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The urge to save humanity is almost always a false face for the urge to rule it 
- H.L. Mencken 
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TIMELINE  
1947: Colonial government establishes Cocoa Marketing Board  
1947: United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) formed 
1949: Nkrumah breaks with UGCC and forms the CPP  
1951: first elections held in then-Gold Coast; Nkrumah wins by a landslide and invited to 
form a government under temporary supervision of the colonial governor  
1953: CPP wins elections; Nkrumah is leader of government business under colonial 
governor  
1952/53: CPP establishes the Cocoa Purchasing Company as subsidiary of CMB and 
captures large share of the market 
1953: CPP establishes the United Ghana Farmers’ Council as farmers wing of the party 
1957: independence granted; Gold Coast becomes Ghana 
1957: CPP dissolves the CPC and transfers cocoa purchasing power to UGFC 
1957: CPP recognizes UGFC as sole organization entitled to represent farmers; merges 
cocoa co-operatives under the UGFC 
1961: CPP government expels foreign firms and grants UCFC full government-sponsored 
monopoly on cocoa. Note: direct state control by a state agency was considered 
but dismissed because competition between the UCFC (a wing of the CPP) and 
the state agency would introduce a degree of separation between state and party. 
1964: Kwame Nkrumah officially declares self President for Life 
1966: First military coup overthrows Nkrumah’s government (establishes NLC) 
1969: NLC hands power over to elected government (PP under Busia) 
1972: second military coup overthrows Busia’s government (establishes NRC, later 
replaced by SMC) 
1978: SMC removes General Acheampong as head of state, but retains military 
government under General Akuffo 
1979: another military coup overthrows SMC government on the eve of planned elections 
(the first Rawlings’ coup) 
1979: Rawlings hands power over to elected government (PNP under Hilla Limann) 
1981: Rawlings ousts PNP government in another coup and establishes NDC government 
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Introduction 
This dissertation sits at the crux of two major lines of research: the literature on 
democratic consolidation, and the literature on the political economy of agriculture, 
connecting the two in new ways. I theorize that the structure of a country’s agriculture 
sector is linked to democratic quality and stability through a web of structural constraints, 
power asymmetries, and the strategic calculations of political actors. Though Barrington 
Moore’s early work spoke to the role of agricultural development in the trajectory of 
political regimes, no work on democratization has since picked up this line of argument, 
instead tending toward analyzing the relationship between broad measures of economic 
growth and democracy. This theory generally agrees with Moore’s thesis linking political 
and economic development to the commercialization of agriculture, with the constellation 
of class interests determining the trajectory of politics.  
While Moore explores the dynamics of a specific period in time, I view these concepts 
more broadly, arguing that patterns of power and interest among classes and between the 
ruler and the classes can be used to explain political transitions and their ultimate results 
today. Analyses of state building in the developing world today are generally precluded 
from comparison to state building in earlier time periods, as it is assumed that the 
political and economic conditions of today’s emerging democracies are so dissimilar 
from those of Western Europe at its emergence that the two cannot be properly 
compared. Recent studies on Africa’s development instead focus on bringing to light the 
unique historical experience that introduces structural constraints not present in other 
parts of the world or in other periods of time.  
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It is true that the African experience has unfolded differently than Western Europe’s, and 
the resulting differences in the quality of democratic institutions and practices is glaringly 
obvious. Their disparate histories need not preclude comparison, however. The 
underlying force that Moore uncovers in the connection between agricultural 
development and democracy is at base, the increased independence of the population 
from the ruler. This is what ultimately drove political developments in early democracies, 
and it is what populations throughout the developing world have not yet achieved. I argue 
that the opportunities and constraints within which rulers and their subjects work in the 
developing world are still framed by the dependent relationships that Moore identified in 
feudal Europe, and that this continued dependency subverts democratic values. 
I revive two ideas that have been neglected since the publication of Social Origins: the 
role of agricultural modernization in political outcomes, and Moore’s vision of more than 
one possible political outcome arising from economic development. To these themes, I 
add several new elements: the pattern of interests of the political and economic power 
nuclei in a society, the differences between early and modern political transformations, 
and a strategic actor argument that places the deliberate calculation of quasi-authoritarian 
leaders at center stage.  
My theory posits that what sort of government will emerge is a function of where the 
locus of economic power lies, whether that power is heavily reliant on political favor, and 
whether the interests of the economic elite are aligned or opposed to the political regime. 
When the political regime is able to marry the interests of the primary nucleus of 
economic power to its own ends, genuine democracy based on the principle that the 
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people may limit what the government can do does not develop. Political leaders, whether 
dictator or democrat, design policy to maximize their ability to hold onto power.1 The 
primary source of influence that can counter political power is economic wealth; thus 
leaders of all sorts must be concerned about hubs of economic power. Rulers use 
different strategies for enhancing their political power depending on whether economic 
power is concentrated in urban or rural areas, but one way political power is cemented is 
by making the financial support network as dependent on the ruler as possible. 
Existing theories that connect economic realities to political outcomes, such as 
modernization and dependency theories, have tended to focus on socioeconomic forces 
stemming from societal changes.2 A new line of work inspired by Bringing the State 
Back In has shifted focus to the state, explaining political outcomes in the developing 
world by the lack of state capacity. This dissertation takes a more balanced approach, 
viewing the state and society as interacting forces, whose relationship, and the balance 
between them, codetermine outcomes.  
The view taken in this work of the state’s purpose and role also diverges from the 
mainstream literature. Embedded in much of the work on political economy is a view of 
the state primarily as a political arena for the conflict and collaboration of various societal 
interests, robbing the state of its autonomy. Even state-centric works tend to present the 
state as a relatively benign actor whose interests sometimes clash and sometimes intersect 
                                                          
1 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, xxiii-xxiv.  
 
2 Kohli and Shue, “State Power and Social Forces,” in Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, State Power and Social 
Forces, 298-301. 
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with different sectors of society.3 My work takes the view that the state and those who 
rule it, regardless of regime type, is an oppressive and predatory actor whose principal 
purpose is to acquire control over people, property, and power.4 Changing the 
fundamental assumptions regarding the state and its rulers leads to a markedly different 
interpretation of the sociopolitical dynamics that prop up political systems.  
Literature Review 
The literature on democratization has evolved in fits and starts, and is often highly 
regionalized. “Waves” of democratization have been clustered in regional blocks, leading 
scholars to offer different explanations for its emergence. If there is a grand theory on the 
emergence of democracy over time, it centers on its relationship to economic 
development and class politics.  
Early Modernization and the Middle Class. Early scholars working in the comparative 
historical tradition pointed out the connections between economic development and the 
emergence of democratic institutions. The earliest democratizations are thought to be 
driven by the emergence of the middle class in the wake of economic modernization. In 
the absence of the feudal lords who were off fighting the Crusades, cities began to 
develop, increasingly becoming the hub of trade and capital accumulation.5 The growth 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, especially chap. 2 “The Theory of Predatory Rule.” See 
also Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In; Skocpol, States and Social 
Revolutions.  
 
4 For a similar perspective, see Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, chapter 5. See also Scott, The Art of Not Being 
Governed. 
 
5 Blaydes and Paik, “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation,” 551. 
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of towns led to the emergence of a new political group: the “burghers” or town dwellers.6 
This new group of townspeople drove the development of production, commerce, 
education, and eventually, the social and political institutions that would be the precursor 
to modern democracy.7 The accumulation of capital and the rise of trans-local trade 
began to generate an interest in protecting the means of trade: namely, individual 
property rights.8 As this emergent capitalist class gradually eclipsed the nobility in 
economic influence, governments began to incorporate their interests, often in 
representative institutions.9 Barrington Moore contributes a critical stipulation to 
modernization theory. As the old aristocracy was eclipsed by the rising merchant class 
and capital as the new basis of economic organization, it undermined the old system of 
political order. However, the new political order that would replace this depended on how 
the landed elite reacted to economic modernization. Democracy was only possible where 
the old elite transformed or fused into the new bourgeoisie.10  
These accounts of the rise of the middle class out of Medieval Europe remained 
influential in explanations for the roots of stable democracy today. Economic 
development is often cited as a key condition that encourages the development of stable 
                                                          
 
6 Spruyt, “Institutional Selection in International Relations,” 538. 
 
7 Engels, “The Decline of Feudalism and the Rise of the Bourgeoisie,” 445. 
 
8 Engels. 
 
9 Tilly, “Entanglements of European Cities and States,” in Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of 
States in Europe, 23. See also Stasavage, Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe's 
Rise, 339.  
 
10 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, passim. 
6 
 
democracies. Modernization theories on later waves of democratization argue that it 
stems from industrialization. The growth of industry leads to increased wealth, education, 
and lower levels of socioeconomic inequality; this tends to moderate politics and gives 
birth to a middle class that produces the right conditions for stable, moderate 
democracy.11 By this account of democratization, economic development exerts an 
indirect impact on regime type through the strength of the middle class.12  
Modernization, the Working Class, and Inequality. As suffrage was extended, the focus 
of democratization shifted from forms of executive restraint to mass inclusion. These 
explanations have in common with Moore the view that political power, interests, and 
outcomes center on class relations. They differ primarily on two axes. First, they see a 
greater role for the lower classes in pushing forward demands for democracy.13 Second, 
while conceding that capitalist development strengthens lower classes and weakens the 
landed upper class, they argue that democratization stems either from demands for 
inclusion or redistribution, not from capitalist interests.14 Scholars who focus on the role 
of the working classes argue that economic growth indirectly influences democratization 
through several mechanisms. Development increases the economic standing of the lower 
classes, raising societal expectations, and producing demands for political freedom and 
                                                          
11 Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” 83. See also Stephens, “Democratic Transition and 
Breakdown in Western Europe,” 1024. 
 
12 Lu, “Middle Class and Democracy,” 157. 
 
13 Collier, Paths Toward Democracy. See also Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist 
Development and Democracy. See also Acemoglu and Robinson, “A Theory of Political Transitions.”  
 
14 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, 271-272. 
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representation.15 The middle class would support a form of “bourgeois democracy” that 
extends political rights to them, but would be uneasy about further inclusion of the lower 
classes, while the lower classes are expected to be the most ardent and consistent 
proponents of democracy.16 Pressure for democratization should come primarily from the 
working class, due to the role industrialization plays in facilitating mass mobilization.17  
Much of the work on working class-driven democratizations assume political cleavages 
are related to socioeconomic inequalities: wealthy elites are the rulers of nondemocratic 
societies, while the power of the masses is in the threat of revolution.18 Democratizations 
are a result of pressure from below on the elites, who are forced to extend political 
inclusion to the masses. Two modifications to this theory followed. One line of work 
starts to move away from modernization theory, focusing primarily on class conflict over 
socioeconomic inequality. Authors differ on to what extent those inequalities stem from 
development itself, and whether inequality encourages or inhibits democracy.    
Theories based on socioeconomic inequality share a common assumption that democracy 
is at least in part about redistribution. The wealthy fear that democratization will bring 
about demands for redistribution of wealth. In accordance with their economic interests, 
                                                          
15 Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, “Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis,” 903. See 
also Lipset, “Some Social Requisites.” See also Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 
 
16 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, 5-6. 
 
17 Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, 11. See also Stephens, “Democratic Transition and 
Breakdown,” 1024. See also Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and 
Democracy.  
 
18 Ansell and Samuels, “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” 1543. 
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elites will be against democratization, and lower classes will be in favor of it. Where the 
ruling elite hold the preponderance of wealth, they will be incentivized to oppose 
pressures for democratization, making it less likely at higher levels of inequality.19 
Likewise, elites are more incentivized to reverse or rollback democracy at higher levels 
of inequality as a reaction to redistribution.20 While this represents the conventional 
wisdom on inequality, there is no consensus in the literature. Ansell and Samuels point 
out that the process of economic development often generates increased income 
inequality in its initial stages, as a newly wealthy economic group emerges; these rising 
groups will seek political representation, leading to pressures for democratization at the 
same time the modernization process is increasing levels of inequality. 21  Houle brings 
up the role played by a country’s overall income level, arguing that this alters the effect 
of inequality on democratization. Under a high level of development, state capacity to 
repress is high, so inequality impedes democracy. Under low levels of development, the 
state has no capacity to redistribute, so there is no incentive to support or oppose 
democratization; thus, inequality should have little bearing on democratization where 
development is very low. When states are in a middle-income range, inequality fosters 
democracy through the mechanism of redistributive demands.22 When these dynamics are 
taken into consideration, democratization is most likely at middle levels of inequality. 
                                                          
19 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution, 3. 
 
20 Acemoglu and Robinson, “Theory of Political Transitions.” 
 
21 Ansell and Samuels, “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” 1545. 
 
22 Houle, “Inequality, Economic Development, and Democratization,” 505. 
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Houle’s work is relatively unique in the inequality literature in that it carves out a distinct 
role for the state, but the primary axis of conflict is still along class lines.  
Another line of work on democratization does away with the assumption that elites only 
democratize in response to pressure from below. Current work on regime change 
emphasizes political incentives that may lead to democratization from above. Collier 
analyzes democratization as an interactive process of strategic maneuvering by the elite 
combined with class mobilization from below.23  
Bringing the Political Back. The most recent wave of democratizations has produced a 
shift from the focus on structural conditions based on economic development and class 
relations to agent-based explanations centered on the choices of political actors. The 
emergence of this type of voluntarist explanation for modern regime change is heavily 
influenced by Linz and Stepan’s description of the breakdown of democratic regimes. 
Though Linz and Stepan’s work examines the stages of democratic breakdown (rather 
than emergence), the approach of juxtaposing structural context with agent choice 
marked a major shift in the literature. Strategic interaction, particularly between the 
regime and opposition, or among elites in the incumbent regime, plays a central role in 
contemporary accounts of democratic transitions. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter’s influential work differentiates between periods of stability and 
the process of transition. Transition periods are characterized by uncertainty and disorder, 
                                                          
23 Collier, Paths Toward Democracy.  
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which is inherently unpredictable.24 This complex process of transition is driven by the 
interaction of context, incentives, and strategic negotiation. They argue that the economic 
interests and class politics are less relevant during these periods of transition, where the 
strategic interaction of key actors in one stage has unanticipated consequences for later 
developments.25  
Under these conditions, it is more important to examine short-term political calculations 
and interactive consequences. Underlying causes of democratization stem from 
international forces such as the spread of democratic values, global economic growth, and 
pressure from the West; but the proximate causers of democratization are domestic.26 
Transitions are marked by divisions within authoritarian regimes between hard-liners and 
soft-liners, a growing opposition that can take advantage of windows of opportunity, and 
defections by key elites.27 The ruling elite are motivated by political objectives: namely, 
to attain or preserve their political position. Democratic transitions are driven by elites 
who see an opportunity in it to further their interests. Haggard and Kaufman argue that 
the ingroup/outgroup dynamics within the ruling elite are a more potent factor in regime 
change than the economic undercurrents in society: either elite outgroups and defectors 
from the sitting regime see a potential gain for them in democratic opening, or the 
                                                          
24 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4-6. 
 
25 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 5-6. 
 
26 Huntington, The Third Wave. See also O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
 
27 Huntington, The Third Wave. See also Bunce and Wolchik, “Defeating Dictators.” See also O’Donnell 
and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 15-16. 
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incumbent ruler believes they can control the design of democratic institutions to protect 
their position.28 One of the key issues they highlight is that inequality has mixed effects 
on democratic transitions and later reversals. Distributive conflict is present in only half 
of all transitions, and even less so with reversions, calling into question theories based on 
inequality and distributive conflict.29 They steer the literature toward political accounts, 
noting that economic forces play a greater role in long-term stability, but is not a reliable 
predictor of the emergence of democracy. 
Reversions, Reversals, and Backsliding. It is surprising that this last observation by 
Haggard and Kaufman is not part of a much larger body of literature                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
. The realization that the reasons for the emergence of institutional democracy in the 
modern era, and the causes of the long-term stability of that democracy, are different, is a 
major breakthrough in advancing the literature. The democratic transitions and 
subsequent reversals throughout the developing world has woken scholars to this. Several 
major works have since submitted that the factors that contribute to the initial 
establishment of democracy are different than what is needed for long-term viability,30 
which has led to a separate body of literature on democratic stability. Modern transitions 
to democracy are frequently characterized by backsliding, reversion, and failure to 
consolidate.31 Scholars have sought to explain how and why this occurs, but no 
                                                          
28 Haggard and Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change,” 496.  
 
29 Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, 13. 
 
30 Huntington, The Third Wave. See also Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats. See also 
O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
 
31 Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, 1. 
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systematic explanation has yet emerged for why this is so much more common in later 
waves of democratization. 
The most prominent line of work on democratic reversals follows the third wave trend of 
looking to domestic political dynamics for answers. Reversions are often the result either 
of populist authoritarians elected to office on the promise of greater redistribution, or 
conflict among elite factions that lead to a coup.32 Interactions between the incumbents 
and opposition, the radicals and moderates, or the reformers and conservatives within the 
elite are the key dynamics that influence political outcomes.33 While modernization 
theory dominates in the democratization literature, the issues that topple democracies are 
different from those that undermine autocracy. Most democratic regimes are brought 
down by conspiracies involving a few key actors (usually elites),34 which explains the 
focus on political factors in the reversion literature.   
The interaction of domestic political actors during periods of transition are thought to 
have far-reaching consequences for political outcomes. This is partly an epistemological 
shift in the literature. Political leadership and the choices of key actors are important 
elements of understanding what happened and why. These choices are made in the 
context of opportunities and constraints that stem from structural characteristics of 
societies, and the choices made in turn influence future opportunities and constraints. 
                                                          
32 Haggard and Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change,” 496. 
 
33 Huntington, The Third Wave. 
 
34 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 18.  
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This gives greater agency to individual actors, making broad theoretical claims difficult. 
Patterns do emerge from this, most notably, that individual actors confronted with similar 
situations are likely to react in ways that contribute to breakdown.35  
Political factors such as legitimacy and effectiveness of the sitting regime,36 and the 
efficacy of democratic institutions37 are also influential in the literature on democratic 
breakdown. Legitimacy is key to overall stability; most regimes that fall lose the 
perceived legitimacy of either the political or socioeconomic order, if not both.38 Much 
has been written on the varieties of institutional design, debating the merits of 
presidential versus parliamentary systems and different forms of electoral rules.39 
Presidential systems are found to be less stable than parliamentary ones, though authors 
disagree as to the reasons. Regardless of the type of system employed, there is a general 
consensus that strong, organized states and parties are a hallmark of stable democratic 
governance.40 Still, this does not explain the variance in state capacity exhibited by 
democracies who revert, nor the survival of some who do not.  
                                                          
35 Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. 
 
36 Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes; Huntington Political Order in Changing 
Societies. 
 
37 Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy. See also Mainwaring and Shugart, 
Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. See also Przeworski et al., Democracy and 
Development. See also Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. 
 
38 Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. 
 
39 Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy. See also Lijphart and Waisman, eds., 
Institutional Design in New Democracies. See also Stepan and Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and 
Democratic Consolidation.” 
 
40 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. See also Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation. 
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Svolik takes to task the assumption embedded in this literature that authoritarian reversals 
are synonymous with a failure to consolidate democracy. He points out that consolidated 
democracies are not at risk of reversal, but transitional democracies may or may not 
collapse, due to a variety of factors.41 Since the factors that explain whether a democracy 
is consolidated differ from those that explain the risk of authoritarian reversals in 
transitional democracies, survival and reversion are two different phenomena that need 
two separate theories.42 This is complicated by the fact that we have no substantive 
definition of democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is understood as the 
absence of regime breakdown following two consecutive and democratically held 
elections.43 The problem with this definition is that it doesn’t offer any identifiable 
characteristics of consolidation, only a time frame after which a democracy is considered 
to be consolidated. We do know that the longer a democracy exists, the less likely it is to 
revert,44 but little is known about what indicates democratic consolidation. Since we can’t 
directly observe whether a democracy is consolidated, it is difficult to separate the factors 
that lead to breakdown from those that indicate consolidation.  
Some clues might be found in Haggard and Kaufman’s unheeded observation: economic 
forces play a greater role in long-term stability, but is not a reliable predictor of the 
emergence of democracy. The literature on the democracies of the developing world has 
                                                          
 
41 Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation,” 153. 
 
42 Svolik, 154. See also O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 18.  
 
43 Yashar, “Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America,” 98. 
 
44 Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation,” 155. 
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largely dismissed modernization theory because of its inability to explain democratic 
transitions there. With this premature dismissal, scholars have largely overlooked that 
pieces of it might play a major role in the underpinnings of democratic stability (or rather, 
the lack thereof). There is a general consensus in the literature on the relationship 
between economic development and the existence of democracy, though not on a 
relationship between economic development and the process of democratization. This 
would seem to suggest that economic development has something to do with democratic 
consolidation and survival.45  
Though the literature on democratic consolidation touches on the question of what drives 
democratic failure, it is limited in its explanations by the obsession with measurement. 
This insistence on not making theoretical contributions without precise empirical 
measurement is puzzling in light of Svolik’s observation that there is no way to directly 
observe whether or not a democracy is consolidated.46 In its quest for measurability, 
scholarship converges around questions of what causes democracy to formally appear, 
and neglects deeper questions about what makes it sustainable. If these investigations are 
undertaken by anyone, it is by political philosophers debating the merits of democratic 
forms of government. Mainstream political science, by avoiding engagement with these 
questions, is missing out on key insights into what democratic governance must be built 
on to be authentic and lasting. Though it may at times depart slightly from the well-
beaten path, this is what this dissertation attempts to explore.  
                                                          
45 Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, 2.  
 
46 Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation,” 166. 
16 
 
Revisiting Modernization Theory. Even in the midst of the current trend toward political 
explanations, research on regime type has repeatedly returned to the question of 
economic growth as a precursor to, and predictor of, democracy. The level of economic 
development is still identified as a key indicator of democratic stability in that the higher 
it is, the more likely a democracy is to consolidate. Using statistical methods developed 
since the publication of early work, later scholars question the validity of this conclusion. 
Przeworski and Limongi resuscitate the argument, asking whether the correlation 
between wealth and democracy is a result of economic development or merely the greater 
political stability of wealthy countries. They point out that if economic development 
necessarily leads to democracy through the increasing complexity of society as it 
industrializes, there must be some threshold of development at which an authoritarian 
government will fall and be replaced by democracy; but there is not.47 Though they do 
not offer an alternate theory of how or why democracies do emerge, it is notable that they 
find no evidence to suggest economic growth leads to democratization. The level of 
development does not instigate the emergence of democracy, but they persuasively 
demonstrate that democracy is much more likely to survive in economically developed 
states. This would seem to resolve the issue, except that they only include 
democratizations that occur after 1950.  
Boix and Stokes extend the data to include early democratizations in Western Europe, 
which reveals a more nuanced relationship between economic and political development. 
                                                          
47 Przeworski and Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” 158.  
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They demonstrate that prior to World War II, the relationship between economic growth 
and democratization stands, but after World War II, democracies appear without regard to 
economic development, though the wealthy ones are more likely to survive. 48 A second 
puzzle emerges from this: what has so fundamentally changed that would cause this 
relationship to disappear? I argue that nothing has changed since Moore’s observation of 
the underlying economic changes that must take place to lead to representative 
governance. Rather, scholars have changed the way they define democracy, modern 
rulers have learned to manipulate the system within which they rule, and most of today’s 
emergent democracies are not democracies at all.  
Democracy in Africa. Since the analysis in this dissertation will focus on Africa, a brief 
review of the literature specifically on this continent is due. Despite Africa’s wave of 
democratization, authoritarian backsliding has been common. The distinction between 
autocracy and democracy has been problematic in Africa because many developing states 
classified as democracies are based on institutions that have been unstable. Over the last 
half century, a number of states have frequently vacillated between one regime type and 
the other. Persistent features of governance, such as clientelism, corruption, predatory 
revenue extraction, and other authoritarian tendencies have not been as fluid as the 
mechanisms for ruler selection. Under these circumstances, conclusions about the 
relationship between regime type, which has in these cases changed rapidly, and overall 
economic development, which is a gradual process, are questionable.  
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Work on the relationship between economic growth and political stability has repeatedly 
demonstrated the connection between democratization and income. However, recent 
work found that the data in Africa doesn’t match up: countries in Africa are currently 
more democratic than their income levels would predict.49 This suggests that in Africa, 
the setup of democratic institutions has outstripped, or at least preceded, the fundamental 
societal changes that must occur in order to produce stable, quality democracy. The 
stronger the private sector becomes, the better it can resist predation by the state,50 but in 
African democracies, the private sector has never been permitted to flourish. The lack of 
indigenous capital accumulation and economic development is an indicator that society 
does not have the clout it needs to hold the state accountable. Democratic institutions in 
this context should not be expected to fare well for very long. My theory postulates that 
late developing states have deliberately chosen to keep the private sector too weak to 
successfully resist harmful state policies, and it is this persistent imbalance in power 
relations between the state and society that undermines both economic development and 
democratic governance.  
The agriculture sector is particularly salient to this dynamic for several reasons: it is 
characteristically the largest sector of the economy in underdeveloped states, and it 
dominates economic activity in the rural areas that determine the social structure of 
society. There is some evidence that governments throughout Africa deliberately 
discriminate against agricultural producers, particularly those who produce for 
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commercial export.51 The bulk of the theoretical work posits that this is a byproduct of 
developing states’ emphasis on urban areas. Some scholars point to urban bias as the 
culprit, arguing that this is a result of the desire for rapid industrialization in developing 
states. This leads the ruler, regardless of regime type, to prioritize the needs of urban 
industry and shift resources from rural, agricultural to urban, industrial areas. The state 
extracts resources (primarily tax revenue) from rural farmers to finance industrialization. 
This predatory behavior stunts the growth of agriculture production and inhibits the 
development of free markets.52  
Some scholars see this as a structural feature of late development, wherein the state must 
shift resources to support industry in an attempt to compete with the developed world.53 
Other authors view urban bias as a political choice. Bates argues that it is a matter of 
political survival: rulers use the tax revenue extracted from agricultural production to buy 
off the support of the urban poor. Agricultural policies, particularly those that interfere 
with market prices, are likewise designed to garner urban support for the regime.54 The 
line of contention between the two is over whether urban bias is a result of structural 
economic constraints or a political choice. Neither fully identifies how those political 
choices are embedded in those constraints; both look at agricultural policies as a result of 
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political-economic variables. My theory goes farther in exploring how those policies 
impact the way economic development unfolds and its implications for democracy.  
While Bates doesn’t distinguish between regime types directly in this work, later work 
finds that policy can vary under different types of regimes. Authoritarian governments 
formulate policy to address the interests of powerful groups that could potentially 
organize against the regime.55 Under autocratic rule, which is more widespread in the 
developing world, the ruler must satisfy the urban population to avoid revolt. Rural 
populations, on the other hand, are too scattered to pose a real threat. This explains the 
tendency for the state to favor urban over rural interests and produce policies biased 
against agriculture producers. Under democracy, rulers respond to electoral incentives; 
because they must address the needs of rural voters, shifting to democratic rule produces 
agriculture policies that are more favorable toward farmers, especially when elections are 
competitive.56  
Though this explanation seems self-evident, this contradicts findings in the civil war 
literature, which shows that most rebellions are based in rural areas. Later authors catch 
this paradox, concluding that in cases where the threat of insurrection from rural areas is 
more acute, politicians will produce more pro-rural policies.57 This is a recurring feature 
of autocratic governments, where citizens can only hold the state accountable through a 
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threat to its political survival.58 The location of the group or class with the power to 
threaten the regime’s survival has a significant impact on policy. For example, where 
there is a landholding elite in rural areas, they can compel the ruler to account for their 
interests, which often center on agriculture policy.59 Taken together, this suggests that 
underlying power dynamics, not regime type, is the most important determinate of policy 
results. My theory aims to address this issue by focusing not on the regime type under 
which a state is officially classified, but on the power structure that underlies state-society 
relations.  
A closer look at these dynamics in the African context reveals an imbalanced picture of 
power relations. Catherine Boone argues that the state deliberately encourages rent-
seeking behavior in its rural elite. The landholding class is not necessarily able to hold 
state leaders to account. Rather, the state uses patronage and clientelism to control the 
landholding class. In her case study of Senegal, she demonstrates how this dynamic has 
undermined the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie class that was so crucial to the 
development of the early democracies.60 These clientelistic policies have been blamed for 
the persistent economic problems in Africa. Though it inhibits development and 
undermines accountability, state elites are incentivized to continue the practice because it 
protects their access to resources, and props up their political positions. 61  
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This “predation” by the state dampens development, but it also affects political stability. 
If the state restrains itself from extracting rents by impeding market access, controlling 
access to factors of production (labor, capital, inputs, etc.), altering prices, expropriating 
profit, engaging in corruption, and other means the state has of predating, firms 
increasingly shift from the informal to the modern sector and the economy grows.62 
When the state is predatory, not only does it discourage firms from entering the formal 
sector, where they can be more easily preyed upon, it also causes citizens to resist and 
attempt to overthrow the predatory government.63 Corrupt, predatory governments 
followed by overthrow, followed by another corrupt government, has been a persistent 
feature of politics throughout Africa.  
The literature on agriculture in Africa has been a bit spotty, with few clear lines of 
contention as strong as that in the literature on democratization. There are several 
identifiable gaps. Boone’s work in Senegal comes closest to touching the basis of 
political instability as it relates to the state’s economic policies, and she identifies many 
of the means the state uses to maintain political control, but even this misses the larger 
underlying relationship between agriculture and democracy. Similarly, scholarship that 
looks at regime type also does not examine agricultural structures as a causal factor in 
political outcomes. Its focus is on why different regime types select different policies, but 
it does not examine the causal chain in reverse. Much like the literature on 
democratization, the literature on African agriculture suggests many of the connections 
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outlined in my theory, but overall, has failed to notice the way in which state predation of 
agriculture is entwined with the process of democratization.  
Given the persistent instability of democracy in Africa, it is the best place to start looking 
for answers to the incongruity between democratization (as it is currently understood) and 
democratic consolidation. Though the literature has come to the conclusion that the 
causal forces of each must be different in the modern era, there is little theory offered on 
it. To move beyond the impasse where the democratization and democratic consolidation 
literature now stand, two important puzzles for modern scholars include: 
First, what caused the relationship between economic development and 
democratization to disappear or shift?  
And, what is different about later democratizations that make them prone to 
instability? 
This review of the literature on democratization places the questions addressed by this 
dissertation primarily among the literature on democratic consolidation. The literature 
review began with early modernization theory and its developments since the rise of 
statistical modeling. It addressed some of the main contentions in the literature over the 
role of economic development in democracy and identified several areas where the 
question remains unresolved and where it has, I argue, taken a wrong turn.  
The theoretical chapter picks up here, identifying two major questions of interest, and 
proposing that the answer to both is the same. The theory chapter is broken into give 
major parts: the initial theory about how economic development participates in 
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democratic processes, an argument for redefining democracy in order to better understand 
these processes, a discussion of the interaction between structure and agency in political 
development, and lastly, the connection between democratic quality and democratic 
stability. The theory section is followed by the research design, which details the factors 
taken under consideration, the pros and cons of various research designs, and the reasons 
for my ultimate selection. It also describes the case selection process and makes an 
argument for the suitability of the selected case.  
The analysis chapters then begin in full force with a historical analysis of Ghana’s 
historical development. The first analysis chapter is set during the colonial era, in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, when critical decisions over how to organize agricultural 
production took place. This digs into the structural conditions, how they came to exist, 
and to some extent, why those choices, which set the structural conditions for later 
development, were made in the first place. The following two chapters lay out the 
conditions that existed as a result in the lead up to independence, the institutions that 
survived the turnover to independent governance, and the logic that underlay their 
persistence. They examine both political and economic institutions, with the latter chapter 
focused specifically on the structure of the agriculture sector and its special relationship 
to political outcomes.  
The fourth analysis chapter closely examines the turnover from colonial to independent 
governance. Key choices and the reasons behind them at this point in time were 
considered to be highly instructive as to the causes of post-independence instability. 
Evidence from this time period is given particular attention, due to the political upheaval 
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and potential for structural change embedded in this critical time period, and the personal 
writings of Ghana’s first president are woven into much of the narrative during this 
period. The fifth analysis chapter lifts the curtain on the new democracy, examining more 
deeply how it operated in the years after independence. It also details the leadup to the 
overthrow of Ghana’s first democratic government. The remaining analysis chapter 
discusses the entrenchment of institutions, briefly examining possible parallels in 
subsequent coups and exploring the underlying causes of cyclical instability.  
I conclude by summarizing the connections drawn out in each individual chapter, how 
they link together, and contemplate possible implications drawn from this case that may 
be applicable more generally. The dissertation ends with some bold and unusual 
suggestions for future research with the potential to carry these findings to broader 
conclusions.  
Theory 
For both questions, the answer I propose is the same. Even as the economy grows, 
economic independence of society from the state is not necessarily developing. When 
today’s emerging democracies appear without regard to economic measures such as per 
capita wealth or overall GDP, it is because these are not accurate representations of the 
economic preconditions for democratic governance. These so-called democracies often 
remain quasi-authoritarian and prone to reversal because they are emerging without the 
development of the economic clout or the alignment of economic interests than can 
constrain political power. This ability to constrain is key: consolidation requires reliable 
and consistent governance that doesn’t run to extremes. Consolidation, then, is not 
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merely about the level, but the type, of economic development, and its degree of 
separation from politics. New democratic societies without this history may have the 
outer trappings of but their governments will not find themselves constrained in the way 
today’s stable democracies were at their outset.  
This is largely a consequence of historical developments outside the control of 
contemporary actors. The type and degree of economic development at the time a ruler 
comes to power sets the underlying conditions of rule, and determines the relative 
strength of different socioeconomic groups that exert force on politics. How strong these 
groups are as a state moves into critical decision periods, and what their interests are vis-
à-vis the state depends on structural conditions set long before their significance comes to 
light.  
This does not mean that outcomes are fully predetermined by history. It is at least in part 
a deliberate calculation by political actors, operating under the opportunities and 
constraints unique to their place and time in history. Today’s rulers rule in a later period 
of time with the benefit of hindsight. While early modernizers could not possibly foresee 
the political consequences that would develop centuries later as a result of socioeconomic 
changes, latecomers are well aware that economic modernization once led to 
democratizing pressures. They have learned to manipulate the course of economic 
modernization to alter the constraints under which they hope to rule. This attempt to alter 
the path of economic development and resulting distribution of power has consequences, 
both foreseen and unforeseen, for the quality and stability of democracy.  
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This theory proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the primary goal of the state 
is to acquire and retain power.64 To that end, it will endeavor to maximize the reliability 
of the resources, revenue, and support it needs to maintain or expand control. The state’s 
constraints are determined by the extent to which its officials depend on these outside 
resources. In order to alleviate their constraints and tip the balance of power in its favor, a 
state and its rulers seek to increase the dependence of their supporting base on the state. 
The power of the state to do as it will increases in proportion to how well they achieve 
this. 
Rulers are well aware that they rely on a constant revenue stream to survive, and so they 
must have a source of economic wealth, but they do not want to risk the political 
modernization that has accompanied economic development in the past. In early cases of 
democratization, the fusion of interests between rural landowners and the nascent 
capitalist class of town-dwellers had to occur in opposition to the royal bureaucracy for a 
free society to emerge.65 Averting this alliance in opposition to the ruler is accomplished 
through the two mutually reinforcing tasks of making the country’s wealth reliant on 
political favor, and either eliminating groups with potential economic strength, or 
aligning their interests with that of the political center.  
At the same time, certain choices are only made possible by the historical conditions that 
unfolded in preceding time periods. It is this interaction of structure and agent that this 
dissertation explores. I argue that a context characterized by a small, weak class of 
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economic elites, dependent on the state for their status, is a result of historical conditions 
whose roots are found in the structure of agricultural production. Combined with a state 
that uses this to its advantage to retain control of economic wealth, it produces political 
outcomes that are often far from democratic: a powerful ruler who can operate the state 
like personal property; government that thrives on corruption and cronyism rather than 
accountability and transparency; and a lack of checks and balances to protect minority 
interests and limit the authority of the state.  
Changing direction is not as simple as getting a “good” leader. Scholars and other 
contemporary observers emphasize the need for political leaders to work for the public 
good above private goals and pursue lofty ideals that benefit all. Yet there is no evidence 
that today’s developed democratic societies ever developed out of altruism; there is rather 
more evidence that they developed out of the self-interest of various groups aligning and 
opposing each other in ways that forced compromise from their rulers. This emphasis on 
the “right” personal motivations represents not just a fundamental misunderstanding of 
human nature, but a miscalculation of how far goodwill can go to change national 
trajectories. Decisions made by political rulers are both influenced and reinforced by 
structural constraints. Lamenting that “we just need the right people” seems an odd 
response;66 it is highly doubtful that there have been no good people in the history of 
struggling democracies that have taken up the mantle of political leadership. More likely, 
leaders are simply surviving in the context in which they exist; a highly complex and path 
dependent context in which they have little control beyond the choice next in front of 
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them; choices which are not only influenced, but sometimes severely limited, by the 
environment. 
Sorting out what conditions are structural and what is driven by agent choice is an 
imprecise science. Important political actors enter the scene at a point in time when the 
inertia of history has already set a course. What choices are viable for an actor, and the 
incentives that influence what choice will be made is often determined by events that 
came long before. Significant choices at critical points in time, while shaped by the past, 
in turn affect future constraints. Structure and agency are thus entwined throughout the 
course of history. Sorting out those “critical junctures” and their consequences is a central 
goal of my analysis.  
Reconceptualizing Democracy 
This argument departs from previous literature in defining democracy differently than 
modern scholars. The commonly used procedural definition of democracy centers on the 
freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to 
association, free speech, and other basic freedoms, free and nonviolent competition for 
political office, and provision for the participation of all members of the political 
community. Some authors employ a minimalist definition that focuses only on the 
existence of a democratic electoral process67 or legislative and constitutional 
institutions,68 while others use a sliding (rather than nominal) scale based on how free 
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and fair political competition is.69 None of these commonly used definitions mention 
anything about economic freedom, a notable absence considering the known impact of 
economic development on political outcomes. The literature that comes closest to 
touching on this underlying basis of democratic governance is work on the “resource 
curse.” One explanation for the inverse relationship between oil wealth and democracy is 
that since economic wealth flows straight to the state, it alleviates pressure for 
accountability that under democracy, presumably comes from taxpayers.70 Since oil-rich 
states have an alternate source of revenue, they do not rely on their populations to the 
same degree. In other words, economic wealth, which typically functions as the basis of 
non-political power, is rendered less relevant because the state has an alternate source. 
The resource curse is a stark demonstration of how state ownership of economic wealth 
can rob the population of any leverage it might otherwise have. 
Most studies of democratization rely on quantifiable measures of democratic institutions 
(institutions which themselves have varying efficacy). This is inadequate as a measure of 
democracy because institutions are only useful in achieving quality governance insofar as 
they are used to limit the state, not as a tool for oppression. The same institutions that are 
meant to prevent a ruler from acting arbitrarily can also be used to facilitate full-scale 
predation by an opportunistic ruler.71 Political institutions are based in public authority, 
which makes them fundamentally a struggle over power and resources; they are “the 
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structural means by which political winners pursue their own interests”.72 Generally, they 
are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise the new 
rules.73 If the purpose of the group who controls an institution’s formation is to constrain 
a ruler, and they have the bargaining strength to do so when the institution is formed, then 
the mechanisms of the institution will work in this fashion. However, the inner workings 
of the same institution might also be such that it feeds the ruler’s supremacy; this will 
likely be the result if the institutional setup was dominated by power asymmetries that 
favored the ruler at the time. For example, “representative” assemblies might represent 
opposing interests and serve as a check on the executive. Alternatively, the executive 
might use the same institution to expand his personal network of influence and exercise 
control from the top down. The mechanisms through which the institution operates can be 
formal or informal, but once set, they tend to be durable.74 This isn’t just a chance 
product of the ruler’s personality or choices; which purpose it serves depends on the 
underlying power distribution on which the institution is built. Depending on how they 
are used and who controls them, even democratic institutions can be weapons of 
oppression as well as constraint.  
This is not unique to certain regime types. Those who build institutions tend to design 
them in a way that formalizes and perpetuates existing power asymmetries in their 
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favor.75 I like to demonstrate this principle in my undergraduate courses with a game. 
Students are divided into two teams standing in single file lines and given a simple task: 
they must move as much water as possible from the large container at one end of the line 
to the container at the other end by passing it from team member to team member one 
cup at a time. Whichever team has transferred the most water at the end of the round wins 
that round. The winning team is given a small prize and is permitted to make a rule that 
will apply to all subsequent rounds. Without fail, every group with which I have ever 
conducted this game has, without prompting, made a rule that makes it easier for their 
team to keep winning, and harder for the other team. All this for a much smaller prize 
than political and economic domination (usually it is just a piece of candy).  
It is an excellent demonstration of how institutions work, and the purpose they often 
serve: to secure power for whatever group controls the institution. Whomever writes the 
rules wins; and early decisions and events are critical to determining who that will be. 
Typically whomever wins the first round will continue to win thereafter. A team that 
manages to reverse this pattern once the power dynamic sets in is extremely rare. This is 
why institutions tend to endure for so long: they develop increasingly powerful 
constituencies with a stake in their continuation.76 Once cemented, power resists change, 
and its ability to resist increases over time as power also self-perpetuates. In political 
institutions, it replicates itself through the extension of circles of influence, the 
accumulation of wealth and status, and the ability to make and enforce rules for others. 
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The mere existence of a democratic institution, then, is not an accurate measure without 
knowing more about underlying power asymmetries.  
Alternatively, some studies attempt to measure the degree of liberal notions of free press, 
assembly, expression, et cetera. Like representative institutions, these are only useful to 
the extent they can truly limit the state. Free speech, right to assembly, independent 
media, and other symbols of democracies in no way guarantee this when they can be 
granted or withdrawn at the government’s pleasure. I argue that quality, stable democratic 
development is based solely on the ability to limit the power of the ruler and hold the 
state accountable. Other scholars may contend that the guarantees outlined above 
contribute to limiting what the government can do, but I would counter that it is the other 
way around. Limitations may only be placed on someone or something by an entity more 
powerful than that which it is trying to limit; consider the example of how an assembly 
might be used to increase power or to increase restraint, depending on who possesses the 
ability to control the institution. Only an equal or greater reliance of the government on 
the governed can produce the ability to constrain. In other words, the government must 
rely more heavily on the population than the population does on the government. This 
determines the balance of power that underlies formal institutions and either supports or 
undermines their effectiveness. Otherwise, the state may rescind these “freedoms” at will. 
This is why the defining element of democracy is not in formal institutions that can be 
manipulated or even discarded, but in the underlying balance of power between society 
and state.  
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This is a re-conception of democracy that is both quantitatively minimalist and 
theoretically rich. Though not commonly employed, this is not an original 
conceptualization. Moore offers the following definition of democratization: the struggle 
to check arbitrary rulers, replace arbitrary rules with just and rational ones, and to obtain 
a share for the underlying population in the making of rules.77 This says nothing about the 
particular institutions that must be used to accomplish it, but aims right at the heart of 
democracy’s purpose. In the Western European states where modern democracy first 
appeared, the practice of representation preceded formalized democracy, serving as the 
linkage through which society acquired the ability to exert control over the state.78 It is 
not about the specific institution through which this takes place (such as elections or 
parties, which came much later), but about whether citizens actually have the power to 
hold their government accountable; whether it produces the rule of law over people. The 
rule of people over people can still be produced by elections. Measurements of 
democracy by modern standards do not capture this dynamic.  
The literature has since moved away from this understanding of democracy in both a 
theoretical and empirical sense. The move toward easily measurable concepts is partly 
culpable in missing the change in how new democracies form, and the implications of 
this shift. Many of the commonly employed definitions outlined above are used primarily 
out of utility in order to conduct cross-national, large-N quantitative analyses. While this 
may help us identify overall trends and test existing theories, it eliminates the layered 
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complexities of the process of political, economic, and social transformations. As a result, 
it has left scholars unable to identify the roots of stable democratic governance, 
distracting us from the underlying foundations on which it is built. This is the cause of 
political science’s poor track record for predicting the overturn of so-called democratic 
regimes and a continued inability to explain why some remain stable for centuries while 
others fail.  
2.2 Shift in the drivers of democratization 
Also partly responsible for this failure is the transformation in how we envision 
democracy. Observers point out the difference between establishing representative 
institutions to constrain an absolutist head of state, and fully inclusive democratization. 
For these scholars, the hallmark of democracy is universal suffrage and the equal 
inclusion of the lower classes. The drivers of this more inclusive type of democracy are 
the lower classes, who play a greater role in contemporary democratizations. Their 
observation of the greater visibility of the masses in modern transitions is borne out in the 
evidence. Working-class mobilization was a feature of many of the late 19th and early 20th 
century suffrage movements,79 and labor parties later played a major role throughout the 
1970s and 80s.80 Revolutions, mass protests, and other forms of collective organization 
that end in toppled dictators are driven by the collective efforts of the urban lower 
classes.81  
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However, observations of the increasing role for the lower classes in democratization 
have not considered how this new process of democratization fundamentally alters the 
political outcome. When the process is different than that which occurred in early 
democratizations, the outcome should also be expected to look different, but this is rarely 
discussed beyond the basic observation that suffrage will be more diffuse. Today’s 
transitions differ from early ones in important ways, which have long-lasting implications 
for the degree of freedom that society can actually expect to possess. First, the pressure 
for democracy is no longer coming from a sector with a large degree of independent 
strength. Recall my earlier assertion that something can only be truly limited by an entity 
more powerful than that which it is limiting. Moore’s theory suggests that the first 
requirement for democracy, the struggle to check arbitrary rulers, arises from the 
alignment of powerful segments of society in opposition to the ruler. In the early 
democratizers, the power to limit government was developing with the increased 
economic power of the rising bourgeoisie and a nobility that had turned to commercial 
farming.82 The lower classes have no such base of economic strength.  
Nor do the lower classes have the same vested interest in placing limits on state authority. 
The demands of the lower classes often center on overturn of the social order, responsive 
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government,83 economic redistribution, and mass inclusion.84 This constitutes a 
requirement that government act in a way that suits the interests of a certain societal 
group, not that the government be limited in what it may do. Democratic governance in 
this form is focused on collective demands, rather than individual rights. Demands for 
reform center on redistribution by the state, rather than limitation of the state, because it 
is the state that controls the relevant economic resources. The byproduct is that it is not a 
limitation of government, but an expansion of it, and one that the state may therefore be 
incentivized to encourage.  
This leads to two major incompatibilities with democratic governance. First, the political 
regime in such a transition is not required to place real limits on itself; only find a means 
by which the segments of society that keep the regime in office are satisfied with their 
lot. Rather than the effect of limiting government, this is an empowerment of it, so long 
as the state caters to the right sectors of society through the exercise of its coercive 
power. On the surface, these two forms of democratic revolution may seem to be the 
same, but it amounts to a profoundly different form of government-society relations; one 
that leaves greater power in the hands of the state. Under such conditions, there is little 
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Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Boix, Democracy and 
Redistribution, 171; Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-government, 85-86: “mass publics, at 
least in Eastern Europe and Latin America, conceive of democracy in terms of social and economic 
equality.”  
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protection for minority interests, such as checks and balances, secure property rights, or 
absolute “lines in the sand” on what the state can involve itself in. If these constraints do 
not take root before elections are introduced, the ballot box (a manipulatable institution) 
can be used to do or take anything a popular ruler so chooses.  
Second, the state ultimately undermines itself by tying economic to political control, 
particularly in the context of underdevelopment, because it stakes its survival on its 
ability to deliver economic outcomes. For representative democracies that emerged 
gradually as a result of the process of economic development, the state’s job was in some 
respects, much simpler. Under these conditions, strong social forces already 
independently possess significant degrees of wealth before the government becomes 
democratic. Stabilizing whatever regime represents political authority (in this case, 
democracy) requires only that the regime guarantee the security of that property. The 
absence of strong property-owning classes at the time of democratization should thus be a 
warning sign. For states that undergo “democratic” transitions to electoral democracy 
under conditions of low levels of development, the state must secure the stability of the 
political regime by actually generating that wealth for the population, or risk the entire 
political system losing its legitimacy. For the state who stands as the primary arbiter of 
economic allocation, it will bear the full brunt of the blame when economic outcomes 
don’t meet expectations, and the political regime will stand accused of not following 
through on its fundamental purpose. Even in developed democratic states, elected rulers 
are called to account for economic woes (whether justly or not); but in these cases, 
democracy itself, based on guaranteeing individual property rights, has still upheld its 
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promise. For the democracy emerging undeveloped, it has not done so. This leads to a 
deeper sort of political dissatisfaction, for this discontent hits at the perceived purpose of 
democratic governance, and the population will hardly balk at nondemocratic forms of 
regime change in order to remedy it. 
This shift between early and contemporary democratizations has been missed for two 
reasons. The first is the emphasis on inter-class conflict. Theories that highlight the role 
of the working class or the level of inequality have in common an overemphasis on the 
struggle between classes, and inattention to how it impacts the relationship between 
society and the state. The line of demarcation between scholars is over socioeconomic 
inequality: either the lower classes seek redistribution through democracy and the elite 
resist,85 or the lower classes seek democracy as resistance to elite expropriation of their 
property.86 These two viewpoints often lead to disparate conclusions on the compatibility 
of democracy and private property. The first sees the two as incompatible: in this view, it 
leads to social and economic inequalities that challenge the political equality democracy 
promises. The latter viewpoint sees private property as crucial to democratic governance, 
because it protects the lower classes from arbitrary expropriation by the political elite. 
Boone identifies this as a potential key to understanding instability in Africa: she argues 
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that the failure to develop these rights prior to the introduction of democratic processes 
left everything “up for grabs at once,” raising the stakes of politics.87 
I clearly take the second view, given the inherent protections from the state embedded in 
property rights, and given that the type of semi-democratic regimes under investigation 
here are frequently accused of just such arbitrary expropriation. However, this line of 
contention also misses a bigger picture in terms of how the difference can impact 
democratic stability. Where a propertied bourgeoisie drives democratization, individual 
protections from the coercive power of the state will precede suffrage, because their 
foremost concern is protecting their property. If this class is nonexistent or too small to 
participate meaningfully in the construction of representative democracy, then elections 
will likely emerge first, resulting in twin outcomes that undermine stability: a state 
without effective limitations on itself, and a populace that expects that state to deliver all 
manner of economic outcomes.  
Under these conditions, whomever controls the resources of the state may use them to 
exploit or redistribute as needed for political ends through the use of the state’s coercive 
power. This often includes the use of state resources to secure private wealth, which is 
incompatible with accountable, transparent government (both supposed to be pillars of 
democracy).  Whomever “loses” in this political arrangement will find themselves 
without built-in protections, and will react by attempting to acquire the power of the state 
by any means available to them. When these means include violent overthrow, coups, and 
                                                          
87 Boone, “Electoral Populism Where Property Rights are Weak,” 15. 
41 
 
other non-democratic forms of regime change, this is incompatible with stable democratic 
government. More often than not, the struggle to control state resources will include both.  
The focus of the struggle for political and economic power in this theory differs from the 
conventional approach. The primary axis of conflict in existing theories of inequality is 
among the classes. Previous theories argue that inequality can be a threat to democracy 
because the economic elites have the power to undermine or overthrow democratic rule.88 
This represents a view of the state primarily as an arbiter of the ruling class. In this view, 
under autocracy, the wealthy elite rule, while democracy is rule by the masses. Authors 
differ on the implications of this. Where the masses rule, either they will use the state to 
expropriate wealth from those above them on the economic ladder through the vote, or 
those with economic power will roll back democracy to prevent this from occurring. 
Though not necessarily incorrect, these stories are incomplete. The major shortcoming of 
both views is the failure to distinguish the state from the ruling class. Most theories of the 
state fall into one of two views: either the contract theory approach wherein the state 
provides services in exchange for revenue, or the predatory theory wherein the state is 
considered the agent of a group or class and its function is to extract income from the rest 
in the interest of the that class.89 There is also, however, the predatory state that does not 
redistribute most of the resources it captures, or does so in  a way that doesn’t represent a 
certain class other than those that belong to the state apparatus itself. This demonstrates 
two things: first, that the state is separate from society and the classes that make it up; and 
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two, that has interests and agency of its own. This theory treats the state as an 
independent actor whose goals and interests stem from the need to accumulate the only 
resource that maintains its existence: power. Still, which class drives democratization has 
important implications for the sources of state power and the degree to which it can 
employ it arbitrarily. This theory recognizes the distinct interests of the state and 
repositions the main axis of political and economic conflict not among the classes, but 
between classes and the state.  
Despite the emphasis in the inequality literature on this ‘Robin Hood Story’ that the poor 
seek redistribution from the wealthy through the vote, this actually represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the tale of Robin Hood. Though it has become a 
parable of wealth redistribution in contemporary society, the story was never about taking 
from the rich to give to the poor. The tale is about the state stealing from everyone (thus 
keeping people poor); Robin Hood merely returns their rightful property. In this sense, 
the author of Robin Hood has already written the logical end to this theory. Confusion 
over the source of tension in this story is emblematic of (and perhaps even causal in) the 
misdirection of the literature.  
The role of agriculture in political and economic development  
In the earliest developing democracies, the growth of towns and the economic activity 
associated with their development produced a new political class.90 These “burgher 
dwellers” made their livelihood in merchant and commercial enterprises, developing a 
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shared interest with the emerging commercial farmer in limiting what the government 
could do in the market. As the locus of economic power began to shift, rulers were forced 
to incorporate their interests in the form of representative institutions.91 These rising 
economic classes emerged as entities powerful enough to compel the ruler to recognize 
contractual and property rights, with “long-term implications for the development of 
executive constraint.”92 Admittedly, it is unlikely that the same process can and will 
unfold in subsequent centuries and in disparate regions. Many of the drivers of this result 
were particular to the time and place in which it happened, but several pieces can be 
extracted from this that are probably necessary, in one form or another, in order to enjoy 
a similarly democratic outcome. Significant economic and social changes have to occur; 
though they may not be identical to the way it has unfolded in the past, they do have to be 
transformations capable of producing a society with the ability to constrain its own rulers. 
This transformation is rooted in agricultural modernization, offering first rural, then 
urban, dwellers a source of economic wealth not dependent on the whims of a beneficent 
ruler. Technological developments allow more efficient production and increasing 
commercialization of food products. Commercialization extends beyond simply selling 
products in a local market; it is defined by the move from the traditional sector to the 
modern where industrial firms utilize new technologies and physical capital on a 
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relatively large scale.93 In the modern world, it must mean more than simply market 
orientation; it also implies large scale, mechanized production technologies that can 
produce enough to supply growing trans-local markets.94 This propels economic 
development in several ways. Consolidating and commercializing agriculture increases 
overall output and makes production more efficient. The increase in food security and 
decrease in manpower needed to cultivate the land enables small subsistence farmers to 
either sell the land and move into town, or make a living off the land rather than live at 
subsistence level.95  
The natural byproduct of this commercial transformation is that consolidation into large 
production facilities will transform agriculture-based peasant societies. The peasant class 
that once worked small plots of land primarily for their own subsistence disappears into 
the annals of history. Rural dwellers either rise to own plots of land large enough and 
capital significant enough to invest in new production methods, and produce a marketable 
surplus; or they become part of an urban working class in growing cities and towns.96 The 
emergence of a robust class of urban tradesmen, merchants, and eventually, industrialists, 
depends on the ability of a small percentage of the population to be able to produce 
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enough to feed the rest. This is only possible when agriculture is thoroughly commercial 
and mass produced. When food supply is secure, it generates demand for non-essential 
goods that births new industries; this enables specialization and local trade, and 
encourages the development of the transportation and communication infrastructure 
necessary for trans-local economic activity.  
This has a transformative effect on power relations between the ruler and the rural 
classes. When rural economic activity is based on commercial farming, rural landholders 
gain a source of wealth and power independent from the state. As they begin to develop 
interdependent supply chains with urban centers, they find a common interest with the 
urban dwelling capitalist class in limiting state interference in the market. On a deeper 
level, what develops with this transformation is economic power independent from 
political power. The independence of that wealth is key: this point is far more vital to 
limiting absolutist control than the setup of democratic institutions.  
Absent the modernization of production methods and the resulting alteration of rural 
society, the land and capital accumulation that produces a class of rural landholding class 
oriented toward commercial production cannot emerge to demand from the state 
individual property rights and restraint in markets. Without this class of commercial 
producers to produce enough food to support a growing urban population, 
industrialization will also have difficulty flourishing. Without the rural development to 
permit it, no urban bourgeoisie of any significant size or wealth, that class of such 
significance in democratic development, can emerge either. Accordingly, without the 
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widespread commercialization of agriculture, society cannot develop the independent 
economic power to counterbalance the ruler.  
All states are, to some degree, predatory insofar as they exist to control people and must 
coercively extract resources from the people they control in order to do so. There are no 
completely benign states, as it would cease to exist if it did not employ coercion, power, 
and control over others to extract the wealth it needs to function. The degree to which 
states predate is also not a matter of whether or not officials use public resources for 
private ends. It is a function of to what degree society can use the very mechanism of 
control (the state’s need for economic resources) to constrain their own state. To possess 
the bargaining strength to do this, wealth must be created, accumulated, and controlled 
primarily by private citizens. The state’s need for revenue, and the possession of 
independent wealth by members of society, is what makes the ruler dependent on the 
ruled, and thus, what gives the ruled power.  
A change in relative power (such as a new source of wealth) that improves bargaining 
strength vis-à-vis the ruler can force the state to make concessions, often as an exchange 
of private wealth for public representation. The root cause of democracy, defined in terms 
of the ability to check arbitrary rulers, is the ability of the population to acquire and own 
wealth independent of the state, and therefore make the ruler more dependent on them for 
revenue than they were on the ruler. Where this is not the case, the state has virtually no 
limits to what it can take and what it can do with what it takes. Further, without this 
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constraint, the state can make profitable industry its private preserve for selected 
favorites.97 
Definitions of the state used by scholars tend to center on political institutions, rule-
making authority, the ability to enforce its rulings, and a monopoly on the use of 
violence. States throughout large parts of the developing world, such as Africa, struggle 
to meet these standards: often they have low legitimacy, inept and unstable institutions, 
and limited integration throughout the countryside. An entire body of research is 
dedicated to exploring the causes of persistent state weakness in Africa, arguing that the 
state-building processes undertaken in Europe largely as a consequence of territorial 
conflicts, have been absent in Africa, resulting in states with less incentive and less 
ability to consolidate power, extract resources, and unify a national polity.98 
We call these states weak states, yet they hold a seat of power in a capital city, make 
decisions at the national level, eliminate political opposition, and extract resources from 
the population that lives within its borders (with a few exceptions). The definition we 
commonly employ refers only to political and sometimes to physical power, but those are 
not the only forms of power a state can use. African states often appear weak because 
they lack forms of political power: legitimacy, monopolistic rule-making authority, and 
strong public institutions. Power is the “currency states use to achieve their ends;”99 so if 
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it lacks one form of power, it will use another. With only a small handful of exceptions, 
most states in the developing world still have the means of employing significant power 
over their citizens; so much in fact, that they have been able to appropriate much of the 
surplus produced within their borders, dampen economic development, and prevent the 
emergence of alliances within society that might threaten their dominance. A more 
accurate depiction of this type of state would categorize certain institutions as strong 
(such as the presidency or executive), but the constraining institutions of state as weak. 
Unfortunately, this distribution of power does not bode well for democratic functioning, 
regardless whether democratic institutions exist on paper. 
The goal is not necessarily to produce a weaker state, but rather a state in its proper role 
as the holder of political power. A state strong enough to underpin economic activity by 
guaranteeing rule of law, particularly as it relates to property rights, is actually crucial. To 
encourage the type of economic development that reinforces stable government, the state 
must have sufficient political power to establish reliable property rights. This can only 
occur where two conditions are met: the state must have an absolute monopoly on 
political power, defined as the ability to set and enforce laws. Second, private individuals 
must hold the preponderance of sources of economic wealth, sufficient to have the 
bargaining power to induce the state to underwrite laws favorable to accumulation and 
investment. The sequence of development matters as well: a relatively strong state in 
terms of political and territorial control must precede the rise of an independent economic 
elite, so that the state can uphold the law throughout the country, rather than become a 
mere agent of the upper class. The subsequent rise of an economic elite with significant 
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bargaining power fosters mutual dependence and serves as a form of constraint on the 
state. Out of this mutual dependence develops representative governance, and eventually, 
electoral democracy.  
If these middle steps are skipped over in the rush to elections, and the economic elite are 
not first able to establish limits on the state, elections can ultimately lead to undemocratic 
politics. A popular elected leader and his associated political actors can take advantage of 
democratic institutions to appropriate resources, preventing capital (the private sector’s 
primary source of power) from accumulating. The state can run roughshod over industry, 
and those with their fingers in the pot of state resources can use it for anything from 
building patronage-based political networks to siphoning off personal wealth. Without a 
strong elite who retains ownership of significant resources, society will be left searching 
for the accountability and representativeness out of its state that elections had promised, 
but don’t have the capacity to deliver alone.100  
The separation of economic wealth from political power, and the role of agricultural 
development in that process, is the crucial piece that is missing from the democratization 
literature; yet this pattern has appeared repeatedly across historical cases of successful 
long-term democracy. In Great Britain, the increasingly independent emerging classes 
provided a counterweight to the ruler’s absolute power, eventually with the ability to 
place real limits on their own government. Political reforms focused on limiting the 
monarchy and securing representation in government in order to guarantee property 
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rights. The process of democratization in Sweden, initially led by rural smallholders and 
later joined by the growing urban class, likewise centered on limiting the authority of the 
state.101 In both cases, as well as in the United States, demands for reform were couched 
in terms of the connection between taxation and representation,102 a situation that arose 
from the population’s increasing economic independence. Groups who pressed for state-
limiting reforms were increasingly aware of the interaction between economic and 
political power. In all of these cases, recognizable democratic institutions, such as 
constitutions, elections, and representative assemblies emerged not as a cause, but as a 
symptom of society’s increasing ability to restrain its rulers.  
Late-emerging democracies more frequently appeared under different conditions, and for 
different reasons. Here, the setup of democratic institutions such as elections, assemblies, 
and constitutions, has preceded the development of constraining power. Throughout 
Africa, for example, the bulk of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, and 
most states on the continent struggle to industrialize the urban economy. In this context, 
few actors other than the state possess enough land or capital to produce efficiently and 
generate wealth. I expect that conditions of late development will be a significant 
determinant in the structural conditions that plague these democracies. The relatively 
small amount of capital required for the development of industries in early modernizers 
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facilitated modernization without dependence on the state; this is a tall order for 
economies emerging in the context of global competition.103   
I expect that the existence of former colonial governance will also play a major role, as 
societies will have entered suddenly an era of independence and democratization with a 
long history of a predatory state. Colonial governments set up economic systems to 
extract cash crops under state direction based on non-mechanized, subsistence farming by 
peasant societies. No large scale, widespread development of commercial agriculture 
could emerge to provide a propertied elite with a basis of power with which to oppose the 
state’s encroachment on land, resources, and wealth. These conditions set the stage for 
subsequent events by constraining indigenous economic development. When the colonial 
governments granted independence, it was to a society without a basis of economic 
power, and to a new state with built-in mechanisms of control over wealth.    
Power, interests, and strategy: how today’s rulers learn from the past  
Choices made early on during and after democratic transitions set patterns that are 
difficult to reverse. Institutions that develop in these early years, both formal (such as sets 
of laws or bureaucracies) and informal (such as corruption) develop powerful 
constituencies, people highly invested in their continuance. The longer these are in place, 
the more they move to the backdrop as expectations or habitual ways of doing things. 
These institutions can be remarkably persistent, even in the face of exogenous shocks, 
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such as coups. For this reason, democratic transition periods are critical windows of time. 
The prevalent conditions and the choices made within the given constraints determined 
by those conditions are important for understanding how a new “democracy” unfolds.  
Decisions that came much earlier are also still relevant as a society approaches 
democratic transition. They can set the incentives and constraints within which the agents 
at every level must work for long periods of time. Critical junctures such as independence 
were opportunities to change directions and disrupt embedded habits and practices, but 
there is no such guarantee. Under the conditions outlined in the previous section, there is 
no powerful alignment of interests in opposition to the state. When these dynamics are 
predominant at the time of transition to political democracy (as marked by elections), 
there are few serious constraints on the new ruler, particular if he is popular. A semi-
authoritarian leader with a thin veneer of democratic legitimacy granted by (often rigged) 
elections, can strategically position themselves to avert the alignment of interests against 
them, leaving them a relatively free hand to do as they wish. 
Most research on democratic transitions that considers the role of economics focuses on 
market reforms/economic opening and democratic transitions, as if they necessarily go 
hand in hand. In theory they often do, but that has not lately been the case in practice. 
What scholars often fail to note is what the state may hold onto in terms of economic 
control as they transition to political democracy. Transitioned states may or may not 
directly control the means of production, but that does not mean they are without tools of 
social and economic control. By manipulating relationships between producers, between 
producers and consumers, and by maintaining de facto control of key elements of food 
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production, states are able to limit the degree of freedom their population can actually 
exercise, and retain the bulk of society’s wealth in the hands of the state.  
Agriculture remains central to this for several reasons. First, its basic inputs (particularly 
land) are highly immobile. This means agribusiness is more susceptible to state 
interference than any other industry. The state can control land more readily than more 
mobile types of inputs, and the struggle for land tenure institutions pervades the 
developing world. The centrality of private property rights to economic growth has been 
covered extensively, but less has been said about its connection to political stability. The 
value of property rights lies in the fact that it limits the state’s power to expropriate and 
redistribute, and enables the commercialization of agriculture to occur under the 
incentives of private accumulation. Agricultural production is also linked to overall 
stability because its main product is food for human consumption. Though demand for 
certain types of food undergoes change with economic growth, the overall level of 
demand never sinks below a basic level. Because of the necessity of food, its lack of 
substitutability for cheaper products, and the percentage of household income that goes to 
food, the political salience of agribusiness is greater than in other industries.  
Some states have been able to modernize economically and eventually, politically, under 
conditions of dependence on the state, but only where it resulted in a strong independent 
business class. State-led industrialization has in some cases led to successful economic 
modernization, but only to democratic outcomes when control is passed to a burgeoning 
independent private sector. This likewise depends on a strong commercial agriculture 
sector. In societies based on peasant production, they are often taxed to pay for state-led 
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industrialization. To sustain that long enough to develop a strong urban economy, 
agriculture productivity must be steadily rising. To bring agricultural productivity to the 
level needed to support a growing urban economy, production must be consolidated into 
more efficient means of production. In a society dominated by peasant production, where 
the peasants already have the vote, this is likely to be heartily resisted. Africa, for 
example, is dominated by states that are politically weak struggling with private sectors 
that are economically weak. The states typically win this battle for resources, but find the 
coffers quickly run dry without a strong productive capacity to generate more wealth.  
Some authors have suggested that the fact that some states are more successful at 
directing industrialization and economic growth and others are not is a sign of a weak 
state,104 but neglect to consider another dimension. A state’s primary goal is not 
economic development, but authority and control. Economic development may be a 
secondary goal, but if it does not see a strong private sector as complementary to its 
primary goal, then it will pursue contradictory policies to achieve economic growth in its 
attempt to preserve a state-society balance in favor of the state.  
Given the right conditions, a shrewd ruler can continue to prevent the social and 
economic transformation that undermines political power even after the introduction of 
elections. One way rulers can keep a wedge between rural and urban populations is by 
interfering in agricultural markets. The recurring natural cleavage between rural and 
urban populations is primarily over food prices.105 The ruler (whether elected or not) can 
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optimize his hold on power through manipulation of prices and supply in food markets. 
Through its command over the price of food, rulers can control the level of unrest as 
needed in urban areas, where people live in close enough contact to enable 
mobilization.106 Artificially lowering food prices appeases the urban population, and cuts 
into the ability of farmers and ranchers to profit from their labor. This has the double 
effect of preventing small-time agricultural operations from growing enough to wield 
significant economic power, and making the urban population dependent on the 
government for food supply.  
This manipulation of agriculture markets also grants the ruler a tool of control over the 
urban industrial sector. Agricultural production has a special relationship to economic 
development. Most obviously, it provides food, but perhaps even more significantly, it is 
a key source of inputs for other industries. Agricultural modernization is where 
indigenous industrialization must start, or the result is persistent inefficiencies and 
overreliance on foreign investment and/or the state itself. When this step is skipped over 
in the rush to industrialize, it also results in rapid urbanization that outstrips agricultural 
production, leading to food insecurity. Because of the necessity of food in every 
household, prices of agricultural goods are crucially important to urbanites, but they can 
also make or break an industry that relies on agricultural inputs. Rulers seeking greater 
wealth through industrial development for their state can drive down production costs for 
industry by artificially lowering the cost of those inputs coming from the rural agriculture 
sector. Ostensibly, this is designed to encourage industrialization and economic growth. It 
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is also a means of making industry reliant on the ruler for its success. Economic wealth 
under this system is acquired not through economic efficiency, but through political 
channels; so long as the state generally meets the needs of favored industrialists, they 
have no incentive to seek limits on government.107 The ruler successfully strips industry 
of independent power, while aligning their interests with his own.  
Governments who draw support from rural elite prevent the adoption of capitalist 
economic interests that would pull them toward increasing independence by perpetuating 
rent-seeking behavior on the part of landholders. Where wealth is held by a small class of 
large landholders, the ruler may need their support to keep his hold on political power. 
The ruler uses the coercive and resource-allocating powers of the government to develop 
a cadre whose status and wealth is likewise dependent on favorable government 
policies.108 Through the application of laws regulating land ownership, water usage, 
access to credit, and input subsidies for land, equipment, and supplies, the government is 
able to control not only the amounts and profits of agricultural output, but who can 
produce it. The result of these policies is to prevent the widespread commercialization of 
agriculture. This is key for establishing government control over the population, as it is 
simpler to control a few (who depend upon your favor), or many who own no resources 
of their own, than it is to control many who possess independent wealth.  
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This incentive structure has survived the test of time. Where it remains possible for 
landlords to sit back and collect rent instead of risking their wealth on a free market, 
state-limiting system, there is no incentive to limit the authority of the government.109 In 
such a system, the landholding elite are heavily dependent on a coercive state for their 
wealth. This was true of Moore’s agrarian societies that ultimately became fascist 
regimes, and it holds true for today’s rulers, who are able to create this system of 
cronyism instead of an economic model based on private property.  
The same system that is designed to keep the landed elite beholden to the ruler rather than 
self-sufficient also prevents the smallholder from being able to modernize. This was 
recognized by Moore in pre-modern societies: “For peasants living close to the margin of 
physical existence, modernization is clearly too risky, especially if under the prevailing 
social institutions, the profit is likely to go to someone else.”110 Much like peasants in 
early agrarian societies, subsistence farmers throughout the developing world are stuck in 
the same dilemma. Where food prices are kept low through government policy, there is 
little to no profit in farming beyond what is needed for the farmer’s own subsistence. For 
those who do produce for any market of substantial size, much of the available profit 
ends up in the pockets of government officials. Under this model, there is no incentive for 
the small farmer to turn to commercial farming, nor is there enough profit in it to use 
their returns to modernize agricultural operations. This incentive structure keeps 
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commercial agribusiness firmly in the hands of those tied to the ruler, and prevents 
farmers from becoming a group with independent wealth and power. 
Through the creation or perpetuation of an elite who are, through government policy, the 
primary possessors of modern mechanized agriculture, the government has effectively 
tied commercial farming to its own interests. Along with its (often simultaneous) control 
of the agricultural markets, they also tie urban interests to their own. By making the 
primary hub of economic wealth dependent on them, and hindering new ones from 
developing, the ruler is able to block the interest in limiting government from taking root 
in any corner with influence.   
Figure 1 
State-Society Relationships in Different Sectors  
Sector of society Potential source of 
power 
State means of control 
Urban industry Economic wealth Control of profitability through input 
costs, reliance on political favor, or 
direct state ownership  
Urban masses Ability to mobilize Control of food supply and prices 
Rural elite/ large 
landholders 
Economic/land wealth Control of land, inputs, and reliance on 
political favor  
Rural subsistence 
farmers 
Food production Limit commercialization of agriculture/ 
limit profitability  
 
Under this configuration, economic elites must be in favor with the state to retain their 
wealth and status. Individuals or groups must seek assistance from the state to subsist or 
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rise. This incentive structure is designed to induce actors (including voters) to seek 
government policies that favor their segment of society, rather than restriction on 
government (as in early democracies). The types of demands made on government in 
modern democracies will instead be focused on securing economic wealth through 
government favor. Each segment of society must use the coercive apparatus of the state 
to achieve its ends rather than unifying against it, further solidifying the power of the 
state regardless who is using, and who is ruling, it.  
Reversion and Instability  
This imbalance favoring the state in late developing democracies has implications for the 
success of democratic experiments: it encourages corruption and discourages 
accountability and transparency, two key components of democratic quality. This has 
been a major contributor to economic stagnation and political instability in the 
developing world, which addresses a hole in the literature connecting this to democratic 
reversals. Under these conditions, two paths open up to democratic reversals: extreme 
corruption leading to regime overthrow; or gradual autocratic reversion by the ruler 
eventually leading to overthrow by the opposition.  
Under regimes where few sources of wealth do not flow (directly or indirectly) through 
the state, the political class controls the channels through which a member of society can 
change their economic circumstances. Wealth is acquired not primarily through market 
participation, but through political connections. Status and wealth is a result of, or 
contingent on, the favor of the ruler and his political network. In such a system, economic 
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success and politics cannot be divorced from one another. This has a number of political 
consequences.  
The state is not likely to be very responsible with resources where there is no clear 
ownership from whence they came, and no oversight. Either they are used by those with 
access to secure their own wealth or doled out to political favorites in order to secure 
political power. This type of corruption pervades political systems where economic status 
(land, money, and other forms of private profit) is obtained through political connections. 
Though the focus, especially by political actors, has been on getting “good people” in 
positions of power, the political elite who operate within this system are not necessarily 
“bad men.”111 They respond to the incentives and constraints embedded in the system, 
just like everyone else. This system is set up such that corruption, cronyism, and political 
favoritism is incentivized by the co-location of political and economic power. Once this 
means of doing government business became informally but powerfully institutionalized, 
it quickly developed strong constituencies whose survival depended on it, and whose 
power self-replicated as the practice spread.   
When this underlying institution does not change with a democratic change in 
government leadership, and the way to change your economic circumstances is still 
through the state, there is little option other than to control the resources of the state. 
When democratic elections are not accompanied by political and economic restraint, it 
does little to protect the interests of anyone outside the political class, leading the 
population to question the efficacy of democracy at all. The performance of democracy as 
                                                          
111 Throughout my field research, this is often how they were referred to. 
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the prevailing means of regime change will hinge primarily on whether society judges the 
political system to perform economically. Alternate forms of regime change don’t 
necessarily need to be led by the masses, though it often has had their support. It may 
come from those political elite who are on the outs with the current government, because 
they have no other economic options when they are out of favor, and thus, nothing to 
lose.  
A second, more direct, path arises through the inability of opposing interests to exercise 
any constraint over the newly elected ruler. An increasingly powerful regime with 
virtually no practical limitations will backslide, becoming increasingly autocratic. These 
regimes slip into authoritarian practices, such as oppressing the opposition, revoking 
political freedoms, doing away with term limits, and rigging or canceling elections. 
Already by this point, the new democracy has become something that better reflects 
authoritarian than democratic rule.  
Rarely do these regimes remain permanent though. If the new “democracy” is not one 
with checks and balances that limit the ruler, then it will not be a democracy that stays 
stable for long. Opposing interests develop in the transition to democracy, which do not 
disappear as the ruler leads the state down the path toward autocracy. Opposing, 
especially minority opposing, interests will have no built-in protections from the tyranny 
of the majority, or the encroachment of the ruler on its freedoms. With no democratic 
means of protecting its interests, the opposition’s only recourse is to overthrow the 
regime.  
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The reasons for authoritarian backsliding are centered on the ruling regime. It occurs 
because it can; there are no opposing forces strong enough to provide balance. The 
reasons for the coup focus greater attention on the opposition. They overthrow because 
they have no other options. Whatever the logic guiding the coup, the persistence of 
economic issues tied to political power ensures its relative popularity among the 
population. Undemocratic regime changes garner a surprising degree of support when it 
is replaced with a new leader promising order, representation of the people, and a greater 
share of the wealth. Many new democracies that have emerged in the last several decades 
have seen repeated regime instability, alternating between dictatorship and quasi-
democracies that allow limited political and economic freedoms. Authoritarian 
backsliding is common, wherein elections are won using illicit tactics, term limits are 
ignored or overturned, and power is seized through unconstitutional and sometimes 
violent means.112  
Moore asked the question at the beginning of his chapter on England’s development into 
a democracy: why did the process of industrialization in England culminate in the 
establishment of a relatively free society? I might ask a similar question; why, here, is it 
not doing so? This question might be qualified to read why has it not done so yet, and 
might it still? Scholars and practitioners both are obsessed with the relationship between 
economic growth, industrialization, and democratization. It has been revisited repeatedly, 
with recurring arguments over whether it is positively or negatively correlated, in which 
                                                          
112 This is the definition employed by Bates, Fayad, and Hoeffler, “The State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,” 323. 
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direction the arrow runs, or whether it is really related anymore at all. What is clear so far 
is that it matters how industrialization happens. England didn’t become a democracy 
simply because it industrialized; it became a democracy because of the way the particular 
process of industrialization in that case changed state-society relations in both the cities 
and the countryside. This isn’t the only road to the modern world, as Moore himself 
shows, but there are certain features of the transformation from agrarian to industrial that 
must occur in sequence to undermine the old order and bring forth a new political and 
economic order. Stable democracies went through a long and arduous path to arrive there. 
In simple terms, it looks like this: 
 
 
In parts of the developing world where democratic institutions were introduced suddenly, 
and elections held prior to the unfolding of the political and economic modernizations 
outlined above, it looks more like this:  
 
 
It should be no surprise that these experiments with “democracy” have followed a course 
that goes more like this: 
 
 
Pre-modern systems of production → agricultural modernization → economic growth → 
development of new classes independent of political position → forms of constraint and 
representation in government → democratic elections 
Pre-modern systems of production → democratic elections 
Pre-modern systems of production → democratic elections → authoritarian backsliding → 
regime overthrow → more elections → authoritarian backsliding → regime overthrow 
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This dissertation explores how it came to be that these features are missing from modern 
day transformations, show that they still matter today, and argue that the modern state 
has, at least in part, deliberately brought this about. The theoretical expectations are 
detailed in figure 2 below.  
Figure 2 
Theorized relationship between agricultural and economic development, and governance 
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Research Design 
Method selection. The relationship between democracy and economic growth has been 
revisited so often one might think the answer settled, or if not, at least beat to death. Part 
of the reason the answers remain elusive after so many attempts to resolve the question is 
the repeated use of cross-national regression to provide answers, which has proven 
inadequate. Several issues arise from using large-N quantitative methods to explore this 
relationship. First, it is very difficult to sort out the problem of reciprocal causation.113 As 
many quantitative studies have been devoted to demonstrating the impact of regime type 
on economic growth as the other way around, and have come up with answers as varied 
as the second. This stems from the inherent complexity of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. It is not a direct one, and the causal mechanisms in 
between are concurrently linked to context, history, and the choices of political actors at 
certain points in time. Quantitative methods do not lend themselves easily to this type of 
complex causality.  
Second, as outlined in the previous chapter, understanding regime type is more 
complicated than the strict dichotomy often used to measure it for the purposes of cross-
national comparison. Though there is a general awareness now that ‘institutional 
democracies’ do not necessarily equate to responsive, representative governments of the 
people, few studies adequately differentiate one from the other, or fully investigate the 
reasons for that divergence. Exploring important differences in the overall quality of 
                                                          
113 Seawright, “Regression-Based Inference,” in Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, 251. 
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democratic governance is a task that can only be undertaken when the definition of 
democracy can be guided by rich description rather than numerical measurement; or as 
Collier and Levitsky call it, “democracy with adjectives.”114 Maxwell Owusu suggests 
that representation and accountability are linked, since the former takes place through any 
linkage that involves leadership accountability and responsiveness; this does not 
necessarily have to be through elections or political parties, but can be through any 
institution that provides this linkage.115 
Even were these issues not present, this dissertation engages a wider scope of causal 
relationships than previous studies. To reduce the independent variables to “economic 
growth” is an oversimplification that does a great disservice to a complex question. I 
argue that democratic consolidation is about the type of economic development, most 
particularly its degree of independence from the state, for which there is no simple or 
straightforward measure. Furthermore, I pay special attention to certain sectors of the 
economy, namely, agricultural production, and its special relationship to the state. On the 
right side of the equation (outcomes), I am not attempting to measure democracy directly, 
but instead to engage a deeper discussion about its neglected pillars. The goal of this 
research is more to provoke than to prove.  
This approach to the question requires a research method that takes the investigation of 
context, as well as the interaction of political actors, to be a central part of the study. 
Given the shortcomings of previous research in addressing the complexities of this topic, 
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and the underpinnings of both economic growth and democratic consolidation that have 
not been explored, it is most useful in this situation to conduct an in-depth historical 
analysis of a single case to observe how the process has unfolded over time. Seawright 
calls the relationship between regime type and economic growth a “case study in failed 
causal inference,” and suggests that the literature move forward by abandoning cross-
national regression analysis in favor of qualitative methods that explore the causal 
mechanisms within.116 This is the type of approach I use by selecting a single case to 
explore in great depth. 
The merits of this type of research design have been outlined by numerous preceding 
authors. It has been used by historical institutionalists who emphasize historical timing, 
the sequence of events, and the socioeconomic dynamics underlying the political 
environment.117 This allows room for actors to make decisions within a context or system 
that influences what those choices are. The search for explanations of democratic 
instability have focused on immediate causes, but rarely look very far back into history. 
This is where seemingly small or unrelated events can be found that set into motion chain 
reactions that continue to determine underlying conditions and influence events that take 
place decades, or even centuries, later. This approach to research is best suited for the 
exploration of a single case that draws out interactions between structure and agent and 
highlights the role of historical context. This within-case analysis will uncover the 
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117 See for example North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. See also Pierson, 
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” See also Moe, “Political Institutions: 
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political outcome as the product of unique, temporally-ordered, sequentially unfolding 
events.118  
It is worth noting here that the development of this research design has proved to be an 
iterative process that continuously interacted with the early stages of exploring the 
background of my chosen case. The initial intent was to conduct process tracing for the 
purposes of theory testing by specifying each causal mechanism and testing the theory 
explicitly at every stage. Even a basic investigation of the history of my case revealed a 
plethora of previously unconsidered causal mechanisms, hypotheses, and paths to the 
outcome.  
This crystallized the realization that although I had a clear conception of what the 
outcome was, and ideas about what factors might have influenced its development, 
existing theories (including my own) said little about what this process would look like. 
Further, it confirmed Atul Kohli’s observation about the difficulty in isolating the relative 
significance of a number of causal variables in a single case; a feel for what might be the 
most significant dynamics comes out with the researcher’s immersion in the details.119 I 
therefore scrapped the initial design in favor of an inductive approach that was open to 
new information and more fully specified causal explanations that would emerge from 
the analysis. This dissertation therefore undertakes process tracing in the form of process 
induction: setting out with the purpose of finding a potential causal path that may be 
                                                          
118 As suggested by Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” 
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rendered as more general hypotheses that both fit the overarching theoretical guidelines, 
and might later be tested against other cases.120 This shift in focus to theory development 
rather than theory testing has allowed for a much richer description and more accurate 
depiction of the causal process.  
This openness does not detract from the research design’s ability to be methodical in its 
approach. I start with the outcome of interest and work backward by asking questions of 
my case geared at homing in on how it got there. Why has democracy been unstable since 
independence? What are the given reasons for repeated military coups, and more 
importantly, why were some so widely supported by the public? What contextual factors 
contributed to the environment in which democratic governments were overthrown? 
What elements of democracy or good governance are missing such that that form of 
governance couldn’t hold? I let the data collected in the case answer these questions, and 
allowed the answers to guide the next round of questions until I could hone in on an 
underlying root cause. Each step of the process is carefully laid out, connecting the 
outcome to the cause that precedes it. When that cause seems sufficiently explained, new 
questions are asked about what led to that step, tracing it further back down its historical 
path until I reached a juncture at which the event or cause could not be explained on the 
basis of related prior conditions. When I arrived at that point in the research, I had what 
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Mahoney calls a path dependent explanation: a historical sequence in which contingent 
events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains.121  
This is not an atheoretical approach by any means. To some extent, theory did guide the 
direction these questions would take. For example, in investigating sources of power and 
causes of disempowerment, I asked questions about the structure of the agriculture sector 
and the peasant society that supports it (At what point did its transition to commercial 
agriculture halt, and why? How did this affect the transition to modern social structures? 
How does that impact the political influence of relevant classes or groups?) Judgements 
about what variables may be relevant and worthy of process-tracing had to be made both 
in advance (given prior theory and the researcher’s guesses), as well as along the way.122 
Without this direction, the number of possible answers might prove too varied to ever 
condense into a single study. The expected answers as to how exactly one step was 
connected to the next, however, was not predetermined by theory; it is developed fully 
through data collection.  
There are some pitfalls to using this approach. I anticipate critiques about the 
generalizability of this theory and offer up two responses. First, even if the theory is not 
globally generalizable, the inductive approach undertaken ultimately identifies some 
lingering effects of resource extraction mechanisms that have endured since the colonial 
era. This may open up new lines of questioning on the impact of colonialism in a 
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particular region of the world. The exploration of its impact in a single case may also lead 
to new ideas as to how different systems employed by the colonial powers in different 
cases may lead to disparate effects. Particularly if these causal mechanisms are found to 
exist in other cases across the region, this research might contribute to a typology of cases 
in which different paths to different types of democracy exist in the modern world. 
Regardless how it is used in the future, this research does not look to discover universal 
laws independent of context; rather, it seeks to identify a sequence of events in history 
that produced a certain outcome; a pattern that might plausibly be repeated in similar 
cases.123  
Second, new theories cannot be properly tested on a more general population of cases 
until they’ve been fully fleshed out.124 We must start with rich analysis that fully explains 
the interaction of structural conditions, historical events, and human decision-making 
before we can accurately understand how best to test it on other cases. Later studies can 
observe multiple cases in order to judge to what extent the same process underlies other 
cases; this study will limit itself to uncovering the causal mechanisms in one instance. 
This achieves a core goal of qualitative research: to explain the specific outcomes of 
individual cases.125 What did the development of unstable, institutional but not 
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124 Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis in the Study of Revolutions,” in Mahoney and 
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substantive, democracy look like in this case? Whether it applies more broadly is a 
question for the next round of research.  
A second, but related, source of criticism might come from adherents to the King, 
Keohane, Verba (KKV) approach to qualitative research. This dissertation does not use 
the same logic of causal inference as outlined in their quantitatively-inclined work. The 
single case study undertaken here is interested in the multiple, conjunctural causes of an 
outcome, and how they’re linked. For the purposes of this study, seeking variance in 
either the independent or dependent variable would not only be unnecessary, it would 
also be counterproductive because it would require the oversimplification of both the 
causes and the effects studied here. At this point, it is worth recalling that the “variables” 
being examined here are not regime type or economic development per se, but a complex 
configuration of government-society relations that underlies political institutions.  
A comparative research design would have been a closer match than statistical methods 
to the causal logic employed, but it proved similarly inappropriate. There is an implicit 
comparison embedded in the theory to the early-developing capitalist democracies, 
though the analysis focuses only on the case of a late-developing quasi-democracy. 
Though this implicit comparison plays a role in theory development, I do not consider it 
sufficiently similar to draw comparisons in the analysis because of the many 
dissimilarities that would make it impossible to isolate the effect of the factors of interest. 
Comparison within the region has proved similarly difficult to draw conclusions from 
based on the attempts of modernization theory to do so. Modernization theory has been 
largely rejected in African on the grounds that it doesn’t explain variation within Africa: 
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those countries in Africa that enjoy greater economic prosperity have not shown to be 
more democratic than those within Africa who are less so. Scholars conclude from this 
that the relationship between economic growth and democracy has not materialized here; 
I argue that this conclusion is premature.  
Efforts to measure the relationship, particularly by quantitative methods (whose 
popularity have grown along with an interest in the developing world), represents a 
misapplication of modernization theory. These methods seek linear relationships between 
economic growth and democracy, which was never purported by early modernization 
theorists to exist in the first place. Furthermore, by world standards, the entire region is 
poor, rural, illiterate, economically underdeveloped, and lacking a strong middle class; 
within-region variation is probably not enough to work with to draw strong 
conclusions.126 Exploring the extent to which modernization theory, or any pieces of it, 
might have relevance in Africa therefore precluded both statistical and within-region 
comparative approaches. The nature of the complex relationship between economic 
growth and democracy is better sought in an investigation of the presence or absence of 
relevant processes, which was best suited to the single case study method.   
Traditional approaches to causal analysis, such as King, Keohane, and Verba’s require 
the researcher to assume either necessary and/or sufficient conditions (for the 
comparative method), or case homogeneity and uniform effect of the independent 
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variable on the dependent variable across cases (for regression analysis).127 These 
assumptions would be untenable under the theory outlined in this dissertation, which 
takes context and historical timing, along with actor choices, to be important. Instead, this 
theory requires a method that fits its ontological frame.128 For a single-case analysis of 
causal processes, the “narrative analysis” or “analytical historical” design utilized here is 
highly appropriate.129  
The King, Keohane, Verba approach calls this single case study approach a “no-variance” 
design, arguing that it is not sufficient for causal inference. However, it is equally 
potentially valuable to select a case based on an outcome and trace the process that led to 
it.130 The ontological assumptions underlying my research are based on an understanding 
of the political-social world as a series of strategic interactions that over time, create 
structural conditions, which in turn impact later choices. Historically rooted causal 
factors, particularly those that change the trajectory of political and economic institutions, 
can set the stage for subsequent events, thus influencing later -even much later- 
developments. Earlier choices can have deep and lasting impacts on social structures that 
once embedded, are nearly impossible to reverse, as the incentives built into the system 
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reinforce itself.131 This type of ‘branching tree’ or ‘path dependent’ interpretation of 
political events does not align with the KKV understanding of causal structures.  
Skocpol argues that the description of complex processes that culminate in outcomes over 
time should be part of the investigation. Qualitative research conducted in this way does 
not assume away anything; it is able to develop the context along with the causal 
relationship, and demonstrate complex interactions the way they really play out.132 This is 
the type of research I aim to produce; this dissertation undertakes a process analysis that 
examines the causal chain as it unfolds in the chosen case. The emphasis will not be on a 
direct relationship between a start and end point, but on the process that unfolds in 
between.133  
Case selection. This dissertation will focus on Africa as the ideal setting in which to 
develop this theory. Throughout the continent, the agriculture sector is typically the 
largest sector of the economy, and often characterized by smallholders and non-
mechanized production. The preponderance of farming throughout Africa is undertaken 
for subsistence or for small-scale sale in informal markets. It has not yet been widely 
transformed into the commercialized value chain that in the past, has fueled both the 
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economic and political development of the West, allowing me to observe causal 
relationships even as they are still unfolding.  
Within Africa, there are a number of countries to select from that make attractive case 
studies. Though some scholars advise against any consideration of the dependent variable 
during case selection, others have noted that in small-n research where the scholar is 
searching for multiple causes of a known outcome (as opposed to observing the outcome 
of a sequentially prior event), selecting on the dependent variable is appropriate.134 
Quantitative and comparative approaches have traditionally viewed qualitative social 
enquiry as an alternative when large-N observations are not possible, wherein causal 
inference is achieved by coming closest to approximating the conditions of experimental 
research.135 This means the research design should select cases on the independent 
variable and let the dependent variable fall as it may.  
However, as in this case, that conception of a scientific research design is not always 
useful. This theory does not wish to suggest that all governments with a certain 
independent variable must end in authoritarianism (or an authoritarian-imbued imitation 
of democratic processes); therefore, it makes no sense to set the design up to demonstrate 
something I am not aiming to show. To warp the research question into something else in 
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order to make it fit the traditional conception of scientific testability would be to lose the 
richness of this research agenda.136  
The aim of this theory is to explore the connection between agricultural production and 
political outcomes, and expose the questionable, unstable grounds that underlie 
democratic governance where this relationship exists. We know the outcome is unstable 
democratic governance; what we want to know is why. A fitting design for this question 
would take a case whose outcome (or dependent variable) fits the query and uncover the 
factors that contribute to it. In early stages of a research program, this can be a valuable 
way of selecting cases that can help identify the causal paths that lead to the dependent 
variable.137  
Cases whose governments are clearly authoritarian in nature are less useful for this 
analysis because they are, in short, too obvious a case. If I were to select from among the 
least free societies in Africa, it would present two issues. First, I would risk being 
accused of bias by selecting cases most likely to fit the theory given their extreme value 
on the dependent variable. Second, it is not even necessarily the most fitting case to test 
the theory. As Svolik points out, democratic transition and democratic consolidation are 
two different processes, but often end up treated as the same. The middle ground between 
fully consolidated democracy and full-fledged authoritarian is the murky area this 
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research wants to explore. This is the category political scientists have most struggled to 
define and measure. Part of the reason for this is an overreliance on quantitative methods 
that require precise measurement of an inexact process. This in-between stage resists 
measurement and classification. Because no one knows exactly how to classify this range 
of “unconsolidated” democracies, there is little agreement in the literature on where they 
fall, and confusion about conflicting results between researchers.  
The search for causes of authoritarian reversals is also complicated by its relationship to 
democratic consolidation. What we do know is that consolidated democracies do not 
appear to be at risk of reversal, while unconsolidated democracies are (though not all of 
those at risk do revert).138 Therefore, the reasons for consolidation must be different from 
the reasons for reversal, or every democracy that was not consolidated would revert. 
What we don’t know is how to tell when a democracy is consolidated. Before 
quantitative studies of authoritarian reversals can become useful, we have to know how to 
observe democratic consolidation, so that we can identify which countries are even at risk 
of reversal. Unless we can sort that out, the literature on both will remain stuck where 
they are, in repetitive measuring of the same few factors. 
To start untangling this mess, we need to explore the newer democracies who we think 
may fall into the unconsolidated group, but are not fully authoritarian.139 Social scientists 
who study this in-between stage need to get comfortable with the things we can’t yet 
classify. Among this possible group, we should start asking questions about state-society 
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relations that underlie its institutions. The best place to find this is in cases that have the 
right institutions; those that at first glance, appear to be fully democratic, and ask what’s 
beneath that may make it susceptible to reversion and instability. Because they have the 
“right” institutions, but continue to experience instability, these kinds of questions should 
offer clues as to what prevents consolidation. This can be done with any number of cases 
where democratic institutions exist, though they may not be truly consolidated. This 
description fits a number of countries on the African continent.  
Ghana emerges as one of Africa’s stronger democracies in recent years, though it has 
suffered a number of regime overthrows since independence. This affords the opportunity 
to observe change over time, allowing for the possibility of some within-case variation in 
later time periods. The extent to which agricultural production has become a profitable 
commercial venture may result in some corresponding changes in political outcomes; for 
example, it may explain Ghana’s increased stability in recent years.  
Ghana also has a similar political history to the majority of African states. They share a 
colonial history which, despite variation in the form and source of colonial regimes, tends 
to produce similar structural constraints that influence later development. The trajectory 
of political development since independence throughout Africa has produced recurring 
patterns, and Ghana is no exception. The first post-independence government began with 
single-party rule, followed by the first of a series of military coups that would be 
intermittently interrupted by brief returns to democratic governance for the next three 
decades. This back and forth of political regimes has been a feature of post-independence 
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politics in most African countries; military coups to “root out corruption and instill 
discipline” was the norm across the continent from the 1960s until the early 1990s.140   
Since the 1990s, democratic institutions have seen greater stability across sub-Saharan 
Africa. Some regimes are still dominated by a single party, but increasingly, politics are 
marked by alternation between parties engaging in competitive elections. Ghana, like 
many of its neighbors, is currently in its longest period of stable democratic rule. Among 
the sub-Saharan states, Ghana is regarded as one of the strongest democracies. This also 
makes it a ‘least likely’ case study in which to find the forces that undermine democratic 
accountability explored in this research, potentially strengthening the author’s argument. 
Ghana’s selection as a case with typical historical features and a comparatively stronger 
democracy allow the researcher to probe underneath the surface of democratic 
institutions to unveil underlying dynamics in the African context. 
Sources of inference, sources of evidence, and data collection. This research design is 
characterized by thick analysis that thinks in terms of processes, rather than variables. 
Observational data includes information about context, the interaction of structures and 
actor choices, and other pieces of information that enhance an understanding of the causal 
process.141 This process-oriented method is a “fundamentally different approach to causal 
inference than that which defines and measures variables, organizes them into data sets, 
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and observes correlations.”142 Causal process observations require complex judgements 
about inference and probability, requiring a rich knowledge of context and identification 
of the critical turning points or moments of decision making,143 the identification of 
which is part of the investigation of the case.  
The emphasis throughout the analysis will be not on variables, but on causal-process 
observations: insights or pieces of data that provide information about context or 
mechanism.144 This type of analysis looks much like detective work and historical 
analysis, rather than a matter of applying an orthodox quasi-experimental design. Bennett 
equates this type of research to a detective piecing together a convincing explanation 
based on evidence that bears on the means, motives, and opportunity of a suspect. These 
“smoking guns,” which strongly support a given hypothesis, can be found in the answers 
to the how and why, where insight into causal process lies.145 Observations, or 
information, that suggests the answers to those questions will be taken by the researcher 
to be persuasive evidence, especially where it comes from sources with a hand in 
decision-making or first-hand witnesses at critical junctures. As noted by Bennett, not all 
data are created equal; a single piece of compelling evidence can strongly affirm an 
explanation; and particularly powerful process observations that reveal causal 
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mechanisms can yield inferential leverage on their own.146 These potent insights into why 
decisions were made and how they impacted later developments are what this research 
seeks.  
This type of evidence must be sought in a deep knowledge of the political and social 
processes of my case, both current and historical. The necessary information is gathered 
through the use of both primary and secondary sources. The overall timeline engages a 
fairly long time period, and the balance of primary versus secondary sources will need to 
shift as I go farther back in time. Secondary sources such as historical works will be used 
to collect most of the evidence on how agricultural production and governance was 
structured during the colonial and early post-colonial periods. I made every attempt to 
locate histories written by indigenous scholars, because of the deep understanding they 
can bring to their accounts. However, I recognize the potential for bias that can introduce 
to the analysis, due to the politically sensitive nature of colonialism and the personal 
experiences local authors might imbue with meaning that might distort a more balanced 
picture. Therefore, I also incorporate a large number of secondary sources whose origins 
are outside the colonized areas.  
I attempted to rely more heavily on primary sources for the recent time period including 
independence for several reasons. First, independence is a critical period, because it 
represents the shift from foreign, colonial rule to the first attempts at democratic 
governance. Though the events that preceded it are important for establishing context and 
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structures that influenced later developments, it is here that the analysis of its impact on 
democratic quality can begin. It also represents a critical juncture in which key decisions 
were made by political actors. Thus, primary sources such as first-hand accounts 
(including autobiographies), statements from leaders, and newspaper articles from the 
time, will be important for establishing causality. Particular attention will be paid to 
learning why certain decisions were made, and what role was played by the structure or 
context, as well as the interests of relevant actors.  
However, I acknowledge that primary sources are not always readily available, nor is the 
time needed to peruse what has already been collected by historians, economics, and 
political scientists who have studied Ghana’s development. Thus, I use secondary sources 
generously to fill these gaps, viewing them as intermediate products between raw 
materials and explanatory syntheses such as I am compiling.147 With the understanding 
that these sources may already be colored by the author’s own biases, I take great care to 
avoid using them selectively, paying particular attention to contradictory evidence, and 
tracking down the cited source of such evidence myself. For the period directly following 
independence, I rely heavily on the research done by Tony Killick on government records 
in Accra. Most of this evidence is of a statistical nature and comes from budgetary and 
financial reports from the 1960s. I have no reason to shy from the liberal use of this 
information, as there is little room for introducing researcher bias in these reports, but 
they are full of supporting evidence that makes clearer the economic situation during an 
important period.  
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Lastly, what is unfolding in the present will also be examined for two purposes: to 
establish the implications of earlier developments, to detect change or lack thereof, and to 
uncover clues that suggest where the future might be headed. To investigate 
contemporary developments, I conducted in-person interviews with a variety of sources 
including local scholars, agribusiness leaders, small farmers, and government officials. 
The initial questions were approved by IRB prior to leaving for Ghana, with the 
annotation that I would conduct them as free-flowing interviews where I offer initial 
prompt questions and allow/prompt the interviewee to expand on the details and their 
views on the answers.148  
To locate my interviewees, I began with a list of the different perspectives I would like to 
gather information on: government officials, small farmers, agribusiness owners of 
commercial enterprises (preferably large ones), indigenous academics, agribusiness 
finance professionals, aid workers focused in rural areas, and if possible, high-level 
political figures who played a role in or witnessed first-hand any key transition periods.  
Networks are enormously important in Ghana, and many of the people I met were happy 
to help me connect, so I was able to utilize this to my advantage. After each interview, I 
told them what other perspectives I was seeking to gather information on and asked if 
they were able to connect me with anyone. I never had a single interviewee who didn’t 
lead me to another. I recognize that this sort of ‘snowball’ or ‘chain-referral’ approach 
can potentially introduce bias into the analysis, based on the assumption that people will 
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tend to recommend others who share similar characteristics or the same outlook.149 I 
tackled this potential issue in two ways: first, the cast of characters I set out to find was 
deliberately designed to be incredibly diverse and likely to bring about a variety of 
perspectives, even were they all connected to one another. Second, I did my own research 
on those that could be found myself (high-level political figures, academics, and even 
owners of large ventures, which are few in number), and set out to contact them, so that 
the first set of respondents would be unconnected to one another and avoid ending in a 
closed loop of contacts.  
This triangulation of different techniques, including historical analysis of primary and 
secondary materials, and conducting interviews at various levels of society, has deliberate 
goals. First, to reduce the potential for systematic bias that could be introduced through 
the research process. Second, to connect different historical time periods to one another 
by gathering evidence through techniques most appropriate to their place in time, while 
keeping consistent the questions being asked in my research.  
Throughout the evidence gathering process, as I conducted interviews and perused 
primary and secondary materials, I continually asked the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions that 
dug beneath the surface. Sources were used in accordance with what could best be 
learned from them. For example, I began with books and persons who were enmeshed in 
political institutions, asking of them why the democratic governments in Ghana have 
been overthrown, why those turnovers were sometimes supported, what were the central 
grievances with the democratic governments that came since independence? The answers 
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I got were consistent: corruption, theft, arbitrary and inconsistent law enforcement, 
politicians living above the law and acquiring their wealth off the backs of its citizens. In 
the next round, I spoke to those who were closest to corruption, wealth-skimming, and 
the other listed grievances: former government officials and business owners. Here I 
asked how it came to be this way and why, and again, came away with consistent 
responses. From the business owners: we have no power to restrain them. From the 
former officials: there is no fighting the system, you must fit in to survive in it.  
The next round of questions should be obvious. Democratic governance is about 
restraining arbitrary rule: why then, am I being told that no one has the power to 
constrain their government? This is where the research gets truly interesting, as the 
answers I found were rooted in developments that long preceded independence, which no 
one could have foreseen. This round of questioning had to be asked of the history books. 
At base, the question is from where does society get its power to constrain rulers, and 
how was this potential undermined in my case? Constructing the causal narrative here 
involved a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning. Inductive because the 
theory fell into place as the evidence was gathered. Deductive because much of the 
evidence that came from preceding time periods would not likely have been connected 
unless its possible implications had been pondered in advance.  
I first gathered all the evidence I had collected in a single, very long, document. I 
occasionally came across information that gave me the tingling feeling that it might be 
important, but it was unclear how it fit in. I wrote it all down with little to no 
discrimination at this stage. Once a month, I sat down and reviewed my evidence, 
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thought about the causal chain, attempting to map it out. If I couldn’t, I went back to 
gathering more evidence. When I got stuck, I tried another source, eventually finding that 
newspapers from the independence era helped click the last pieces into place. Eventually, 
a day came when I could map the process and how it was all linked together, finally 
understanding that it was not linear, but interactive. I divided the causal chain into four 
distinct sections, and began sorting my document full of evidence into those sections, 
depending on which stage of the process the evidence pertained to. Only then did I begin 
to write.  
This approach is a less strict, less formal, but no less rigorous, investigation of the causal 
process as it unfolds. The goal is to uncover key structural constraints and critical 
decision points that played a role in bringing us to the present. Approaching it by starting 
with the end point and working backwards left room for the introduction of new evidence 
and new hypotheses to develop. This is a highly inductive approach to building the 
argument, which aims to discover new insights and yield causal inference through the 
gathering of evidence that links processes stretching over long periods of history. 
This reconstruction of the historical narrative presents connections between events 
divided in time in a straightforward manner. The historical progression from the colonial 
era to the present is the core focus, because as the analysis revealed, this period of time 
has particular relevance to how political and economic institutions evolved. Each chapter 
unpacks the power dynamics and interests of key actors, and identifies actual outcomes 
that can be attributed to these undercurrents. Several of the propositions that come out of 
this analysis re-emerge throughout more than one period of history, with the connections 
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to earlier periods explicitly highlighted. This approach to the analysis will help illuminate 
the theory as it unfolds by highlighting the historical connections between early events 
and their impact on later developments.   
Analysis 
The Colonial Era: Setting the structural conditions 
The analysis begins with the advent of colonialism in Ghana. Events prior to colonization 
are not insignificant and throughout Africa, have received regrettably little attention in 
western scholarship. Developments that preceded the colonial era sometimes crop up in 
the analysis as they relate to the story being told, but it is not the focus of this causal 
chain. This is because colonization is identified as a critical turning point in history that 
changed the trajectory of both political and economic development. What came before is 
regarded as not able to predict the event of colonization, and therefore less relevant to 
understanding the developments that followed. Certain elements of pre-colonial history 
may have created conditions that made Africa’s colonization possible, but colonization 
itself was an exogenous event that altered the course of history. In other words, it was an 
external shock that can’t be explained by preceding events. The causal analysis thus 
begins in full force with what came afterward.  
Growing economic competition in Europe led them to seek beyond their borders for a 
competitive edge. What they sought to this end was not free trade, but exclusive sources 
of raw material that they could extract cheaply to serve as inputs to feed their growing 
industrial centers. The primary purpose of the colonial state throughout Africa was 
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economic extraction. Prosperity was determined by how cheaply this could be 
accomplished. For the British in Ghana, this came to be defined in terms of the cheapness 
with which cocoa could be obtained.150 Colonial government achieved the extraction of 
raw material for export to their home country by encouraging, and sometimes even 
requiring through compulsion, peasant cultivation of cash crops.151 So long as the system 
of extraction relied on peasant production, this required little in the way of infrastructural 
development. What economic and infrastructure development did occur was designed to 
extract and export, not develop productive capacity. This is evidenced by lines of 
transportation leading directly to the coast, bypassing cities instead of connecting them. 
Even today, transportation infrastructure in Ghana is markedly underdeveloped between 
major population centers.  
What was needed to uphold this system of resource extraction and export was some form 
of political control sufficient to ensure both cheap production and monopolistic control. 
Channeling land and labor to the production of low-cost agricultural commodities, a 
project private capital was in only very early stages of accomplishing in Africa at that 
time, was enabled by the construction of a stable political order by the colonial 
government.152 A somewhat minimal state (in terms of capacity and governance) was set 
up, with political power concentrated at the center and financed by extraction from the 
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rural population in the form of cash crop production and export.153 Political control under 
the colonial state was merely a means by which they could exercise economic 
dominance. Minimalist though the state was, it was marked by tyrannical and oppressive 
rule in terms of its total control of economic activity and the dominance of the center 
through means of elite cooptation. This contradiction has led authors to differ on whether 
to characterize the colonial (and thus the post-colonial) state as weak or strong. Most 
view it as weak: they generally didn’t fully colonize outside the main coastal areas, 
exercised limited day-to-day administration over the countryside, and put little effort into 
actually consolidating control of the hinterlands.154 This viewpoint, however, overlooks 
the highly effective mechanisms of control available through indirect rule, the system of 
choice for the British in the Gold Coast.155 The colonial government had no need to exert 
direct control throughout the countryside demarcated as being under their rule,156 so long 
as they were able to manipulate rural social and economic systems in a way that would 
underwrite domination by the center, something they did thoroughly achieve in economic 
terms.  
The first step was to rid itself of local economic competitors, which the British 
understood could also threaten their hold on political power. In the preceding years, when 
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contact with European traders facilitated commercial activity before formal colonization, 
African merchants had begun to flourish. Particularly in the Ashanti region of the Gold 
Coast, commercial enterprise was rising, creating a bourgeoning class of capital-owning 
and investing men whose potential power was not small; this class of commercial 
entrepreneurs represented the beginnings of development into a middle class of nation 
builders in the European tradition.157 With colonization, the British overlords could not 
permit the competition for wealth and power that this emerging group posed, and they 
were summarily expropriated, exiled, or otherwise done away with.158 The remnants of 
this class, dubbed the asikafo, survived in Asante, but their rise to an enterprising class of 
commercial producers was halted as the British took control of the export trade and 
extracted surplus from producers at prices fixed by the colonial state.159  
The colonial state would continue to block indigenous economic growth wherever it 
threatened to crop up outside the bounds of their control. The flourishing of African 
merchants and traders that characterized the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
definitively ended with the colonization that took root by the end of the century.160 In 
1874, the British declared Gold Coast its colony, and began making some of the 
structural changes that would facilitate resource extraction, and the accompanying 
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political changes required to underwrite it. Economic activity shifted from trade to 
agriculture: namely, the production of cash crops for export.  
By the early 1900s, cocoa farming accounted for half of all Gold Coast exports; by this 
time, the value of cocoa on the global market had mushroomed and Gold Coast was the 
world’s leading exporter.161 The newfound wealth heralded by the increase in the value of 
cocoa and land produced a powerful new group of people economically independent of 
the chief, and a consequent shift in political power away from the chiefs to the traders.162 
This group of newly prosperous (and increasingly powerful) farmers and traders 
presented a challenge to the new state, as well as to traditional authorities.163 The colonial 
state instituted a number of measures aimed at keeping costs of extraction low and 
maintaining control of the increasing commercialization of agricultural commodities. 
Though the indigenous population were the ones mainly involved in agricultural 
production, the agribusiness end (storage, warehousing, transportation, distribution, 
financing, and marketing; where value is added, and money made) was shored up by the 
state on behalf of the European trading companies. More importantly, they stunted the 
development of land markets that would facilitate consolidation, and solidified the chiefs’ 
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political control over their subjects by codifying into law their power to allocate, control, 
and dispose of land.164 
Gold Coast peasants were under threat from early stages of modernization on the eve of 
and early years of colonization. In response to indigenous cocoa brokers beginning to 
accumulate wealth in every district, the British Director of Agriculture in 1919 
recommended the introduction of a system of state-controlled cooperatives and produce-
buying stations.165 Meanwhile, indebtedness was forcing smallholders to surrender 
control of their land to would be estate or capitalist farmers;166 a group which threatened 
the economic and political domination of the British in the Gold Coast. Credit and 
marketing cooperatives were developed to slow this process by protecting peasant 
holdings from consolidation by individual farmers.167 Cooperatives allowed peasant 
smallholders to circumvent indigenous moneylenders and middlemen, cutting this group 
out, creating a direct link between the peasant producers and the European purchasers of 
export crops, and effectively transferring those resources from local to state-backed 
foreign holders.168  
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Colonial administrators next took control of distributing agricultural inputs, including 
seeds, fertilizers, and tools. Boone details the emergence of these cooperatives and their 
link to systems of credit and input under British control: 
After World War II, colonial regimes sought to increase the productivity and output 
of peasant producers by distributing credit and agricultural inputs through village 
cooperatives. To finance this, cooperatives acquired debt in the name of the 
collectivity. Pressuring families to repay debts, allocating state-financed credit, 
distributing inputs, and weighing and purchasing the crop were tasks placed in the 
hands of village-level cooperative officials. The system enhanced the power of 
these authorities and the vulnerability of farming families to decisions made by 
local-level agents of the state. The financial cycle was completed when debt 
payments were deducted from the proceeds from sales to the marketing boards. 
Cooperatives gave local-level authorities another means of controlling the 
distribution of productive resources within the community. Simultaneously, they 
gave the state and European merchant houses another mechanism for extracting 
surpluses from peasant farmers.169 
These measures were designed to improve output by increasing peasant production, 
which allowed them to extract greater surplus without encouraging the rise of commercial 
farms that would undermine the political and economic system they could control.170 The 
establishment of these cooperatives was followed shortly by the introduction of 
marketing boards. After World War II, the British in Gold Coast further rooted its 
stranglehold by creating a cocoa marketing board in order to control to whom producers 
could sell their product. Rather than trading directly with companies seeking the raw 
materials, all cocoa sales must be conducted through the state. The board buys the 
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commodity from peasants at the price they fix, and sells it on the international market at 
prevailing global prices, pocketing the surplus revenue.171  
Through these policies, the colonial state was able to ensure itself a steady supply of 
resources and complete control of the cash crop economy. It averted potential 
consolidation into larger production units by keeping peasant farmers afloat. To this end, 
the state took control of the distribution of inputs for agriculture production, charged 
peasant producers for the inputs provided, and determined to whom the output could be 
sold at prices fixed by the state. They kept the smallholder from accumulating enough 
surplus to grow by fixing prices below market level, and redirecting the profit to British 
merchant houses and the colonial state that supported them.  
Agricultural production under this system remained technologically stagnant. Surplus 
was extracted from the rural economy, leaving indigenous producers unable to save and 
invest in more efficient technologies. Nor was British capital invested in the production 
end of agribusiness. The British accumulated wealth through buying from the producer 
cheaply and selling at high prices, which left no incentive to take direct ownership of the 
productive land and invest in innovative modes of production. Rodney calls the failure to 
change the technology of agricultural production the “most decisive failure of 
colonialism,” noting that the vast majority of Africans “went into colonialism with a hoe 
and came out with a hoe.”172 Into the 1960s, the main instruments of agriculture 
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production continued to be hoes, cutlasses, axes, and knives.173 This was at least partly a 
result of the incentives built into a system where neither the indigenous farmer nor the 
large foreign merchant houses had any reason to invest in better production techniques, 
since one would not be able to keep the profits either way, and the other could keep them 
only so long as peasant production remained exactly as it was.     
The system of extraction and appropriation of surplus depended on agricultural 
production characterized by the peasant social structure. Small farms worked by family 
members, and land held but not owned, meant little to no overhead costs for land or 
labor. It was this system that kept the cost of cocoa production extraordinarily low and 
allowed profit to be made by the colonial powers in buying cheaply from indigenous 
cocoa producers. So long as production remained the domain of family farms split up into 
many small producers, this also ensured that producers would need to use state-controlled 
mechanisms for marketing and distribution. Consolidation into larger production units 
held by individuals with greater resources at their command would have meant the 
eventual destruction of this system. Continued economic and political dominance by the 
colonial state thus depended on the survival of the peasantry in their present social and 
economic position.174  
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Expansion of production and productivity in the rural economy would have “necessarily 
implied the dissolution of peasant forms of production.”175 The peasantry dissolves in the 
process of modernization, as they lose access to the resources that underpin peasant 
society (mainly, land) to consolidation.176 Over the long term, consolidation would have 
fundamentally changed power dynamics in a way that would undermine the colonial 
state’s control of production and ultimately, society. Large landowners with accumulated 
wealth of their own not only present a challenge to state authority in the form of demands 
for secure property rights, accountability, and the resulting constraints on government 
autonomy, but it would also disrupt the smallholders’ access to land. Under the colonial 
state, this mattered because they needed the value of land to remain minimal; under the 
post-colonial state, this would later matter also because electoral politics was introduced 
before independence. Elected rulers in a highly rural society were at risk of an additional 
challenge from political competitors who could capture the support of Ghana’s large 
population of small farmers whose social and material basis would be under threat with 
these changes.177  
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To block this development from moving forward, the colonial state “responded with 
efforts to retard the disintegration of the peasantry.”178 The peasantry could retain their 
access to resources, so long as the output from those resources went to the colonial state. 
As a result, rural society would remain only partially modernized: participating in a larger 
economy as commodity producers for a global market yet blocked from full participation 
by the interjection of the state. Maintaining the status of the peasantry was a multi-
pronged effort including measures political and economic, overt and covert. Publicly, it 
was often couched in terms of enforcing tradition, protecting culture and community, and 
respecting custom; its underlying purpose was to incorporate the rural population into the 
state-enforced customary order that would guarantee its economic position.179 For the 
peasantry, this meant continued access to land, resources, and position as the primary 
agricultural producers. For the colonial state, this meant they could continue to dominate 
production and distribution systems. This was accomplished through the cooptation of 
existing sources of authority built into village life.  
Under the guise of protecting and supporting “customary” practices, the colonial state 
codified the chief’s powers into law. This had a dual purpose: first, it consolidated 
responsibilities that traditionally had spanned different levels of society into one position. 
Customary law granted the chiefs powers that were not typically fully vested in the 
chieftaincy in the precolonial era. This included the power to collect taxes, conscript for 
labor, adjudicate cases, and distribute land, but they functioned without judicial restraint 
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and eventually, became positions approved (and in some cases, even appointed) by the 
colonial administration.180 In this sense, the chiefs became legislator, administrator, 
judge, and policeman combined, vastly expanding the power of the chief while 
eliminating internal checks and balances that existed in pre-colonial society.181  
Second, by fusing these powers into one position and making it answerable only to the 
colonial authorities, it ultimately vested this new authority in the colonial state. Gold 
Coast chiefs were autonomous within their own regions, but dependent on the colonial 
state: “they acted as intermediaries in implementing directives from the state, and were 
supervised, [and later even appointed], by them.”182 Initially, colonial rule was resisted by 
the chiefs, until the state began to underwrite their local authority and provide them a 
means of retaining their power and position. The station of the chief had always been one 
of wealth and power, which was not eradicated, but was irrevocably and fundamentally 
changed. Their duties put the chiefs in a position of control over substantial local 
resources: labor (sometimes coerced), tax and tribute, and the distribution of key 
agricultural inputs, including land. This position brought with it significant economic and 
political benefits. With the introduction of colonial rule, and customary rule suddenly 
subordinate to the former, but insulated from below, chiefs were better served under the 
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new system by collaboration with the colonial powers.183 This is one of the most crucial 
changes that would impact democratic institutions a century later. Traditional society had 
developed complex systems of checks and balances that were rooted in its own historical 
development;184 the subordination of the chiefs to the colonial state may have 
undermined their traditional basis of authority, but it also reversed the balance of power 
between society and its rulers, warping it into an authoritarian system where political 
power was generated not from below, but from above.  
The way the colonial state used chiefs to shore up their power through indirect rule was at 
bottom, a way of making them dependent on the state and allying their interests at least 
partially with those of the colonial overlords. The related projects of keeping rural 
production small, scattered, and powerless through peasantization, and incorporating the 
traditional political elite into the state combined to subvert existing sources of power 
within society to the state’s own ends. This process placed the chiefs “at the center of the 
simultaneous destruction and preservation of pre-modern modes of production.”185  
The survival of this system from each key position – chief, peasant, state – was upheld by 
the system of land allocation. The centrality of land alienation in the development of 
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political constraints has been covered extensively in the literature.186 Property rights 
matter because, depending on the system employed, they either distribute land equitably 
and prevent accumulation, or they allow the distribution of land in a way that encourages 
accumulation, efficiency, and productivity. 187 Out of this accumulation develops a class 
with not only an interest in constraining the reach of the state, but the power and access to 
compel the state to be responsive to its needs. Often this power comes from the resource 
base this class provides to the state in the form of tax revenue. The state may have an 
interest in complying with these demands, because it increases productivity and therefore, 
increases the overall resource base. Either way, the state may have little choice, since this 
class already controls a significant portion of the resource pool. This presents the state 
with a conundrum: allowing the expansion of the resource base means relinquishing 
power by placing certain rights beyond its reach. This was not an option for the colonial 
state, nor was it necessary since its operating revenue came primarily from the home 
country. The legacy of the colonial system would later present enormous difficulties for 
the post-colonial state, which would have to face the dilemma of power consolidation 
versus economic development in a way the colonial state did not. For the colonial 
government in Gold Coast, the choice was not so difficult. Institutions were designed for 
extraction, not economic development.188 Revenue was generated through direct 
                                                          
186  A number of authors have written on the importance of land rights. See Moore, Social Origins; North, 
Structure and Change; a large number of articles by Catherine Boone, and various articles and book 
chapters written by Naomi Chazan.   
 
187 Though in practice, the actual distribution is often not equitable at all, and the politically powerful end 
up enjoying privileged access under more “equitable” systems. 
 
188 Whatley points out that conversely, in settler colonies (not the Gold Coast), colonial settlers settle and 
produce, resulting in property rights, which constrain the state, thus encouraging economic development. 
102 
 
compulsory acquisition of the productive output. The eventual economic stagnation that 
would inevitably result from this was irrelevant to a foreign power that didn’t need other 
sectors of the economy to grow.  
Nor did the colonial state want the economy to advance far enough such that it would 
present a challenge to its rule. Preventing accumulation of land by the indigenous 
population was a central goal of a colonial state that feared the large acquisition of land 
by private treaty by individuals.189 They undertook a compulsory acquisition project to 
transfer ownership to the state where individuals in the Gold Coast owned large tracts of 
land. Since individuals who privately owned large tracts of land were relatively few, this 
was accomplished by direct transfer to the state, sometimes with compensation, 
sometimes without.190 Throughout most of the countryside, setting up “customary” land 
tenure systems would suffice to keep land broken up.  
The British government set up the West African Lands Committee (WALC) to 
investigate the impact of the cash crop economy on indigenous producers; it was found 
that in the Gold Coast, where the economy had become most advanced, individual 
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ownership and sale of land were responsible for the gradual emergence of rural elite and 
proletariat classes.191 WALC wrote: 
Native rule depends upon the native land system. If it is the policy of the 
government to govern the natives through themselves, subject to European 
supervision, retaining what is useful in their institutions, the native system of land 
tenure must be preserved at all costs.192 
The document goes on to define the native system of land tenure in a way that prevented 
it being bought or sold, despite evidence that purchase and individual holding of land 
occurred before colonization. This is because it wasn’t designed to preserve pre-colonial 
society, as public statements would imply, but to “preserve, or rather create, a system that 
would guarantee the economic prosperity of the colony. That prosperity could be 
guaranteed by ensuring the numerical predominance of a small cash-cropping peasantry 
that farmed on lineage land, used family labor, and grew most of its own food crops.”193  
In the early years of colonization, the Gold Coast economy had already been on its way 
to the complete commodification of land. Farmers increasingly viewed land as individual 
property with the commensurate rights to buy and sell it, a practice that had become 
commonplace until it was identified by the colonial state as a threat to cheap cocoa 
production.194 The colonial state’s “re-institutionalization” of customary land tenure 
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guaranteed that farmers would remain tied to the land, producing small individual 
quantities for a market the state could control.195 By depriving the indigenous population 
of private property rights that would give them control over their economic choices, it 
simultaneously ensured that no independent class of producers would emerge to 
challenge European hegemony. After the commission’s report was released, purchase and 
sale of land and individual ownership was no longer recognized and the chiefs were 
granted full control of land allocation under native authority.196  
This system of land allocation had the dual effect of keeping peasant farmers small and 
scattered, and preventing further growth. Land outside direct state control was defined as 
a customary and communal possession, outside the scope of the market.197 Peasants who 
farmed the land had no say over what happens to it because they did not actually own it. 
They could not grow their farming operation any larger than the plot of land allocated for 
their household, and could not sell it to those who might want to consolidate, rendering 
the land virtually unusable for a fully commercial-scale operation. Seeing as it is their 
only resource, no smallholder is likely to give up their allotment of land without 
compensation, but they cannot collect compensation for a resource they do not own; they 
cannot sell it and they cannot feasibly move off of it. The only access to resources that 
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remains to them is to stay on the land and continue to farm it, with food on their small 
plot going to their own subsistence, and the surplus to the state. The continued assurance 
of customary access to, but not outright ownership of, land, guarantees the peasant farmer 
some degree of security, but renders them powerless against the authority that distributes 
access.  
Under this system of “customary” land tenure, individual households remained the 
primary producers of agricultural output. This had several key benefits for the colonial 
state. It kept economic development from growing beyond the state’s control. Through 
the cooptation of the chiefs, it ensured political control in the countryside where the state 
had a limited presence. It slowed the rate at which economic activity chipped away the 
social structure on which they depended for political and economic control, it guaranteed 
continued cheap extraction of agricultural surplus from the countryside, and it kept the 
supply coming without having to invest in methods of cultivation that would improve 
productive efficiency.198 
In order to retain control of the allocation of resources, the state needed to ensure that 
land would continue to be distributed by political (rather than market) mechanisms. This 
was particularly salient in prosperous cocoa-producing areas of the Gold Coast, where 
land was appreciating in value.199 Increased land value tends to create pressure toward the 
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commoditization of land, where money can be made in its buying and selling. To assure 
the colonial state’s continued access to cheap output in this context, it was important that 
the bulk of cocoa be grown on family plots that would not require a capital outlay for the 
land.200 The colonial state guaranteed this by confirming the power of the chiefs over 
land allocation and transfer of land-use rights.201  
Chiefs, backed by the weight of the colonial state, were given the authority to disperse 
and regulate land declared “communal.”202 By placing it under native authority, the state 
ensured the compliance of the chiefs, and constructed a fully hierarchical relationship 
from the colonial state to the indigenous chief to their subjects.203 The power to allocate 
land gave chiefs the “carrots and sticks that they used to govern their rural subjects” and 
served to place those who had control of it over those who worked and needed access to 
it.204 This buttressed the powerful position of the chiefs, effectively securing their 
collaboration in shoring up political and economic control of the countryside. In this way, 
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the state extended its reach into rural areas by using a modified (and significantly more 
powerful) form of existing institutions.205  
The mutually supportive political and economic structures erected around the production 
of cash crops both relied on the land tenure system. Political allocation of land based on 
tribal identities, which were tied to geographical areas, effectively tied people tied to the 
land since the only way to acquire that resource was by remaining in their kin groups. 
This was intended to ward off the possibility of rebellion, since it kept most of the 
population scattered throughout the countryside rather than congregating in cities.206 It 
also ensured that the chief’s position at the top of the hierarchy in descent-based groups 
would survive any economic development wrought by the cash crop economy, since the 
main productive resource could only be accessed through that authority. The 
development of markets enabling the sale and purchase of land would have undermined 
this position, leaving the state vulnerable to economic transformations that might have 
challenged their hegemony.207 In this sense, colonialism didn’t completely undermine 
traditional authority, as goes the usual story. Economic development was seen to weaken 
traditional authority structures; the colonial state instead preserved it in a manner that it 
saw as useful. They reinforced traditional authority by codifying it into law, but in so 
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doing, ultimately warped its original nature by making it simultaneously subordinate to 
the state and free of internal checks and balances.  
More importantly, the political allocation of land left agriculture’s most important 
productive resource firmly under the control of the state. For the colonial state, it didn’t 
matter that the day-to-day exercise of that power was in the hands of customary 
authorities, so long as they could keep them complicit in the economic system through 
mutual interest. The commercialization of agriculture was a central project of the colonial 
state, but it could only ever be partial, given their need to control it. Agriculture’s 
development was stunted by the need to prevent the commodification and accumulation 
of land, and the insulation of peasant society from the forces of modernization.   
For the colonial state, which prioritized extraction and control over long-term 
development, these two requirements were paramount. Though the colonial era did usher 
in the commercialization of agriculture insofar as they were now producing surplus for a 
market, it was done in a way that preserved traditional ties to land and labor, prevented 
the accumulation of indigenous capital, and retained old modes of production. The partial 
commercialization of agriculture during the colonial era only extended to cash crops for 
export, but not to food production. As a result, food production in Gold Coast remained 
dominated by subsistence farming (producing primarily for their own households). 
Production methods for farming remained inefficient. The plough, which had by then 
become the fundamental tool of intensive farming throughout Eurasia, was never adopted 
in Gold Coast.208 Though this lack of better technologies is often blamed for the 
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inefficient production methods, the causal arrow also runs the other way. Without the 
accumulation of sufficient capital to invest in better technology, or enough land under 
one holding to support greater productivity, there is little incentive to adopt more efficient 
methods of cultivation; thus the political allocation of land blocked incentives for 
innovation and investment in more efficient methods.  
Efficient production techniques in agriculture is also critical to economic development. It 
“increases the area of land a man can cultivate and hence makes possible a substantial 
rise in productivity; this in turn means a greater surplus for the maintenance of specialist 
crafts, for the growth of differences in wealth and in styles of life, for developments in 
urban (non-agricultural) life.”209 Accumulating individual wealth and shifting to more 
complex economies begins with commercial agriculture: with having a reliable food 
supply so that most individuals are not spending all their time trying to keep themselves 
and their families fed. For the producers, they can now use their resources (land and 
labor) to produce for a market, accumulate a surplus, and generate personal wealth to use 
for non-food items. This allows others to rely on those producers for food and spend their 
time producing non-food items, for which there will now be a market. Increasing 
agriculture’s efficiency is where the seeds of industrialization and (healthy) urbanization 
lie. Without the ability to produce agricultural surplus sufficient to feed a growing urban 
population, these social and economic changes that propel industrialization cannot take 
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place.210 As the colonial era drew near its end in Gold Coast, this process left significant 
structural constraints on the development of the urban economy.  
On top of this, colonial restrictions on African enterprise and the monopolization of 
lucrative business opportunities by British firms prevented most local businessmen from 
participating fully in a capitalist urban economy; African participation was largely 
limited to small-scale commerce or cash cropping for European export.211 The 
Association of West African Merchants (AWAM), which had become a forum for 
consultation between the European trading firms and the colonial government, entered a 
Merchandise Agreement designed to limit competition in the retail sector.212  Local 
retailers participated in the economy on terms of credit granted by the United Africa 
Company (UAC), which kept them in a largely dependent relationship with European 
merchant houses; other locals were increasingly employed as salesmen, managers, clerks, 
and salaried storekeepers, which gave rise to a middle class that produced a demand for 
imported manufactured goods but did not own capital or fuel the growth of indigenous 
business.213  
Some interpretations of the relationship between the colonial state and the large European 
firms contend that the departing governments deliberately structured the economy to 
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remain reliant on the expat firms and that one of their key policy goals during 
decolonization was to protect British business interests. This line of thought was very 
influential in Africa in the immediate post-colonial period and led to a strong anti-
capitalist streak in the nationalist movement that carried Gold Coast to independence. 
Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence President, himself wrote Neo-Colonialism: 
The Last Stage of Imperialism in 1965. However, British government officials had done 
little to assist British business interests on their way out, and the period between World 
War II and independence was characterized by conflicting policies and strained relations 
between the firms and the colonial government.214 The main British firms involved in 
cocoa processing and exporting departed not long after independence, and when asked to 
return to Ghana by the Busia administration in 1969, elected not to reestablish local 
operations. This casts doubt on the proposition that the economic difficulties in later 
Ghana were due to its being beset by a designed neocolonialist economy.   
Yet the structure of the economy during the colonial era did leave a lasting impact. The 
development of a strong private sector that might pose challenges to colonial rule was 
effectively stymied by the combination of structural constraints rooted in the agriculture 
system and the deliberate crowding out of local business. The indigenous population was 
unable to accumulate land or capital, both necessary inputs for efficient agriculture 
production, and a prerequisite for industrialization and a strong urban business sector. 
These conditions were highly unfavorable to the emergence of a robust African 
bourgeoisie; without the ability to accumulate capital and create economic growth 
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independent of the colonial merchant houses (and later, multinational firms), the wealth 
of the indigenous elite was highly dependent on larger forces, and did little to build their 
independent power.215 By the time independence was granted after nearly a century under 
this system, what little merchant class did exist locally was small and weak. Furthermore, 
it was solely urban-based; there was no landowning rural class of capitalist farmers with 
which to ally.  
This matters for the type of government that emerges because this is the class whose 
primary concern is to protect their property and wealth. They will therefore push for the 
rule of law (rather than the rule of rulers), limiting the powers of the state, and placing 
certain rights beyond the scope of government. This class is uniquely positioned to 
accomplish this because it also has command of sufficient resources to compel the state 
to respect these constraints. When there is a powerful alliance of interests on this, it 
prohibits the state from being able to rule arbitrarily. The state must acknowledge certain 
limits on itself, or risk losing the resource base on which it depends; in turn, these very 
limits are designed to ensure the state’s continued reliance on that class of resource 
holders. This produces a constraining effect that historically has led to the development 
of representative institutions, effective and long-lasting constitutions, and eventually, 
electoral democracy. In Gold Coast, as it approached independence, these powerful social 
forces were decidedly missing; any locally-based resistance to the state’s control of 
economic life that did exist was too weak and isolated to be effective. Instead, in the Gold 
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Coast, soon to be Ghana, a different sort of “petite bourgeoisie” began to emerge, whose 
very existence depended on the state apparatus itself.  
In the countryside, the state absorbed the emerging rural bourgeoisie with a twofold 
strategy to undermine their economic position and coopt them into the existing political 
system. The first major challenge to state dominance in the rural economy came from the 
cocoa brokers. This class was the primary force behind early capitalist development, 
including the commercialization of lineage lands before the WALC report changed state 
policy.216 These middlemen (the first of whom were also farmers, who through brokering 
found a way to accumulate and consolidate cocoa operations even in a system where they 
could not expand their own farms) gathered larger quantities of cocoa from the scattered 
smallholders. As the broker system took root and expanded, they gained economic 
strength, and the European purchasing firms came to depend on them for cocoa.217 The 
British trade firms responded to this development with the 1937 Buying Agreement, the 
intention of which was “to utilize the firms’ collective monopoly power to break the 
brokers’ autonomy and reduce their financial reward.”218 Cocoa farmers suffering lower 
prices, partly fueled by a dip in the global market, and partly by the impact of the new 
arrangement, combined forces with the cocoa brokers to institute the great cocoa holdup 
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of 1938-39.219 When the colonial government stepped in directly in 1939 with the Cocoa 
Control Scheme, the state would thereafter expropriate much of the surplus, and the fate 
of a rural capitalist class was sealed. 
This handful of relatively wealthy cocoa farmers, differentiated by access to land, capital, 
and wage labor, and identified as an emergent petty bourgeoisie, led the cocoa holdups 
with the backing of the brokers.220 Now seen as potentially threatening the political and 
economic order, they had to be dealt with as well. However small the group, they 
represented the greatest possibility for systemic transformation; this was handled by 
cooptation. The government began incorporating them into the aristocratic political 
structures that ruled the rural areas (albeit under colonial supervision). Alongside the 
Cocoa Control Scheme introduced in 1939, the colonial state passed an ordinance 
“establishing the legal basis for the appointment of persons holding no hereditary office 
to hereditary councils such as the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs.”221 Rather than 
changing the system, the emerging rural bourgeoisie found a place in the existing 
political order, where economic gains could be garnered through positions of authority. 
This significantly altered the position of this emerging class, both linking their interests 
with those of the political capital,222 and giving them a stake in maintaining the political 
system that now provides their place it.  
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In the capital city, the majority of the upper and middle stratum of Gold Coast society 
were foreigners, due to the dominance of expats in both the political and economic realm. 
Africans joined the ranks of the urban bourgeoisie in small numbers as the colonial state 
began to incorporate them into higher ranks of the civil service on the eve of 
independence. The dominant element remained professionals, but not big businessmen, 
as there were still significant restrictions on local enterprise.223 The urban middle class 
was thus effectively coopted by adopting them into the state organization. Here, their 
position relied upon the extraction of rural surplus that supplied state revenue, which 
likewise relied upon retaining existing relations of production in the countryside.  
Much like the early democracies of western Europe, political developments during 
democratization were mainly about the satisfaction of the emergent class and their 
interests; but instead of seeking greater independence from and limitation of the state, 
their demands centered on jobs provided by the state.224 Whether in urban or rural areas, 
rather than changing the system, the emerging bourgeoisie found a place in the existing 
political order, where socioeconomic status came from political office. State-supported 
relations of production throughout the countryside, underpinned by the land tenure 
system, served to impede the emergence of an economically vibrant and independent 
rural class both before and after independence.225 Their absence, combined with state 
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control of rural surplus, would provide the material and political basis for incorporating 
the independence era elite into “new political classes linked to the state.”226 Powerful 
interests converged once again to move history forward, but in a way that pushed post-
colonial governance toward a state that beneath the surface, would bear significant 
resemblances to its predecessor.  
Post-Colonial Institution Building 
Decisions taken by the colonial state about how to manage resource extraction and 
political control had far-reaching implications for Gold Coast, later Ghanaian, society. 
Sorting out which of these were intended and which unforeseen isn’t an exact science. 
Documents between British officials during the colonial era were relatively forthcoming 
regarding intent: usually, the extraction of resources by whatever means were most 
economically and politically expedient. The colonial state’s understanding of how the 
preservation of traditional social structures were required to underwrite this strategy is 
spelled out in the pages of historical documentation. Less clear is whether they also 
intended the long-term crippling of social transformation and economic growth. It is 
likely that this was intended to the extent that it preserved British power over their Gold 
Coast subjects, but that little was foreseen, or even considered, beyond that. The colonists 
did not arrive in Gold Coast already looking to a possible future where it might no longer 
be under British rule. Events leading to independence unfolded comparatively quickly, 
given the total amount of time spend under colonial governance. Gold Coast was the first 
sub-Saharan colony to gain independence, and its occurrence was largely unpredictable 
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until it was nearly upon them. This relatively brief time frame represented a critical 
juncture with all the accompanying opportunities for directional change; but the structural 
constraints227 under which these developments would take place had by then been long 
rooted in decisions made by the colonial state beginning over a century prior.  
The colonial era is where the locus of control over society’s economic surplus shifted 
decidedly to the state, but the post-independence government would prove 
simultaneously determined to retain that control, and steered toward it by the limited 
options available. At the time of independence, the majority of private enterprise was 
foreign-owned, with few Ghanaian businessmen to speak of.228 The colonial economic 
system had effectively crowded out the indigenous private sector, leaving behind a lack 
of wealth-accumulating classes, well-established mechanisms for resource extraction, and 
the rural society to support this. The weakness of an indigenous class of merchants had 
several serious implications: it would fail to exact limitations on the new state, it was not 
large enough to provide a resource base in the form of taxation, and it was not dynamic 
enough to stimulate immediate economic growth.  
Colonial governments didn’t establish states that sought complete political rule.229 Their 
priority was economic extraction, using just enough political control to meet that goal. 
The post-colonial states that succeeded them sought to establish political control 
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throughout the countryside but would have to do so without modern political institutions 
and in the context of a pre-modern social structure codified by law and supported by 
strong political and economic incentives. What the colonial state did leave were 
mechanisms of economic control, which would then be used by post-colonial regimes to 
attempt to establish both political and economic dominance.  
The colonial state set up a handful of (at least the façade of) democratic institutions, 
which were underwritten by the economic incapacitation of indigenous society. Africans 
weren’t permitted to set up businesses that competed against the Europeans, so local 
industries were practically non-existent.230 Out of the few emerging indigenous 
merchants centered in urban areas, a “small bourgeoisie of sorts appeared upon the 
historical stage,” but only briefly.231 The capitalist impulse hit a wall where it met the 
rigid structure of peasant society cemented by the colonial system of resource extraction. 
The structure of rural society at independence more closely resembled the peasant 
societies of pre-modern than contemporary Europe, with no class of wealth-accumulating 
farmers. This was juxtaposed with an emergent urban bourgeoisie too fragile to resist the 
post-colonial state’s absorption of private wealth.232 If economic development and 
growth was to occur under these conditions, only the state was left positioned to lead it.  
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These structural conditions, created by much earlier choices, laid the groundwork on 
which the post-colonial state took over. It determined the balance of power between the 
state and society and limited the options available to the new state. The choices actually 
made by the post-colonial state were not predetermined, but they were heavily influenced 
by the colonial legacy. The locals had seen the potential power of a strong business sector 
in their experience with the British merchant houses. The alliance between European 
business and the colonial state underscored the danger of this, for it had kept the locals 
under its thumb for years. The state-business coalition that ran colonial-era Gold Coast 
was arguably one in which business was often the dominant partner. This is evidenced by 
the power of European merchants to change government policies while African resistance 
was generally ignored.233  
Kohli points out that any given society has multiple sources of political power: the power 
of centralized coercion and its legitimate use by the state, the power of capital and other 
property ownership wielded by the economic elites, and the power of numbers when 
workers or peasants are well-organized.234 When these source of power are in 
equilibrium, with each group having sufficient strength to constrain the others, stable 
democratic society emerges from the healthy balance. In Ghana, the state set on a 
campaign to co-opt the other sources of power; most particularly the power of capital, 
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which was already pitifully weak. The first post-independence regime, led by Kwame 
Nkrumah, was exceedingly anxious about the balance of power between business and the 
state. According to a senior advisor, Nkrumah feared that a flourishing business sector 
would ultimately become a rival power to the new state, choosing instead to limit 
indigenous capitalism to small-scale operations.235 The irony of this is that as economic 
activity came increasingly under state control, Ghana ended up with the same state-
business collusion situation the Gold Coast experienced. Only this time, the balance of 
power would favor the state, with disastrous results for the economy. The new state also 
had to face a conundrum that the colonial state was largely able to avoid: how to 
reconcile the goal of long-term economic development with that of shoring up political 
control. The choices made by the state mattered a great deal here, for by prioritizing the 
latter over the former, and deliberately hampering the growth of indigenous capitalism, 
they would guarantee economic stagnation, which eventually came to sow the seeds of 
political instability.  
Nkrumah attempted to reconcile the dual goals of development and control through 
“complete ownership of the economy by the state.”236 The Ghanaian economy entailed 
four main sectors: state-owned, joint state/private, the co-operative sector, and the private 
sector (which mainly consisted of foreign firms), all of which were controlled in various 
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ways by the central government.237 State plans entailed three key pushes for shoring up 
control: marginalize existing business, transferring resources from private ownership to 
the state, and establishing dominance over the economy such that no new private business 
could enter. The marginalization of private business met the twin goals of pushing 
economic activity into the state sector and further weakening the existing class of 
merchants and businessmen. Ghanaian private enterprise was permitted only on a small 
scale and was contingent upon its willingness to operate within the state’s framework.238 
This ensured that no firm or dominant group of firms would command enough resources 
to oppose the state, and the business sector would remain fragmented enough to reduce 
any collective threat.239  
The state still had to contend with the need for greater capital resources it could not 
produce without the help of private enterprise. Underscoring the new state’s extreme 
aversion to a strong business class, Nkrumah chose as a solution to partner with the 
much-vilified foreign firms. Despite the long history of domination by foreign economic 
interests, it posed the lesser political threat to the state, because the state could impose 
conditions directly on foreign capital. These conditions were designed to ensure the state 
kept the upper hand in its dealings with business, including requirements that foreign 
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enterprises give the government the first option to buy their shares.240 Foreign firms 
became the state’s new partner in running the economy, leaving indigenous business 
unable to break into monopolized sectors. These he controlled through high prices, 
restricting repatriation of profits, controlling the importation of inputs, and even direct 
expropriation in some cases.241 Foreign firms that competed with the post-colonial state 
for cocoa supply (the state’s main source of revenue) were closed down completely 
through legislation, pushing the local cocoa brokers out of business along with them.242 
This further sidelined local business activity, since the small traders and storekeepers (to 
which indigenous business was relegated) were highly dependent on the large firms as 
their primary supply of goods for their shops, and credit that allowed them to keep their 
shops stocked with these goods until sales were made and the bills paid.243  
These policies were based on political calculations but were taken within the context of 
existing structural constraints; Nkrumah himself acknowledged that foreign capital was 
necessary due to the lack of a local bourgeoise class to make investments.244 Foreign 
investors were also better positioned to deliver quicker results. An indigenous capitalist 
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class could not be pulled from the sky to deliver economic development when it had been 
long undermined, crippled, and blocked from emerging. In any case, the alternatives 
available to the new state were limited; if the colonial context structured the limitations 
faced by Ghanaian society, the choices made by post-colonial leadership further 
entrenched them.  
After independence, the state rapidly became involved in every facet of the economy. 
They were not just the rule-makers and enforcers, but were part and parcel of economic 
activity. While squeezing revenue out of productive sectors (most notably, cocoa 
production), government consumption ballooned, growing four times as fast as private 
consumption in the period immediately following independence.245 Not including 
government spending classified as ‘developmental,’ government expenditures grew in 
real terms at 10 per cent annually in the same period.246 The state used its rule-making 
and coercive power to make it increasingly difficult for private business to compete. 
Recall the institutions game in which the winning team is permitted to make a rule that 
structures the subsequent rounds. In every iteration of this game, no matter the varying 
demographics of the groups with whom I’ve conducted the exercise, the winners make 
rules that favor its continued dominance. The longer the game goes on, the more 
entrenched the winners and losers become, and the more difficult it becomes to break the 
pattern. State policies after independence were similarly designed to edge out private 
industry and favor the increasing role of the state. Using and building on existing colonial 
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institutions, the new state moved to fill openings in the business sector left by the colonial 
state’s departure and institutionalize state control of the economy.247 
This was achieved by first setting up new institutions and repurposing old ones to reflect 
the new power dynamics, which, in light of overwhelming electoral popularity, favored 
Nkrumah’s government. The Ghana National Trading Company (GNTC) was transferred 
to state ownership and its role expanded to include the allocation of goods and services 
“necessary to the functioning of the local economy,” including the import and 
distribution of milk, rice, flour, and sugar.248 The government expanded its role in trade, 
insurance, banking,249 agriculture, transportation, and manufacturing, and set up the 
Industrial Development Corporation to oversee the establishment of several state-owned 
enterprises. Foreign owners of profitable firms were kicked out of Ghana, and their 
businesses taken over by the GNTC. When the state attempted to sell some of these to 
private individuals (albeit with conditions attached), structural conditions reared their 
ugly head again when no local buyers were financially or managerially prepared to take 
over these corporations.250  
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This suited the new state; the original plan had been to hand commercial enterprise over 
to private operators when they became viable,251 but this plan didn’t last long under the 
post-colonial government. In 1960, Nkrumah announced that they would emphasize 
cooperatives rather than encourage Ghanaians to start private business enterprises, and 
that state enterprises would not be handed off to private interests.252 Fully aware of the 
structural limitations, he declared that “private business must now stand on its own 
feet.”253 Between the lines was that they would have to do so against state competition 
backed by the power of law. Prior to this, the state had ostensibly been more willing to 
assist private enterprise,254 but in practice, the policy “change” toward the 
marginalization of private business amounted to little more than publicly pronouncing 
what they were already doing. On a small-scale, preference was occasionally given to 
locally-owned businesses where it didn’t threaten other interests and did not compete 
with the state sector or with foreign business interests where they were aligned with the 
state.255 The bank tasked with assisting Ghanaian business was limited to ‘small business 
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concerns’; and regardless, funneled 91 per cent of its loans to the state sector instead.256 
Different suppositions have emerged over this change in policy, one of which is that 
Nkrumah simply couldn’t wait for the private sector to grow to meet his expectations for 
rapid industrialization. Nkrumah’s own statements occasionally support this view, as he 
repeatedly laments in public the weakness of African capital. Killick dismisses this as 
disingenuous given evidence that Nkrumah was inimical to an indigenous capitalist class 
prior to that.257 Further supporting the latter view is that despite assurance of the 
government’s intent to assist Ghanaian business, no plan was followed through on. In 
practice, the state began shifting resources from the private sector to its own from the 
beginning.  
By the end of the first decade of independence, 83 percent of the total gross output of 
state enterprises was produced in industries in which state concerns contributed 75 
percent or more of the total output of the industry; in six industries, the state accounted 
for the whole output.258 This monopolization of major industries created market 
distortions that pushed private industry out of business. Very few of the state-owned 
enterprises showed profitability, as they functioned primarily as political institutions, in 
many cases selling goods at below the cost of production. With the introduction of the 
1962 Control of Prices Act, price ceilings outlawed the selling of goods at a higher price 
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than that set by the control.259 In effect, a private producer could legally sell a good for 
more than the state was selling it; however, the state was selling goods at below 
production costs, undermining the viability of private businesses. The law clearly was 
directed at more than its declared aim of controlling consumer prices. If the state is 
making the same product and selling it at a lower price, the majority of consumers would 
choose to buy the cheaper version from the state, making additional legislation largely 
unnecessary for price controls. The actual effect of the law was to ensure private firms 
could not make a profit, effectively driving the private sector out of industries where they 
compete with state firms. Once private industry was removed, state firms were free to 
produce inefficiently, continuing to function in its political role, and even make (state-
owned) money without the pressure of competition.260  
State monopolization of large parts of industry also meant other inputs were not available 
to private industry, including spare parts, raw materials, bank credit and financing, 
foreign exchange, and skilled manpower (which was already in short supply).261 The 
fledgling industrial sector desperately needed inputs that couldn’t be sourced 
domestically, given the infant state of the economy. This meant the demand for imported 
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goods to support the industrialization project rapidly created a balance of payments 
problem, as Ghana imported far more than it could produce for export. To correct the 
imbalance and stave off the resulting debt crisis, import controls were imposed. This 
created shortages in many goods necessary to keep production moving. Since the priority 
of the state was to shift control in its own favor, import licenses were allocated in 
accordance with that goal.262 This meant that the private sector could not acquire the 
inputs it needed to keep running.263  
Private firms faced an additional barrier in the foreign exchange allocation system. Even 
if an import license could be acquired (usually through the payment of a bribe to a state 
official), foreign exchange credit was needed to import items. Foreign exchange was also 
allocated in accordance with political priorities, and the state’s monopolization of the 
available credit successfully restricted private access to foreign goods and transport 
services, both of which are necessary for private enterprise to function.264 This was not 
merely an unforeseen byproduct, but an intentional transfer of resources from the private 
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sector to the state.265 This move had the additional advantage of taking control of the 
resources of foreign firms. Restricting MNC’s access to currency exchange impacted 
their ability to repatriate profits, and “put private enterprise at the mercy of civil servants 
and politicians.”266 The threat of scaring away further investment was not sufficient to 
stay the state’s hand when the priority was increasing the role and power of the state over 
private economic development.  
Taking over the setting of the currency exchange rate was another method of imposing 
state control over the economy. It concentrated power in the capital while disempowering 
those who were not politically connected, and excluded both MNEs and rural producers 
from the political process.267 By keeping the local currency deliberately overvalued, the 
state was able to further transfer wealth from the private sector to itself. Ghana’s system 
of taxation and resource distribution allowed this resource transfer with little resistance. 
An overvalued currency meant exporters would receive less of their local currency in 
exchange for goods sold abroad. Exporters don’t fare well, but few businesses were 
exporting in Ghana in the post-independence years; the export industry was almost 
entirely based on cocoa and a handful of other commodities (which often had parallel 
extraction systems). On the other hand, imports are cheaper with an overvalued currency 
because it will require less local currency to buy them. This was to the state’s advantage, 
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because imported goods were being used to build itself up (in the form of state-owned 
industry), and the allocation of imported goods was under state control. The state could 
benefit from the decreased costs in imports, while the extra cost transferred to the export 
side could be mostly borne by private producers through the cocoa marketing 
mechanisms. 
The relative weakness of both foreign business and rural producers (which were primarily 
peasant producers of cash crops) vis-à-vis the state was evident in their inability to resist 
state policies detrimental to their interests.268 The supremacy of the state in the economy 
was well-ensconced by the end of the first decade of independence. When the military 
took over in the first coup in 1966, a rough estimate of the overall share of the state in 
investment was upward of 80 percent,269 13 rural industries were wholly state-owned, and 
the large scale urban industries were owned either in whole or in part by the state.270 
Perhaps most tellingly, in terms of the declining position of private business and the 
increased dependence of the population on the state, is the drastic shift in wage 
employment. Recorded employment in the modern sector of the economy increased by 
110,000 in the eight-year period following independence, from 267,000 at the end of 
1956 to 377,000 by the end of 1964.271 This increase was entirely accounted for by the 
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public sector, where recorded employment rose from 137,000 to 262,000; in contrast, 
employment in the private sector in the same period declined.272  
Each of these successive policy instruments were used to promote the state’s dominance 
in the economy, further entrenching the existing power imbalance. In his article 
unearthing the reasons for the persistent failure of state-business reform coalitions, Scott 
Taylor identifies the sources of state power as its degree of ownership or intervention in 
the economy, its position as the leading contributor to GDP, and its role as the economy’s 
leading employer, all characteristics that accurately describe the Ghanaian economy by 
the end of the 1960s. Under these conditions, the state’s power stems not only from its 
political role as government, but also from the resources it controls.273 The latter is a 
source of power that in a balanced system would have favored the private sector. This 
imbalance at first glance seems ironic, given the oft-lamented weakness of African states 
in the literature, but African states are only weak as compared to developed states. To 
understand the distribution of power between state and society, states such as Ghana must 
be examined within their own context. Compared to private sector institutions, the post-
independence state began in a superior position of which it was fully aware, and used this 
position to ensure its continued dominance.274 In the independence years, politicians in 
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Ghana believed the power of the state to be almost unlimited,275 and to some extent they 
were right: next to the social forces that might have otherwise constrained it, it was. 
Without a strong business sector, the role of the state had become all-encompassing, and 
the ability of the private sector to protect its interests had become nonexistent against the 
unquestioned power of the state.276 Iliffe calls this the most important consequence of the 
lateness of African capitalism, for it set a question mark against the ability of even the 
most vigorous private enterprise to escape ultimate absorption into the public sector.277  
Authors differ on the driving force behind the state’s economic policies. Most economists 
interpret policies with the assumption that their main goal is economic growth and 
development,278 but this not entirely accurate. Political scientists who study economic 
policies tend to focus on the political motives, the most vocal of them arguing that the 
end is to enrich the government itself and use at least part of those resources to buy 
political support to maintain itself in power.279 As the remainder of the chapter proceeds, 
the second story is precisely what unfolds in post-independence Ghana. Ascribing this as 
the primary goal may be hasty, however. Recall that the state and its rulers have dual 
motives: the consolidation of power and the development of the economy. Given the 
often-conflicting nature of these two goals, the concern becomes how to have their cake 
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and eat it too (so to speak), armed with the knowledge that the achievement of the latter 
goal has historically generated pressure to constrain the former.  
Unwilling to cede on either goal, the state never resolved the fundamental conflict 
between the competing objectives of economic development and consolidating political 
control.280 Instead, it built its political structure on the systems of economic extraction 
and allocation, locking it in to a situation where political objectives would supersede 
economic ones. The distribution of resources would thereafter inevitably be determined 
predominantly by political needs, while economic activity primarily functioned as a 
resource to support the political system. The supremacy of political motivations was 
apparent in the way state enterprises and resource allocation systems were managed.281 
The import licensing and foreign exchange systems detailed above that played a key role 
in marginalizing private industry and favoring state enterprises were also subject to 
purely political pressures. Ghana’s Ollennu Commission, tasked with inquiring into 
import license malpractices found that import licenses were typically given out to 
government institutions and corporations, as well as to companies that government 
officials had special interests in.282 Whenever shortages arose, licensing officials came 
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under direct pressure from politicians to grant more licenses, and they invariably gave in, 
despite the long-term impact this would have on Ghana’s debt problems.283  
State enterprises were consistently overmanned with redundant positions as party 
supporters, and even Members of Parliament, were rewarded with state-provided jobs.284 
This should have come as no surprise, since state enterprises have dual purposes to begin 
with, having been partly designed as a source of job creation. In 1965, Nkrumah shifted 
control of labor decisions from the state-owned enterprises directly to his office, 
decreeing that no state agency should make any large-scale retrenchment of labor without 
the approval of Cabinet.285 Given the widespread overstaffing of state enterprises, along 
with persistent mismanagement and lack of competition from private enterprise, few of 
these projects were profitable, much less efficient.286 These enterprises rapidly became a 
drain on the economy, largely because the political purposes they served were frequently 
in conflict with efficient production.  
The distribution of the resources now within reach of the new state was used to 
consolidate support for the first post-independence regime. Much of the resulting system 
through which resources are funneled to the state and then doled out through political 
networks (alternatively called patronage politics, neo-patrimonialism, clientelism) is 
often attributed to culture, but it was at least in part a strategy for consolidating political 
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regimes in the context of post-colonial society. It was a method of garnering support from 
individuals and groups who now depended on the largesse of the new ruling party, and a 
byproduct of the colonial legacy that left Ghana with extractive economic institutions. 
The location of state farms that provide rural employment weren’t chosen because they 
made geographical sense in terms of maximizing already available resources, but to serve 
political purposes.287 Rural towns who supported the regime received water, electricity, 
paved streets, even schools, while others did not.288 The primary rationale that drove 
these institutions wasn’t wealth-generating productivity, but political control. It allowed 
the state to determine who gets access to “public” resources, who will be employed, and 
who will be left out. For individuals, groups, and businesses, support for the regime 
became the determining factor in economic outcomes, giving rise to a system of 
clientelism and patronage as the primary means of political control and economic 
allocation.  
Though these terms are conceptually distinct from corruption, it is a short slide from one 
to the other. Political allocation of resources creates incentives for clientelist practices, 
which in turn foster an environment conducive to corruption: the incentives to offer (and 
accept) bribes and commissions, especially in the context of shortage, are strong.289 I 
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have already detailed the way import restrictions were used to give preference to state 
enterprises and shift resources from the private to the public sector. The only means for 
private actors to access the necessary resources was through the licensing officials in 
charge of allocating import licenses. This created incentives for businessmen to offer, and 
officials to accept, commissions for granting the license. Licenses became a commodity 
up for sale, much like the other goods in short supply; access to all of them could only be 
obtained through state channels. This was foreseen by savvy officials, but overridden by 
the state’s political priorities. In July 1961, the Minister of Finance recommended against 
import controls, acknowledging that they often led to corrupt practices.290 He would 
prove correct: shortages emerged and rumors of corruption in the allocation of licenses 
led to a number of enquiries; these enquiries uncovered no small amount of corrupt 
practices from license forgery by junior officers within the Ministry of Trade,291 to top-
down, ministry-wide procedures designed to obtain bribes in the allocation of import 
licenses.292  
This type of practice, though publicly condemned, was simultaneously sanctioned from 
the top. The awarding of government contracts was used to generate revenue for the state, 
which by then had become synonymous with the ruling party. Firms competing for 
government contracts were required to pay “commissions” to acquire the contract, money 
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intended for party coffers.293 Forms of clientelism and corruption that service political 
ends were considered appropriate and were part and parcel of state business. It was only 
adapting these same practices to provide for personal wealth that was condemned;294 but 
the transition from one into the other ought to have been all too predictable.  
The state-imposed import and foreign exchange controls generated shortages which not 
only allowed political officials to select who had access to economic resources, but also 
created opportunities for siphoning off personal wealth. Under these conditions, demand 
far outstripped supply, and state officials were the gatekeepers that regulated access to 
desperately-needed goods. The goods in short supply achieved new values requisite to 
what people who needed them were willing to pay those gatekeepers to gain access to 
them.295 These artificially-generated rents could be (and were) used for two purposes: as 
a source of wealth that could be appropriated by the state and its agents,296 or as another 
means of distributing state patronage by allocating licenses to political favorites who 
could buy currency at the official rate and then sell imported goods on the side at prices 
inflated by their state-induced scarcity.297   
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This system of allocation under scarcity incentivized corruption on both sides. Business 
owners desperate to stay afloat found their only means of securing necessary inputs was 
to secure the cooperation of political gatekeepers, who found themselves in a position to 
increase their own economic status through their appointments.298 The only way to avoid 
this would have been to acquire economic resources independently; but by then, all 
access to resources flowed through the state; a condition Boone labels “structural 
dependency on state resources.”299 There was naught left to do but pursue access through 
political channels.300  
Under these conditions, corruption became the normal way of conducting government 
business, as was uncovered by the string of official enquiries beginning with the first 
post-colonial government. The extent to which licenses became issued on the basis of 
“commissions” or bribes was such that it became organized from the top down. The 
Ollennu Report found that two subsequent trade ministers had directed and systematically 
operated this system through agents.301 The more engrained this became, the more 
difficult it would become to change paths. As corruption became increasingly 
widespread, alternative opportunities to exercise influence closed, as the only remaining 
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avenue was through networks of patron-client, which tend to favor the state and its agents 
as the dominant partner. This is evidenced by the tendency for business to either opt out 
by leaving (as many MNCs did during this time period), or participate increasingly in the 
system of political allocation to obtain access to resources. The businessmen vying for 
access to resources were clearly not in an advantageous position, with their livelihoods 
dependent on gaining access to resources through the state. Commercial enterprise was 
no longer a viable route to prosperity. What private business did survive relied on access 
to political offices. Patronage networks proliferated, as capital adjusted: industry no 
longer pushed for limitations to state interference, shifting to a strategy of seeking the 
favor of the state and its officials. The full appropriation by the state of capital’s source of 
political power was thus accomplished.  
Individual officials working for the state understood that the degree of economic security 
they possessed was only by nature of their position as part of the state apparatus. So long 
as the state was keeping the means of acquiring wealth well within its purview, accessible 
only by those within its fold, state officials could use the advantage of representing state 
authority to acquire economic wealth of their own.302 This expanded beyond 
commissions and bribes picked up from the private sector; the savvier officials used this 
advantage to become owners of property in Accra, where (a) the state controlled a good 
deal of land allocation and (b) land value was rising rapidly as urbanization proceeded. 
This wealth and whatever security it provided, however, would never be independent of 
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the state, for it relied solely on their access to political power. The post-colonial state had 
successfully exploited all the power available to it to control nearly all the resources 
within its borders; this became the best means to power, wealth, and social status.303 As 
the only viable path to economic security left, the appropriation of resources for personal 
use was a natural byproduct, and hardly the province of only the unethical. In the words 
of a Professor of Economics at the University of Ghana: “We’ve had elections for 
decades now, but what do we have to show for it? The president sits at the head of the 
table dishing out goodies, and so on down it goes, and that is all there is.”304 
This system of resource allocation through networks of patronage and corruption allowed 
the state to rid itself of the potential threat of an independent capitalist class. Those who 
were unwilling to participate found themselves unable to survive. What remained of the 
private sector was made dependent on the state through these same networks. Systems of 
clientelism, patronage, and even political corruption are not the symptoms of state 
weakness that much of the literature purports them to be. They are an organized system 
of political control.305 The only piece that appears not to be by design was the conversion 
of much of this into personal wealth by individuals connected to the state. Though this 
development was foreseeable, at least by the Finance Minister who warned against it, it 
was not likely intended. Nkrumah railed against personal corruption repeatedly in both 
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public and private, blaming it not on the incentives built into the system, but on 
individual bad actors. He warned against being “swayed by considerations of temporary 
personal advantage instead of seeking the interest of the people.”306  
Most of the literature on political economy in Africa blames corruption for their political 
and economic shortcomings, reiterating the many ways in which officials bleed the state 
dry of its resources. Scholars lament politicians’ lack of self-denial, and locals blame the 
officeholders, wishing for more honest people in office. Few try to explain why 
corruption occurs, leaving an overall impression that Africa as a continent is just filled 
with bad actors. This makes little sense, given the similarity in conditions between 
countries experiencing widespread corruption. It is also highly unlikely that most of the 
world’s corrupt politicians just happen to be in Africa. It is probable, then, that corruption 
has more to do with the political context; that something about the structural incentives 
built into its institutions has led to certain patterns of behavior. This would explain why 
the problem returns after a change in regime. Switching out the actors doesn’t address the 
root of the problem: that politics guides the distribution of wealth and produces an 
environment in which political actors are increasingly autonomous. The economic 
insecurity all around and the rapid political changes taking place in Ghana’s early years 
contributed to an environment of uncertainty, while the increasingly dominant position of 
state agents within this context left them largely unconstrained. This was a recipe for 
disaster. The reaction of Ghanaians to their situation is not attributable solely to culture, 
nor to personal defects in those who participate; Henry Bretton points out “social 
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psychology suggests that where social restraints on the individual do not operate, are 
minimized, or can be effectively controlled by the individual, personal security and 
gratification become the dominant interests.”307  
Still, this worked in favor of the state in its quest for domination, as it gave rise to a sort 
of “political bourgeoisie” reliant on the state for their status. Boone calls this a class of 
‘rentiers,’ who achieve their economic status through the rents generated by state-
allocated resources (described above). State power was used to create private wealth for 
its agents, who became the dominant economic class through their position as the ruling 
political class.308 They are unusual in history in that they did not arise from a pre-existing 
economic, social, or ethnic class. In Ghana, the only thing the bourgeoisie seem to share 
in common is access to the state.309 Because they owe their wealth to their position, and 
not the other way around, Ghana doesn’t fit the redistributive narrative, wherein one class 
or another ‘captures’ the state and then uses it to institutionalize its dominance. Instead, 
this class was part captured and part created by the state. The state thus became the 
dominant actor in Ghanaian society. Though elections were held and democratic 
processes observed (at least in the beginning), the state tended more toward an oppressive 
force resembling authoritarianism than the forum for competing group interests that 
usually typifies democratic governance.  
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The state’s successful creation of its own bourgeoisie was central for maintaining its 
dominance, though it would later also play a major role in its downfall. State-building 
strategies centered on undermining the development of independent interests or the 
accumulation of sufficient power to constrain the state. The molding of the political class 
also into the economic elite guaranteed an elite-state alliance that left the former as the 
dependent partner, for its wealth stemmed not from productive investment, but from the 
rents collected by virtue of their access to the state.310 Around this new bourgeoisie 
developed powerful incentives to keep the system in place.311 Access to the state through 
direct employment or political connections gave the new bourgeoisie its start, but many 
of them used this to facilitate entry into private business. But because their success 
remained contingent on access to state resources and approval, their interests failed to 
diverge. Though the large informal economy, characterized by very numerous small 
merchants, operated largely outside state purview, business on a larger scale remained 
small in number and under tight control. Private business in the formal sector that 
survived through their linkages to state agents and the access to resources provided by 
them, had a stake in continuing the system in which they had invested (through 
commissions, bribery, and political network-building). Continuing to use privileged 
access to state resources became logical: for patrons (state agents) and clients 
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(businessmen) alike, it is immediately beneficial for the individual, their families, their 
political networks, and their economic security. Those who benefitted from it now had a 
vested interest in policies that kept control of prices, supply, and allocation in state 
hands.312 
From the perspective of the state elite, eradicating these networks and investing resources 
in the development of private industry not only lacked these immediate advantages, but it 
also had one huge potential drawback: the eventual limitation of state power as rising 
economic forces come to challenge its control over the economy.313 This alignment of 
interests made the emergence of an autonomous class of businessmen and entrepreneurs 
who might have had the capacity to constrain the state less and less likely. The dependent 
class that emerged instead would be both unwilling and unable to constrain the holders of 
political power.  
This would have a lasting impact on democratic accountability, or the lack thereof. The 
patron-client system concentrated power and wealth with the state,314 while dispersing 
societal pressure through personal networks that tended to divide the potential strength of 
groups by segmenting their collective interests into personal ones. The threat of collective 
pressure is what makes government more transparent. Maxfield and Schneider point out 
that this pressure can help authoritarian regimes resemble more inherently transparent 
                                                          
312 This is part of the political process by which public programs create vested interests in policies. Bates, 
Markets and States, 98-99. 
 
313 The balance of power between business and the state is a key determinate of economic policy, and a 
critical factor in limiting state power. Taylor, Business and the State in Southern Africa, 24, 206.  
 
314 Van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, passim. 
 
145 
 
democracies.315 By the same logic, a popularly elected despot presiding over a 
“democracy” could more closely resemble a closed-off autocratic government when such 
pressure is dissipated through state policy. Without the mutual dependency that fosters 
limitations on both the private and public sectors, the government became increasingly 
autonomous from social pressures.316 Competing group pressures is a necessary 
ingredient of democracy. Recall once more the game used to demonstrate how 
institutions work. It can also tell us something about human nature and group dynamics. 
The groups continuously perform the same way for two reasons: first, their interest in 
winning was aligned in a group effort. Second, humans are predisposed to pursue their 
own interests, above all, security, which in modern society, stems from wealth. This is 
why powerful segments of society operating in opposition to one another and even more 
importantly, in opposition to the state, is so crucial: so that no single group, or individual, 
comes to control all resources. It is this push and pull that produces constraint on the 
other groups. Without it, the state had no need to be accountable, responsible, or 
transparent, and so it was not.  
Agriculture after the Colonial Era 
The post-colonial state faced the problem of how to finance the massive economic project 
of building a state-run economy, and the political project of consolidating state power. A 
byproduct of the colonial era, cocoa remained the primary productive sector of the 
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economy.317 When the post-colonial state took over, there was already in place a system 
of institutions designed for rural resource extraction. The institutions of production were 
based on scattered individual smallholders, with marketing and export handled by 
European firms, who employed indigenous cocoa brokers to gather product from the 
scattered farms throughout the country. Since rural surpluses were meant for export under 
colonial administration, infrastructure (roads, ports, et cetera) and institutions (marketing 
boards) were designed to be controlled by outsiders based in Accra. Ghana’s productive 
economy centered on the export of a single cash crop, which a small number of actors 
could dominate, given its destination for main ports and the institutions that cropped up 
around it. These structural conditions, inherited from the colonial era, made it possible for 
the post-colonial state to control most of Ghana’s economic activity. Selling cash crops 
usually means needing access to foreign markets, expensive processing equipment, and 
export transportation infrastructure.318 State control of the factors needed for export 
enabled the government to control the market for cash crops, on which the country’s 
economy was based.  
Strong incentives existed to continue taking advantage of institutions of economic 
extraction; namely, that the system could be adjusted to become a resource base and a 
mechanism of political control for the postcolonial government. The Cocoa Marketing 
Board (CMB) was a colonial creation, which held exclusive authority over the marketing 
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of cocoa, while the foreign firms continued to purchase it at prices fixed by the board.319 
After elections ushered in Ghana’s Convention People’s Party (CPP), the CPP 
government established the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) as a subsidiary of the 
CMB to purchase cocoa in competition with European buyers such as Cadbury and 
Fry.320 Within three seasons, the CPC controlled one-fifth of the cocoa market.321 
Nkrumah established a political wing of the party ostensibly to represent farmers’ 
interests, but which in practice, would operate as a means of political control (and 
eventually, economic domination) over the farmers. Initially, this political organization, 
the United Ghana Farmers’ Council (UGFC) received its revenue from the Cocoa 
Purchasing Company. In the year of independence, the government dissolved the CPC 
and handed over cocoa purchasing power directly to the UGFC.  
The government-backed UGFC set about on a campaign to monopolize the Ghanaian 
cocoa industry. Two main groups stood in the way: the foreign firms and the cocoa 
brokers. The indigenous cocoa brokers represented a class of traders that had successfully 
carved out a role in the colonial economy; though they were somewhat dependent on the 
European firms for off-season advances in order to buy the cocoa crop, they were as close 
to a rural bourgeoisie as Ghana had at independence.322 The postcolonial state would 
prove once again to be more concerned with jettisoning the potential of this indigenous 
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class than it was with the foreign firms. Two subsections of this class existed: the agents 
working directly for firms, and the independent farmer-traders (most of whom were 
already organized into co-operatives reliant on government financing). The former were 
agents of the cocoa manufacturers and exporters and were easily subsumed by the state 
by guaranteeing them direct employment after the foreign firms were expelled.323 The 
latter were more entrepreneurial in nature and represented a greater threat to the state. 
The farmer-traders had been crucial to the cocoa holdups of the 1930s and 1940s and had 
been a powerful force in organizing opposition to the state. This group was not so easily 
co-opted, and so they were marginalized instead.  
The farmer-trader co-operatives, which competed with the UGFC (capturing roughly 15 
to 20 percent of the cocoa market), were absorbed under the umbrella of the UGFC, and 
permitted now to buy cocoa only for the Farmers’ Council.324 This effectively subdued 
the political opposition to the state monopoly, since they now depended on the UGFC as 
the outlet for their cocoa. This was an intended effect: though presented to the public as 
an organization for increasing farmers share in cocoa profits and representing their 
interests to the government, in practice it operated to control cocoa revenues in the 
interest of the state.325 The independent brokers (which represented only 2 to 3 percent of 
the market) were simultaneously further diminished. The government limited the number 
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of brokers licensed to operate and now required ministerial approval of licenses 
granted.326 License allocation was used primarily as a means of control: licenses of 
farmer-traders who had resisted CPP control were revoked and bank loans necessary to 
finance their activities were granted only to those who operated within the scope of the 
state-owned cocoa agencies.327 After dissolving the co-operative marketing associations 
and transferring control of cocoa marketing to the Council, the government then 
recognized the Council as the only organization entitled to represent Ghanaian farmers, 
effectively silencing the collective political voice of farmers who opposed government 
policies.328 Individual farmers who didn’t fall in line with the UGFC were expelled from 
it, leaving them unable to access the financing necessary to survive.329 The UGFC 
established buying centers throughout the countryside, replacing private traders with 
agents of the party.330 Full political and economic domination of this once-promising 
class by the party and the state, which were beginning to appear as indistinguishable, was 
achieved.  
In 1961, the state expelled the European trading firms and banned Ghanaian private 
buyers, officially recognizing a state-controlled monopoly. This move simultaneously 
transferred control of all of Ghana’s remaining cocoa wealth to the party-controlled 
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UGFC, relegated surviving brokers to agents of the same, and turned smallholders into 
producers for the state. Producers could now lawfully sell only to the CPP-controlled 
Farmers’ Council. Its senior partner, the state Cocoa Marketing Board, provided the 
funding: it paid producers at the price fixed by the Board, and sold cocoa on the world 
market, keeping the difference. This was sold to the public as a boon for cocoa farmers, 
claiming that it would protect them from fluctuations in the global price and fund the 
subsidization of inputs. Practice belied its real purpose: while world prices were rising in 
the late 1950s, the state twice decreased prices paid to producers;331 but when it dropped 
in the early 1960s, they passed the fall on to producers, again paying them less for their 
crop.332 In the same time period, despite an increase in the margins funneled to the state, 
spending on inputs such as fertilizers, insecticides, and seeds, was cut back to almost 
nothing.333 
The social and political impact of these adjustments to colonial institutions are even more 
telling. During the colonial era, direct political control of the countryside was of little 
concern, so long as they kept producing. Economic and political control remained 
somewhat separated, as the merchant houses handled the business side of production, and 
profits were primarily destined for private sector interests back home. The colonial state 
in Ghana received its funding from the home country, and so they had no need to directly 
control economic resources. The postcolonial state by contrast didn’t just need to finance 
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itself domestically; it also wanted to consolidate political control over the entire territory. 
Assuming control of the cocoa industry and involving itself directly in production 
through the subsidization of inputs and direct control of marketing met both of these 
goals. Rural institutions were extended throughout the countryside and adapted to the 
ends of the new state.334 The postcolonial government took over the distribution of inputs 
for cocoa, including credit, fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, and fungicides. Producers were 
organized into “compulsory selling co-operatives,” which displaced private sources of 
credit and exercised extensive control over access to credit and inputs.335 Presumably, 
this effort would increase the size of the crop from which the state could draw revenue. 
More importantly, it would forge a direct and dependent relationship between farmer-
producers and the state. Boone describes this state-building process as follows: 
Nkrumah’s strategies of rural institution building was a no-holds-barred attempt 
to neutralize their capacity to resist taxation and his regime’s political hegemony. 
To subordinate the cocoa belt, the CPP built state structures in the countryside 
that would undercut the stratum of rural society that had been able to mount a 
challenge to the regime. By distributing credit, the state imposed itself between 
the small farmer and large business, turning private/market relationships into 
state-controlled ones. The state distributed credit and inputs, regulated land rents, 
and organized farmers into grassroots co-operatives linked directly to the 
party/state. This disrupted the relationship between large and small farmer, 
creditor and debtor, and producer and buyer… and it created patron/client ties 
between the rural population and the state. Establishing the cocoa buying 
monopoly destroyed the basis of their power.336  
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These relationships became increasingly politicized and corrupted, mirroring what was 
also developing in the urban economy. The cocoa-growing community remained the most 
important rural sector, both economically and politically. The size of its collective 
production dwarfed every other sector of the economy, and despite the small and 
scattered nature of the production scheme, the Ashanti region held the preponderance of 
cocoa farmers, presenting the most salient potential threat to state power. By controlling 
the supply of necessary inputs, the state acquired the power to decide who prospers and 
who doesn’t, and willingly used it as a method of political control over cocoa growing 
regions. Inputs became a source of political power to be meted out according to political 
loyalties. Loans were not granted to any farmer who was not a member of the UGFC.337 
The handful of larger, commercially-oriented cocoa farmers were co-opted into the CPP’s 
growing rural network. They were appointed as Committee Members and Chief Farmers 
in the UGFC and given a share in the appropriations, their positions now dependent on 
privileged treatment by the state, which provided their financial and political support.338 
Retaining their favored positions in the rural economy could no longer be achieved 
through commercial success, but through political connections. Much like the patronage 
system that reigned in the city, this served to fragment resistance: instead of unifying in 
opposition to the state, it was reduced to jockeying for favor in order to access state-
controlled resources.339  
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Institutions of rural control shifted a significant degree of power from producers to the 
state. The ability of state agents to control the business end of production and the excess 
revenues generated from it meant that the political power embedded in owning economic 
resources rested with the state’s emerging bourgeoisie, building in the incentives for 
personal corruption to develop. This growing class channeled their political power into 
economic wealth through its control of extractive institutions. Surplus funds from cocoa 
production followed the same path as the rents generated from trade policies: they were 
politically allocated to fund government projects, finance the growth of the state sector, 
and selectively dispersed to political favorites. The 1956 commission report to enquire 
into corruption in the Cocoa Purchasing Company found that it was run by the 
Convention People’s Party and recommended it be restructured to be run by a board of 
directors consisting of government members that included the opposition; but this 
Nkrumah would not accept for fear it would “weaken materially the power of the 
government over the board.”340 
The post-colonial state’s continued reliance on this mechanism of resource extraction to 
fund the state zapped the promise of economic opportunity that accompanied the 
departure of the British. Instead of surplus remaining in the countryside as a potential 
source of economic development, it funded state projects designed to consolidate political 
control, build networks of political support, and line the pockets of whomever had access 
to the state apparatus. In a system dominated first by European trading companies and 
then by the state, there was no opening for private economic growth. Cocoa farmers had 
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few choices left to them: take the measly sum offered in exchange for their labor and 
produce for the state (which most did), smuggle cocoa into neighboring states where they 
could sell it at prevailing market prices (which those near the border often did),341 or 
divert their energies to producing something else342 (which many did, though they would 
find that avenue similarly closed off). 
Production of agricultural goods other than cocoa were also brought under the auspices of 
the state during the early years of independence. The government undertook a “gigantic 
agricultural scheme,” rolling out plans for the mechanization of agricultural production 
on farms owned and run by the state.343 Investment in modern equipment, irrigation 
methods, and other technical innovations were introduced exclusively on state farms and 
to some extent, co-operatives (which were also under state control through their reliance 
on state-supplied inputs and exclusive production for state markets).344 State assistance to 
the cooperatives was channeled through the same wing of the party that organized cocoa 
production (the UGFC), which was sworn not to protect farmer interests, but to “accept 
the leadership of the CPP and its government materially, financially, and morally.”345  
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The state funneled most of the few resources it devoted to agriculture to the state farms, 
though the farms’ contribution to economic growth would prove to be minimal.346 The 
land for them was forcibly appropriated as needed by the state.347 At last, the 
consolidation of land and capital that permits mass production of food at a lower cost and 
with fewer people needed to cultivate the land was permitted; but only where the state, 
and not individuals, would be the primary beneficiary. This was necessary in Nkrumah’s 
view because private farming “leads to conservatism and acquisitiveness and the 
development of a bourgeois mentality.”348 Once again, this was not merely an accidental 
byproduct of state policy, but aimed directly at stunting the development of an 
independent bourgeoisie.  
Much like the urban centers, the supremacy of political objectives would undermine the 
economic success of the rural projects. State farms were simultaneously designed to 
subsume the potential threat of capital accumulation, and also absorb pressure from the 
lower classes that constituted most of the population. They were meant to provide jobs 
for rural unemployed, which was difficult to reconcile with the purchase of modern 
equipment for capital-intensive forms of production.349 Farms were as overstaffed with 
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redundant positions as the urban government agencies. They were required to sell food 
below market prices, imposing further difficulties on their ability to generate economic 
surplus.350 This wasn’t a problem for the state in the short term: the funding to keep state 
farms afloat could, for the foreseeable future, continue to come from the extraction of 
surplus from the cash crop farmers.  
Outside the state farms, food production remained small-scale, ranging from subsistence 
farming to producing for highly localized, informal markets. To the extent agriculture did 
become commercialized in Ghana following independence, it was predominantly under 
state control. Even medium-sized farm operations only participated in basic agricultural 
production; the state continued to control every aspect of the agribusiness end (inputs, 
processing, distribution, sales, and marketing), where most of the money is made. In the 
commercial industries, which were primarily cash crop export industries, the state 
extracted roughly 40 percent of the total price farmers got for their product. By 
appropriating the surplus and providing the inputs, the state was able to keep producers 
dependent and reduce incentives for innovation and capital accumulation in the cash crop 
industry. Where production was not controlled directly on state-owned farms, access to 
the resources of production were state-controlled and selectively dispersed in a way 
designed to keep autonomous capitalist production from flourishing.  
Facilitating the transfer of resources to the state meant that relations of production in the 
countryside had to remain mostly unchanged from the colonial era. Cocoa producers 
could not be allowed to consolidate into entities large enough to provide an alternative to 
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state buyers. The accumulation of land and capital that could give rise to a class of 
economically independent producers was prevented by retaining systems of land tenure 
that prohibited ownership and sale of land. Though the state sought to undermine 
traditional authority where it competed directly with the new state, in some rural areas, 
land would remain in the hands of the chiefs. The benefit to the state of maintaining 
traditional ties to land was that it undergirded the system of peasant production that 
supplied the state coffers. Protecting peasant land rights kept land fragmented; so long as 
land did not become commodified, the state could prevent private accumulation. 
Land ownership did not remain entirely untouched after independence. Rather than 
restructuring land relations, which risked opening up avenues for the accumulation of 
private wealth, the post-colonial state altered existing institutions in an attempt to shift 
the balance of power from the chiefs to the new state. The colonial state was content to 
leave land allocation mostly in the hands of traditional authorities, so long as they 
acquiesced to directives handed down by the colonial government. The postcolonial 
government sought similarly to prevent the development of land markets that would 
undermine the economic dominance of the state and give rise to private accumulation. In 
southern Ghana, particularly the cocoa growing areas, this arrangement would continue 
to underpin production on stool lands. However, the postcolonial state was also on a 
campaign for full political and economic control that the colonial state saw no need 
for.351 The state began to chip away at the economic resources that underwrote the chiefs’ 
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continued political power; in the farming communities that dominated the countryside, 
that meant land. In exchange for giving up some land rights, the state granted chiefs 
monetary compensation from native treasuries.352  
The cocoa areas resisted this shift: chiefs who controlled lands rich in cocoa were well 
aware of the critical role land allocation played, not just as a source of revenue, but as a 
latent source of political power.353 In these areas, the state continued to recognize chief’s 
rights to dispose of land, but subject to the new political authority: the chiefs retained 
neo-customary rights to dispose of lands under their control, but the state could 
appropriate it if needed for its development projects. Outside the cocoa belt, the post-
colonial state introduced several new measures to shore up state control of land. The 
1960 State Property and Contracts Act transferred lands previously held by the crown 
(during the colonial era) to the President in trust.354 In practice, ‘in trust’ (on behalf of the 
people) meant little; the state seized a significant amount of land for its own purposes, 
without regard to legal modes of acquisition.355 More significantly, the 1962 State Lands 
Act enabled the President to declare that a piece of land is required in the public interest, 
extinguishing all subsisting rights and interests in the land, and vesting it absolutely in the 
President; only then would the President determine whether compensation would be 
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given, and how much.356 In acquiring land, the state’s power was in effect, absolute. 
Though the state continued to recognize areas where customary practices applied, they 
could now determine where those boundaries ended, effectively transferring a great deal 
of power to the state. 
In 1961, the state imposed itself directly in traditional land systems by taking over 
administration of all stool lands, also appropriating the power to collect revenue from 
land that stemmed from rentals to outsiders and access to forest and mineral resources.357 
The government introduced a stool land account to collect these revenues, dispersing a 
portion of it back to the stools, and keeping most as state revenue.358 This represented a 
fundamental shift in the relationship between the state and the traditional authorities, for 
the chiefs no longer independently held access to resources. It robbed them of their 
political power and transformed the relationship into a dependent one359 that in this way 
resembled the state’s relationship to the urban business class and rural farmers.  
A number of scholars who have researched land tenure systems throughout Africa 
interpret it more as a struggle for power between traditional and modern authorities (the 
chiefs and the state). They highlight the limited territorial reach of the state, viewing land 
                                                          
356 Larbi, Antwi, and Olomolaiye, “Compulsory Land Acquisition in Ghana,” 118. Note, also, that some 
portions of land in the Ashanti and Eastern regions were removed and vested in the President during the 
colonial era, and remained administered by the state after independence. Quan, Ubink, and Antwi, “Risks 
and Opportunities of State Intervention in Customary Land Management: Emergent Findings from the 
Land Administration Project in Ghana,” in Ubink and Amanor, Contesting Land and Custom in Ghana, 
184. 
 
357 Quan, Ubink, and Antwi, 185. See also Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, 294. 
 
358 Quan, Ubink, and Antwi, 185. See also Larbi, Antwi, and Olomolaiye, “Compulsory Land Acquisition 
in Ghana,” 3. 
 
359 Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, 294. 
160 
 
issues as a result of incomplete state building by the pre-independence governments.360 
From this view, states have been unsuccessful at reforming land tenure systems because 
of their weakness in rural areas, evidenced by the fact that community-based tenure 
systems still predominately determine access to land. Though it is true that in certain 
regions of Ghana, community-based systems dominate, what this view fails to 
acknowledge is that the state had at least a short-term interest in keeping it this way in 
order to facilitate continued resource extraction to finance its state-building projects 
elsewhere. It was critical to the state that this revenue stream come from a fragmented 
and politically powerless class. Neither the colonial nor the postcolonial state wanted to 
see the rise of a rural capitalist class. Codifying traditional land tenure systems did much 
of the work for the state in preventing this. Furthermore, by recognizing it formally and 
subordinating it, the state brought traditional authority into its political fold.361 Boone 
argues that this should be seen not as an abdication, but a devolution of state authority;362 
one that serves the mutual interest of traditional and modern political elites. Though there 
is much talk in policy and scholarly circles about “freeing the state from the burden of 
traditional agrarian elites,”363 the critical development in early democracies was actually 
the opposite: freeing the agrarian elite from the state through their transformation into 
economically independent producers. The state’s affirmation of the position of traditional 
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rural elites through political allocation of land in Ghana guarantees a continued alignment 
of interests with existing systems of authority.  
In the transformation of land allocation systems that usually accompanies modernization, 
it is consolidation by an emerging capitalist class that drives this change. The 
commodification of land signifies a shift from political to economic control of resources 
and becomes the basis of the new class’s social power. In Ghana, the struggle for control 
of land was mainly between old and new political elites; capital remained sidelined as 
control was passed from one political authority to another, leaving the balance of power 
between society and state untransformed. This was not only by state design, but also a 
result of an alliance of interests between political elites and the class of peasant 
producers. The role of the peasant class often takes a backseat in historical examination, 
but it is unlikely that they desire this type of economic transformation, for it means losing 
access to land, the resource most central to their lifestyle and livelihood. Historically, the 
peasant class is driven out of existence by the forces of modernization: a few may 
accumulate and rise within the changing rural structure;364 most will migrate to cities to 
join a growing class of wage laborers. In Ghana’s case, these economic transformations 
failed to take place prior to democratization. For the peasants, that meant greater control 
of their immediate fate, for they now had a vote and constituted the single largest political 
class in Ghana. It also meant that they were now locked into their place by the political 
and economic system. 
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The state also sought to build their own class of rural economic elite. In cocoa growing 
regions, the modified colonial institutions generally sufficed by preventing private 
accumulation through maintaining land tenure systems and taking control of the 
agribusiness end of cocoa production. Where larger farmers existed, they were few 
enough in number to co-opt into the state’s rural bureaucracy. Outside the cocoa belt, the 
state took direct control of land, using it to plant its own elite. Here, the state would 
monopolize commercial agriculture by co-opting the actual producers. Land could be 
consolidated into larger plots where state control of land reigned, allowing for large-scale 
production, but these land grants would be made to members of the political elite,365 
displacing rural producers with a new rural elite who owed its position to the state. The 
“small cadre of commercially oriented, mechanized farmers” was thus “a group whose 
existence is predicated on the provision of government subsidies and whose membership 
consists largely of politically influential members of the urban elite.”366 State control of 
inputs also allowed members of the political elite to access key resources, including 
water, credit, fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, et cetera.367 Their favorable position in terms of 
access to resources permits them to achieve greater wealth and social status, as much of 
the bill for inputs is funded by public resources,368 but the surplus accrues to a political 
elite that has now converted its political power into economic wealth. One well-known 
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example is the trading company set up by the former Chairman of the CPC, who acquired 
the funding through a CMB loan.369 Through manipulation of resource allocation, the 
state has created a rural elite with a stake in the perpetuation of the system, since it is 
dependent on the state for its position in it.370 Rural resources also played a role in 
creating the urban elite. The bulk of state resources were sourced from the cocoa surplus 
redirected to state coffers through the Cocoa Marketing Board. These resources financed 
the incomes of the state-dependent petite bourgeoisie emerging from the growing 
bureaucracy.  
These disparate classes – peasant producers, rural elites, and urban bureaucrats – had one 
thing in common: reliance on the state for access to resources. Those who would rise in 
any sector could do so only through political networks. Instead of the rural-urban alliance 
that fostered resistance to state interference in early democracies, the urban and rural 
classes were linked only through the state by patterns of access to political power and the 
resulting transfer of economic resources to new state-generated social classes.371 In this 
way, the state could control the social forces that might otherwise align against it by first 
making each dependent, and secondly, altering incentives such that it was in the 
individual interests of key actors to feed the system through patron-client networks and 
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the use of political power to secure personal wealth. Given what has been learned so far, I 
would amend the original chart presented in the theory chapter to the following:  
Figure 3 
Amended State-Society Relations in Different Sectors 
 
Of the groups presented in this chart, the urban masses are the class with which the state 
seemed most to struggle, as is suggested by the literature on urban bias. To some extent, 
urban support was captured through food price policies that favored urban over rural 
interests, which Robert Bates details extensively in Markets and States. This also meant 
that urban support for the regime was tied directly to how they fared economically, and 
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the recipe for economic stagnation carved into colonial and postcolonial systems of 
agricultural production wrote the end before it began. Much of the support for later coups 
would emanate from the urban poor; more on that in later chapters.  
The structure of land rights and the systems of rural production continued to underpin 
these networks of control and domination, embedding powerful interests in keeping these 
institutions unaltered. Chiefs needed to retain some degree of control over land 
allocation, or risk losing their source of political power and private wealth; retaining that 
position now rested at least partially in subservience to the state. Commercial agriculture 
remained small-scale, with the exceptions in the hands of state-appointed elites. If the 
state was to restructure land rights to allow private accumulation under market-based 
allocation, it would undermine traditional authority, and encourage the sort of economic 
growth needed to increase its resource base. However, it would also generate a class of 
property holders independent of the state, and undermine the existing elites whose status 
stems from continued access to resources under state control. Changing land tenure 
would undermine the means of resource extraction on which the state built its cadre of 
elites and on which its power rests.372 With most of society’s potential sources of power 
co-opted, absorbed, and dependent on the state, they had only elections to rely on to keep 
it accountable. As subsequent chapters unfold, we will see that elections as a stand-alone 
institution are not sufficient to constrain state power.  
Even with the introduction of elections, the links between the state and its rural 
communities approximate older systems of political-economic relations that look 
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somewhat like the dependent relationship between monarch and subject in the pre-
democratic West. Land rights are held by higher political authorities, and granted to 
favorites or passed down through lineage. In England, this changed after agriculture 
became widely commercialized. The power to grant property rights increasingly fell to 
the representative assemblies, which were composed of merchants, landed gentry, and 
nobility who had turned to commercial agriculture; their interests were thus vested in 
constraining the power of the king to grant and rescind land arbitrarily, and secure private 
property rights.373 In Ghana, so-called representative assemblies are filled with those 
whose interests coincide with the ruler’s, for their wealth is not independently acquired, 
but gained through patronage networks supported by access to resources controlled by the 
state.  
Until these resources became detached from the state, many of today’s liberal 
democracies had likewise controlled their societies through patrimonialism.374 This 
system perished in the shift to privately owned property and independently acquired 
wealth because it heralded a change in taxation systems. The shift to direct taxation 
fostered a mutual dependence between state and citizen that served to make states more 
accountable and less autonomous. As rising economic classes began to accumulate 
greater wealth, monarchs generated revenue by taxing them directly through 
Parliamentary processes. Direct taxation and government expenditures became a 
                                                          
373 North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 156. 
 
374 Kohli calls them “patrimonial monarchies.” Kohli, State-Directed Development, 395. 
167 
 
bargaining arena in which the private owners of resources agree to allocate some to the 
state when it demonstrates that it is spent responsibly for the public good.  
The resource curse literature tells a modern tale of the constraining power of direct 
taxation; or rather, what politics looks like without it. When the state can extract sources 
of revenue without having to bargain with an economically dominant class, it eliminates 
constraining pressure. This is why oil-rich states are nearly always autocratic. Ghana’s 
reliance on indirect taxation through resource extraction and trade controls has a similar 
effect by relieving pressure on the state to be accountable.375 In this way, the state’s 
decisions about how to extract resources have a direct impact on politics. However, this 
decision was partly guided again by structural constraints in the economy at the time of 
independence. Direct taxation can only be sourced where economic elites hold enough 
resources for taxes on them to generate enough government revenue. This requires a 
strong accumulating class that did not exist at independence, and which the postcolonial 
state worked so hard to evade. 
The introduction of elections during the independence era mapped new difficulties onto a 
social system that remained untransformed, resulting in a state that remained relatively 
autonomous from critical constraining pressures. The next chapter will pick up here, 
unveiling what this “democratic” state would look like beneath the cloak of elections. 
The succeeding chapter backtracks a little to the rise of Ghana’s first president and the 
situation he found at the time of independence.  
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Critical Juncture: Independence 
The rise of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence president, would prove to 
be both significant and ordinary: significant because the decisions made in the critical 
independence years under his leadership set the course for the next century. Ordinary 
because so many African states would find themselves on such a similar path as to call 
into question how much influence the particular actor had and how much is attributable to 
the conditions that many of these states had in common. So far, the role of ideology in 
state policies has been generally neglected. Though a socialist framework was summoned 
by Nkrumah himself to describe his state-building project, public declarations in 
particular are taken to be of minimal value in detecting true ambitions. Often, the “public 
good” was invoked by Nkrumah and his circle to garner support for policies that turned 
out to be almost invariably harmful to everyone but the political elite.  
Nkrumah’s autobiography is taken to be slightly more reliable evidence of his inner 
thoughts, though published as it was during his rule, it was likely written with an eye to 
public reception. Still, the role of ideology cannot be completely ignored, engrained as it 
was in the psyche of a key leader. His autobiography repeatedly expounds the influence 
of Soviet ideology on his education. The timing of Ghana’s independence and so-called 
“democratization” mattered in relation to global trends. Had Soviet ideology been on the 
wane by the time of Nkrumah’s early life, it may not have found its way into his 
education. Had the Cold War been at its height in the 15th century instead of the 20th, it is 
unlikely that a socialist agenda would have played a role at all. Nkrumah’s detractors 
give little weight to his political ideology, and many once close to him have claimed it 
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was personal power he was really after, a story his opponents have often retold. Stark 
differences appear between Nkrumah’s account of his motives for amassing personal 
power and the motives attributed to him by his opponents.  
This debate, though interesting, is of limited use in understanding the political outcome. 
Whether the accumulation of power was in service to his socioeconomic goals for the 
country, or whether it was the other way around, matters little. Neither absolute political 
power nor Nkrumah’s state-dominated socialist economy could be built without one 
another, as should have become clear throughout the preceding chapters. This question 
should be understood as distinct from the conundrum of political control versus economic 
development outlined in the previous chapter. The control-development conundrum arose 
when development required a relaxation of control. State control was clearly prioritized 
consistently over possibilities for development. The present question is whether the 
driving force behind this was a political-economic ideology or personal political power. 
This is a separate question, though one which either way, still lies within the original 
conundrum’s sphere of state control. 
Whichever motivation drove Nkrumah, the result, then, would be the same. A close 
reading of his written works reveal that he does harbor an affinity for public praise, fame, 
and stature, alongside a high level of intolerance for dissention by those he sees as owing 
him loyalty and obedience. On the other hand, his writings also demonstrate a consistent 
devotion to a socialist ideology, which he saw as both necessary and proper for Ghana 
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(and for all of Africa).376 It is likely, then, that both of these motivations underlie his 
actions, though to what extent he is aware of the first is unclear. Whenever he discusses 
political oppression by his hand, it is either couched in terms that warp its true meaning 
to present it in a positive light, or it is justified as necessary to pursue his ideological 
agenda. Whether this is because he himself believes his own rationalizations or because 
he feels compelled to make it more palatable to his audience is unknown to anyone but 
Nkrumah himself.  
Which story you believe mostly comes down to a character judgement, but again, has 
little impact on the outcome for two reasons. First, as stated above, to acquire the total 
economic control he needed to build the socialist state he envisioned, a good deal of 
political control was also necessary. Second, his agenda can only be relevant to the extent 
that the map of structural conditions and the relative strength of allying and opposing 
interests allow it to unfold. Between the two, it is the structural conditions, which 
determined the incentives and constraints actors must work within, that probably matter 
more. That is not to say that individual actors didn’t matter. The choices made by 
Nkrumah and his regime were by no means a foregone conclusion, though his oft-
repeated (but likely insincere) lamentations over the weakness of African capital would 
have you believe his hand was forced. It mattered that local capital was weak because this 
served as a key permissive condition. Yet this condition alone did not move history 
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forward. It wasn’t merely that the local commercial class was weak; Nkrumah set about 
on a calculated and deliberate course to squash it. In a 1964 radio address, he declared 
that “capitalists should be weeded out of the centers of state power, especially from the 
cabinet and the general assembly.”377 The “capitalists” to which he referred was often 
code for the opposition party, whom he accused of having a bourgeois character. This 
war was something he saw as resistance to the capitalist democracies that had oppressed 
Africans throughout the long years of colonialism. He had rejected their political-
economic system in its entirety on the basis that it had been oppressive, without 
differentiating between what it had done in Ghana and what it had done for its own 
population, nor acknowledging that it was Ghanaians’ exclusion from that very system 
that had held them back during the colonial era. 
Nkrumah’s personal appeal was also a key ingredient in whipping up the popular support 
that helped him sideline opposition in the tumultuous independence years. This, 
combined with his personal ambitions, made for a powerful and charismatic leader at a 
key point in time. Delusions of grandeur lay beneath his plans. The image of himself as 
Africa’s rising star, its symbol, and its savior, is a recurring theme in his autobiography. 
He refers to himself and Ghana as one, inseparable entity, declaring “the greater truth” 
that “Ghana is unquestionably Kwame Nkrumah.”378 His aspirations don’t stop there, 
either: he goes on that “the man himself belongs to scale far transcending the bounds of 
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one nation, even of one continent and one race of people; he belongs to a whole historical 
epoch.”379 It is thus difficult to completely dismiss the accusations of many of his 
contemporaries that it was absolute power he sought. This judgement came not just from 
the opposition, but from sources close to Nkrumah within the CPP, as well as colonial 
officials that worked closely with him in the years leading up to independence. His 
equally heavy-handed response to political challenges from both the right and the left 
suggest that it was power more so than ideology that drove his actions. Socialism’s role 
in shoring up political and economic control in Ghana was often as a source of ideas 
about how to go about organizing political control, and secondarily, as a moral 
legitimator for the project of economic control. The more important agenda seems to be 
the need to show the world it could join the ranks of the economically developed and 
exercise political control over its new territory without the interference of the colonial 
powers.380 His determination to do both exacerbated the aforementioned conundrum in 
which the state faces the often-contradictory ends of economic development and political 
control. His hope was that if he could force economic development through socialism, 
this would reconcile the twin goals and allow him to achieve both. From this perspective, 
a socialist system fit neatly with his political and personal ambitions: absolutism requires 
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control of the economic system and vice versa, for the forces that arise from independent 
economic development pull at the threads of absolute power.381  
In the developed capitalist democracies he strove to distance his country from, modernity 
was reached through the release of society from the state. In Nkrumah’s Ghana, 
economic development was to be achieved through society’s submission to the state. In 
the first, political power was made to serve as a guarantee of basic rights that allowed the 
freedom to accumulate wealth. In the second, the economic sphere served as a foundation 
of political power. The way in which Nkrumah conducted his business ventures revealed 
that this view of economic activity predated his rise to power. He reiterates several times 
in his autobiography that his businesses don’t make a profit, something of which he 
seems rather proud. What he doesn’t say, which is often more revealing, is why he does 
do it, if not for profit. The answer seems to be that his primary purpose was to establish 
personal power. The organizations and businesses he set up (newspapers, youth groups, 
committees, et cetera) follow a common pattern. He places close associates at the head of 
them, answerable only to him, and grateful for the economic fortune they derive from 
their appointments.382 This bears obvious similarities to the way he would later govern. It 
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174 
 
also foreshadows the purposes for which business would be conducted after 
independence: not for profit, but for politics.  
Before Nkrumah entered the political scene, during the ten years he spent abroad in the 
United States and England, political changes were underway in Ghana. A group of 
indigenous merchants and business leaders concerned about protecting African 
commercial interests had organized a political movement; they formed the United Gold 
Coast Convention (UGCC) and were beginning to agitate for constitutional reform and 
representation in government.383 Wishing to broaden its base and increase pressure on the 
colonial government, UGCC leadership invited Nkrumah to be its secretary general, 
hoping he could bring the mass appeal they sought. Though he took issue with the 
leadership’s bourgeois character from the start, he couldn’t resist the possibilities it 
entailed as a pathway to political power. A close reading of his autobiography suggests 
that the later split between himself and the original group was intended by Nkrumah from 
the beginning. He recalls his reaction to the invitation to join the leadership ranks of the 
UGCC as follows: “It was quite useless to associate myself with a movement backed 
almost entirely by reactionaries, middle-class lawyers and merchants, for my 
revolutionary background and ideas would make it impossible for me to work with 
them…. I decided to go ahead and take the post, aware that I may come to loggerheads 
with the executive of the UGCC…. I knew that sooner or later a final split would have to 
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come. I was determined, therefore, to organize things in such a way that when this break 
came I would have the full support of the masses behind me.”384  
The eventual disassociation from and defeat of the original leadership was critical for 
Nkrumah’s idea of state building. He was clearly aware that his socialist ideas would 
have little appeal to the self-made merchants and traders that made up the UGCC. Recall 
that the primary interest of commercial classes is in protecting their property. As a means 
to that end, this is the class that pushes for restraints on government. This is why the 
development of the commercial class must precede elections; they are the class that 
secures rights that lie beyond the scope of the political process. Acquiring and retaining 
absolute power relies on closing off the growth of, and further entry to, that class. If it is 
permitted to grow, an increasingly large section of society will develop a shared interest 
in resisting absolutism. But first, the existing group of commercial leaders would need to 
be sidelined; and Nkrumah needed his “politically awakened” masses behind him to do 
that.385  
An emerging commercial class is the minority in any modernizing society, but Ghana’s 
was especially weak. Despite their leadership of the initial independence movement, they 
were remarkably easy to ostracize and replace in the interim years. This was likely a goal 
of Nkrumah’s from the outset. His rhetoric drew on democracy as a popular idea, 
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claiming the CPP would be “the democratic instrument of the peoples will and 
aspirations,” that it would serve as “the political vanguard for removing all forms of 
oppression and for the establishment of a democratic government.”386 His actions suggest 
a different purpose. The CPP was never meant to tolerate democratic competition; it was 
set up to swallow the UGCC and become the only party. When he split from the UGCC 
to form the Convention People’s Party, he announced that the rank and file of his party 
and the UGCC were really the same, but the UGCC working group (the bourgeois 
leadership) was not.387 In other words, they were all “really” still members of the same 
group, only now under one leader: himself.  
Nkrumah successfully commandeered and reoriented the political movement by 
appealing to two popular sentiments, both of which worked to marginalize the minority 
group of business leaders: economic “paradise” and independence now.388 The two were 
brilliantly linked in his oratory. He argued that Ghanaians had been held back from 
enjoying the fruits of modernity by the economic dominance of the colonial era (which 
was far from untrue). Political independence would herald their economic independence 
(notably, from foreign domination, but not domestic). “Only under full self-government,” 
Nkrumah declared, “would we be in a position to develop the country so that our people 
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388 Despite his clear view that there were irreconcilable ideological differences form the beginning, this is 
not what he presents to the public. In his speech announcing the formation of the CPP, he claimed that the 
only issue between himself and the CPP was self-government now versus self-government in the shortest 
time possible. He would later use this issue again to marginalize the opposition that made it into the 
representative assembly, claiming that the CPP was the only party with the aim of self-government now 
and so it was impracticable for it work with those who held different views. Nkrumah, 103, 140.  
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could enjoy the comforts and amenities of modern civilization.”389 He presented 
independence as the means –the only means—to economic abundance for all.390 This 
equation of the economic with the political set the new democracy immediately on 
unstable footing. It promised economic rewards to all, if they would put their faith in 
Nkrumah’s leadership. When he inevitably failed to deliver, his popularity evaporated, 
and with it, society’s faith in the political system.  
But the equation of the two served important goals at the time. Linking it to immediate 
independence, the most important popular issue, cemented his own popularity. It also 
allowed him to speed up the process of government handover. By this time, a committee 
to construct the new constitution was already underway, and they were cautioning against 
jumping toward independence before the work was complete. The Coussey Committee, 
tasked with formulating proposals for the new constitution, was mainly made up of the 
original UGCC leaders. After Nkrumah broke off from the UGCC, he began denouncing 
the process as too slow and demanded self-government before a constitution was in 
place.391 By forcing the issue to elections more quickly, Nkrumah could bring on 
independence and cement his own political power before the constitutional constraints 
championed by the commercial leaders could take root.  
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Several attempts were made by UGCC leadership and their successors to set up 
constitutional bodies that would represent opposing interests and operate to restrain the 
regime. Among the constitutional proposals they put forth were a bi-cameral legislature, a 
federal form of government, and regional assemblies with powers reserved to it. The 
issue of the two-chambered legislature was envisioned as similar to England’s House of 
Lords and House of Commons, with a chamber for the chiefs and another for elected 
members. This was quickly dismissed as “too conservative,” and when the issue was 
raised again as a remedy for the centralization of power and the exclusion of the chiefs 
from the political process, it was again squashed.392 The issue of a federal form of 
government was probably the most significant rift between Nkrumah and his opponents, 
which was important enough to the opposition to attempt to delay independence.393 The 
newly formed National Liberation Movement (NLM), composed in part by the remnants 
of the routed UGCC, and allied with a number of marginalized groups, insisted on the 
importance of a federal structure. They hoped that this would prevent total centralized 
control over the country and permit the representation of contradictory interests.394 The 
NLM at the time already espoused a number of contradictory, perhaps even 
irreconcilable, interests;395 the alliance had few specific political issues on which they 
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1955) in Rathbone, British Documents Part I, Document 161. 
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395 “Proposals for a federal constitution,” Doc 178 in Rathbone. This included the old guard from the 
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agreed. Its primary purpose was to guarantee all of them some form of representation 
after independence. 
It failed miserably. Elections by this time had already been held, and even with the 
alliance, their collective representation in the legislature was dwarfed by the popular CPP 
who were associated with the cause of independence. With the constitutional framework 
still hanging in the balance in the context of electoral victory, Nkrumah and the CPP had 
no real need to write in protections for minority interests. The opposition found that 
without these protections embedded before elections, they could only resort to “extra-
parliamentary” activities, though none of their attempts were successful at reversing the 
decision on the critical issue of federalism.396 Once a unitary state was decided upon, it 
was used to undermine later attempts at checking the centralization of state control. 
Regional assemblies with constitutional powers were suggested in an attempt to slow the 
expansion of the central government and see regional interests represented at the 
center.397 This was initially rejected on the grounds that it was inconsistent with a unitary 
state.398 Rather than statutory authority, the regional assemblies would have to be set up 
by government ordinance, not enshrined in the constitutions, and would have only the 
powers devolved to it by the central government.399 This ensured the supremacy of the 
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central government and relegated regional assemblies to dependency on the central state 
for its authority.  
This battle was an important one that might have left greater constraints on the state had 
it gone differently. Structuring the institutions such that minority interests would give 
way to the will of the majority worked to undermine democratic principles and lent 
greater weight to the dictates of the central state. Without the force of powerful 
competing group interests, there was little pressure to respect the democratic principles 
that did make their way into the constitution. Many components of limited government 
appeared in it: courts of appeal, protection of civil liberties, due process, built in checks 
and balances via the separation of powers.400 In a few short years, these would prove to 
be no more than words on paper. They were written into the constitution because they 
were recognized as democratic principles, and on paper, a democracy Ghana was meant 
to be. But without competing interests and the power to back them, these words didn’t 
produce a government that was actually restrained. Codification into law and into 
institutions is the effect, not the cause, of democratic development. To understand the 
roots of its failure, we must look deeper than the institutional structure, to the power 
dynamics that steered the institutional setup. It is here that effects are determined; the 
institutional structure that emerged was only a byproduct of the underlying distribution of 
power. Had this been recognized, the failure of democratic institutions in such 
circumstances could have been predicted. The early onset of elections was the nail in the 
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coffin, for it was the event that swung the pendulum of power in favor of one man: 
Nkrumah.  
In the years leading up to formal independence, already the new government was 
showing signs that its institutions might be subverted to undermine the new democracy. 
Within the CPP, absolutism reigned. In order to ensure that only those who proved 
themselves loyal to Nkrumah’s leadership and policy would hold positions of power, the 
National Executive of the Party (also Nkrumah) would have final say in the choice of all 
candidates standing for election.401 Outside the CPP, opposition and dissention were 
barely tolerated, even whilst the British remained. Groups who didn’t fall in line with 
CPP leadership were summarily ostracized, replaced, or undermined. The Ghana 
Farmers’ Congress was the initial organization that gave voice to the commercially 
oriented farmer-traders agitating for changes to colonial policies that stunted their 
commercial ambitions.402 The new CPP government required, as a condition of support 
for their political requests, that the Farmers’ Congress accept CPP leadership of their 
group, which the Congress refused.403 The CPP-controlled government’s answer was to 
launch their own buying company (the CPC) and set up its own national farmers’ 
organization, to which it later handed monopoly control of the cocoa trade.404  
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Several years later, political dissention in the cocoa belt arose over the fixing of producer 
prices at 72 shillings a load for four years, despite rising international prices (with the 
surplus, of course, designated for state coffers).405 An opposition movement formed 
primarily in the cocoa-dominated Asante area, culminating in an alignment between the 
Asanteman Council and the National Liberation Movement.406 This development of 
opposing views and their collective expression was denounced by the government as a 
threat to democracy. Nkrumah accused those who led the movement of trying to “free 
themselves from the influence of democracy,” an institution which belonged exclusively 
to Nkrumah and the CPP.407 This wouldn’t be the last subversion of democratic norms he 
would call on to underwrite moves toward absolute power. A pattern began to emerge 
wherein Nkrumah strategically repurposed democratic ideas to non-democratic ends. In 
one of the most egregious examples, Nkrumah argues to the British Secretary of State 
that giving weight to the minority voice in the assembly would actually weaken the cause 
of democracy.408 When several chiefs were destooled by their subjects in Ashanti over 
their support for the CPP, the CPP government changed the law to allow them to appeal 
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directly to the governor.409 This he also passed off as a move toward modern democracy, 
claiming the acceptance of democracy was more difficult in the area dominated by 
traditional society.410 That destoolement was once the highest form of the democratic 
practice of checks and balances in traditional politics went unremarked.411 That this move 
“in support of democracy” eliminated that form of constraint and replaced it with dictates 
from above, was likewise unmentioned. The language, institutions, and moral authority 
of ‘democracy’ were instead used in service of its opposite.  
Nkrumah’s government was still relatively constrained whilst the British remained in a 
quasi-supervisory role between the first elections and formal independence. During this 
time, the colonial government retained control of the army and police force. When 
dissent arose to the point of violence in the Ashanti region,412 Nkrumah’s frustration with 
his limits broke through: he declared that had the police and the army been in his hands, 
this “disobedience” and “disregard for law and order” would never have been 
                                                          
409 Nkrumah, Ghana, 220. See also Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, 59-60. 
 
410 Nkrumah, 220. 
 
411 Several scholars have pointed out that although electoral democracy was not practiced in pre-colonial 
Africa, complex systems of checks on their rulers and forms of democratic restraint had developed over 
centuries. These were undermined with the co-optation of traditional elites, whose positions were now 
underwritten from above. See for example, Davidson, Black Man’s Burden and Sandbrook, The Politics of 
Africa’s Economic Stagnation and Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.  
 
412 The report indicates that some of the violence in Ashanti was perpetrated by members of the CPP, and 
most likely directed from the capital. “Report of the Gold Coast Local Intelligence Committee on the 
allegations made by TM Kodwo Mercer” DO 35/6178, no 4 (Aug 1956) in Rathbone, British Documents 
Part II, Document 244. 
184 
 
permitted.413 In numerous addresses to party followers, Nkrumah promised to deal with 
all enemies of his and his party’s once the colonial government was gone.414  
While the British government remained, Nkrumah’s regime could not simply set 
constitutional limitations aside. They were limited to making changes to the Coussey 
Committee’s constitutional proposals, and to conducting much of their dealings with the 
opposition in secret. In mid-1956, a high-ranking CPP insider alleged that he had 
documentary evidence showing that Nkrumah and his inner circle were using corruption 
and violence to achieve power.415 The British tasked its Local Intelligence Committee 
with assessing the value of the allegations and their political effect. Their investigation 
concluded that Nkrumah had personally controlled the use of violence by the CPP, 
specifically citing the stabbing death of the NLM’s Chief Propaganda Secretary.416 It also 
substantiated some claims of corruption in using the CPC to hijack resources for the 
party, but predicted that even were the accuser to bring this evidence to light, it stood no 
chance of successfully deposing current CPP leadership.417 
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British documents toward the end of their occupation of Ghana suggest that some may 
have seen the writing on the wall. After a series of meetings with the NLM and its allies, 
the general attitude was that the fears of the opposition were well founded, and the British 
were aware they would be leaving them with few safeguards.418 This view resurfaces 
throughout a series of memorandums between colonial officials stationed in Gold Coast 
in its final years. After the first elections, Nkrumah pressed consistently for a title change 
from Leader of Government Business to Prime Minister, which he saw as his right.419 
This concession he viewed as a victory over the British, but a close reading of British 
documents from the same time period reveals a different reasoning from the perspective 
of the colonial administration. The British hoped that with this largely symbolic gesture, 
it might delay further constitutional changes long enough for stronger opposition to 
develop.420 Several of the constitutional issues discussed in the preceding pages were 
seen by the British as critical as well. The compromise over the issue of regional 
assemblies that permitted their existence (albeit under centralized control) was a result of 
British interjection, but with independence upon them before the assemblies were up and 
running, time ran out. Less than three months before the departure of the British and 
formal independence, the departing colonial government could do no more than “prevail 
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upon” Nkrumah to honor the constitutional provisions for regional assemblies, “at least 
for the time being.”421  
In the years between the entrance of Nkrumah’s government and full independence, the 
political structure had shifted rapidly from the Coussey Committee’s plans for the 
representation of disparate interests; it now leaned toward one disciplined national 
political party who would hold all the positions of real power.422 The British Intelligence 
Committee’s report opined that Nkrumah was prepared to be “completely unscrupulous” 
to further the interests of the party of which he was head, and that he would not hesitate 
to use corruption or violence to achieve those objectives.423 A memorandum on the future 
of the Gold Coast as the British prepared for departure suggests a similar conclusion. It 
predicts that the CPP would continue to use corrupt practices and strongarm tactics 
through the party machine, and would not likely be responsible to the electorate in any 
real sense.424 It advised that delaying independence might improve prospects for the 
future of Ghana’s internal administration, but conceded that the potential impact on 
Britain’s future relations with Ghana if they were to postpone independence was the 
greater concern.425 
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When the British departed in 1957 to raucous approval by the masses, the atmosphere 
was one of exultation and hope throughout the country. Those closer to the political 
center, particularly those opposed to the increasing centralization of power, saw it 
differently. The weakness of opposing forces at the time of independence, and the state’s 
project to absorb what remained into its fold, created a context in which the new 
government could trample opposition, especially once the most powerful restraining 
influence departed. The preceding chapters detailed how the state continued to keep 
potential groups from aligning and rising; the next will highlight the rapid departure from 
democratic governance that followed independence.   
The New Democracy 
As dawn broke over an independent Ghana, Prime Minister Nkrumah presided over a 
legislature dominated by the party he led, the CPP, with the combined remnants of the 
NLM, the NPP, and the Asantemen Council collectively representing the minority 
political opposition. That this group could not secure fundamental protections before 
elections proceeded meant that their fate rested largely in the hands of the popular ruler, 
whose absolute control of the dominant party ensured his personal power.426 The checks 
and balances they had strived to enshrine in the constitution before the departure of the 
British were mostly defeated; those that made it in were easily undermined. By linking 
the quick resolution of those constitutional issues to the issue of independence, Nkrumah 
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not only successfully breezed past them but also cemented his own popularity, for it was 
he who would be credited with securing Ghana’s independence from Great Britain. Once 
the colonial government departed, he had a relatively free hand to deal with dissent as he 
would, all of course, “in the name of democracy.”  
This is where incomplete definitions of democracy help to permit the rise of a quasi-
authoritarian state under the guise of democratic institutions. Nkrumah defined 
democracy as rule by the masses, of which elections are the sin qua non.427 By this 
definition, the actions he took to trample opposition, which was by far the minority voice, 
could plausibly be claimed as within the bounds of democracy. Yet any reasonable 
observer would conclude these practices were decidedly undemocratic. Perhaps the most 
infamous of overreaches was the 1958 Preventive Detention Act (PDA), which gave the 
Governor-General the power to detain anyone “if satisfied that the order is necessary to 
prevent that person acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state.”428 
Detention could be extended for five years (later adjusted to ten) without appearance in, 
or right of appeal to, a court of law.429 This was used to control opposition stemming 
either from within or without the party.430 Among those detained under the PDA were 
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many former leaders of the UGCC, with whom Nkrumah had once been imprisoned 
under the colonial state: William Ofori Atta, Ebenezer Ako-Adjei (arrested in 1962 and 
initially sentenced to death), Joseph Boakye Danquah (arrested in 1961 and again in 
1964; died in prison).   
Criticizing the president became a criminal offense, which, given the president’s position 
as leader of the party, the government, and the state, effectively meant opposition to the 
state on anything was now criminal.431 K.A. Gbedemah, Nkrumah’s Minister of Finance 
and an original member of the CPP Central Committee pointed this out, suggesting that 
the Amendment to the Criminal Code providing for the prosecution of anyone who 
undertakes to make the President “an object of hatred, ridicule, or contempt,” should 
distinguish between the President as Head of State and the President as Head of 
Government “in order to permit free criticism of government policies in Parliament.” 432 
The reply to his objection adopted the exact words of the bill: “those who wish to make 
this distinction wish to bring him [Nkrumah] into hatred, ridicule, or contempt as Head of 
Government.” 433 The threat beneath the words was clear: criticize the government and 
find yourself in jail. Minister Gbedemah was subsequently demoted, and less than two 
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years later, fled into exile when plans for his arrest reached him.434 The opposition’s 
protestations that the way government was operating was undemocratic was countered by 
insistence upon the will of the majority and the protection of that majority from the voice 
of a smaller subsection. This counterpoint, made by Nkrumah and his supporters, turns 
democratic values on their head. When elections are the centerpiece of politics, it is not 
the interests of the majority that need protection, but those of the minority. Once elections 
have occurred, however, the minority will find it difficult, if not impossible, to secure 
meaningful representation, unless they possess some rights that predate and supersede 
electoral politics. Without these overriding restraints, mass democracies may find 
themselves increasingly resembling a dictatorship when a ruler is popular enough to run 
the state in accordance with his personal wishes. Nkrumah, popular as he was in Ghana’s 
early years, could amend the constitution at will, dictate legislation, punish disloyalty, 
and generally impose the “people’s will” in whatever terms he desired, running 
roughshod over whatever constitutional constraints stood in his way.435 
The push and pull of well-represented conflicting group interests has a constraining effect 
on individual power. It brings balance and acts as a stabilizing force for the system. But 
the representation of disparate interests and a state that is accountable to them doesn’t 
stem automatically from elections, especially when the size of competing groups is 
markedly uneven. The failure to give primacy to forms of constraint in democratization 
efforts is what permits mass dictatorships such as Nkrumah’s. Historically, in early stages 
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of democratic development, the commercial class has provided this constraint. As their 
economic wealth grows, they become the ruler’s resource base. Their independent power 
is critical for it makes the ruler reliant on them for resources. In return for support in the 
form of taxes, the ruler must guarantee certain protections (usually property rights and 
representation in government) and must follow through on what is codified into law. This 
mutual dependence between the ruler who guarantees property rights and the economic 
elite who provide a resource base transforms the relationship between citizen and state 
into a bargaining relationship instead of a dependent one.  
The accountability of the ruler and the overall balance of power are rooted in this mutual 
need alongside conflicting interests between the political and economic elite. This last 
piece is critical: the interests of the political and economic elite must diverge to produce a 
constraining effect. If the interests of the political and economic elite converge, or if the 
political-economic elite are one and the same, the outcome is reversed. Ghana’s 
independent state resembles the second dynamic. Neither the colonial predecessor, nor 
the independent government secured its resources primarily from this class (in fact, both 
worked hard to eliminate it). Instead, it extracted resources from a scattered rural 
peasantry through systems of coercion and dependency. This system of resource 
extraction and the related weakness of the commercial class at independence meant that 
the state was unaccountable to either group, and therefore unconstrained in its dealings 
with the political opposition that tried to represent them.436 Despite the fervent opposition 
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to laws that increasingly eliminated any obstruction to state power, there was nothing 
they could do about it. The dwindling commercial elite were rapidly overshadowed by a 
new elite, made so by virtue of their political positions or their ties to the government. 
Rather than a divergence of interests over the taxation bargain, the political elite and the 
new economic elite came to be aligned or even synonymous, and mutually sustained by 
the extraction of rural resources from an untransformed agriculture sector.   
The functioning of state and party after independence continued as it had to undermine 
independent economic development, shift resources from individuals to the state, and 
allocate resources politically. Control of the economic system was critical to establishing 
the political dominance of Nkrumah and the CPP. The country’s economic resources 
were used primarily as an instrument of political power and as a means of garnering 
more. Access to those resources depended primarily on one’s degree of loyalty to 
Nkrumah. Through the party’s control of the economic institutions of the state, the CPP 
could reward and punish political loyalty or lack thereof. Financing for their farms was 
only available to members of the CPP’s farmers wing and excluded those suspected of 
identifying with the opposition.437 Alternate employment, in the city or on state farms, 
was gained by virtue of your party connections.438 Surplus accumulated by the Cocoa 
Purchasing Company, which was now the only legal place for cocoa farmers to sell their 
product, was used to finance the CPP government.439 Cocoa revenue was redirected to 
                                                          
437 Owusu, 275-276. 
 
438 Owusu, “Politics in Swedru,” in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 238. 
 
439 Ashie Nikoe had led a delegation of farmers during the colonial era against setting up the CMB and 
subsequent CPC. He was appointed by Nkrumah as one of the original members of the CPP central 
193 
 
state and party uses: though a share of that wealth had been promised to the farmers 
during the CPP’s rise, the break between the CPP and the main center of cocoa 
production meant the ostracization of those farmers from the fruits of electoral victory.440 
After the CPP came to power in the first round of elections, funds not selectively 
dispersed to party faithful were appropriated to finance party activities, pay the salaries of 
the growing bureaucracy, and build the new political bourgeoisie. Bretton identifies this 
as the most important power resource Nkrumah wielded: the dependency of most of the 
population on marginal income that could be easily controlled gave the state what he calls 
“subsistence control,” enabling Nkrumah as its head to wield absolute power.441  
This type of corruption for party or state purposes, which I will call political corruption, 
was a central part of state-building. It became a primary revenue base for the state, one 
which required political control of economic resources. By some estimates, compulsory 
“commissions” paid out in exchange for awarding government contracts made up roughly 
90 percent of the CPP’s income.442 In the second year of independence, Nkrumah set up 
the National Development Corporation (NDC) to collect these commissions for the 
state.443 Firms who paid the NDC were politically protected, while those who refused to 
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participate were not only excluded from government business, but found it increasingly 
difficult to conduct private business without political connections.444 It was only personal 
corruption, whose practices mirrored that of officially (but quietly) sanctioned political 
corruption, that was frowned upon. Incentives for corruption were embedded in the 
system he had designed: appointed Ministers and elected Assemblymen were told to 
surrender their salaries to the party and draw remuneration from party funds on which to 
live.445 He made their living dependent on political position, which was in turn contingent 
on party loyalty. The only economic security available, even to people in positions of 
significant power, was to use their political power to accumulate wealth, and that is 
exactly what they did. Even in such cases, political favorites found themselves protected 
by the state, sending a mixed message in terms of the acceptability of the practice. After 
Nkrumah’s Minister of Communications and Works was caught accepting a “gift” of 
2000 cedis for awarding a contract to build a training college, the businessman who 
offered the bribe was prosecuted, but the Minister was not.446 A number of accounts of 
Ghana’s political deterioration lament the weakness of the state and Nkrumah’s inability 
to reign this in, but the use of resources to increase personal power and wealth began at 
the top. In more than one public address in districts that had not supported the CPP in 
previous elections, Nkrumah told them this was why they had not enjoyed development 
                                                          
444 Wahlin, “The Roots of Corruption—The Ghanaian Enquiry,” 261-262, details an instance cited in the 
Crabbe Report in which a London firm was paying kickbacks to the NDC and charging inflated prices for 
raw materials. When Kwabena Owusu, acting manger of the Ghana Distilleries Corporation, objected to 
this, he was arrested and dismissed from his post. 
 
445 Nkrumah, Ghana, 142. 
 
446 Nkrumah, 257-258. 
 
195 
 
projects, promising government resources for electricity, water, and schools, if they were 
loyal to him.447  
The submission of the chiefs was likewise achieved through control of economic 
resources. The colonial state had laid groundwork during the shift to indirect rule. When 
the new elected government took over after independence, the chiefs found their position 
further altered. The Stool Lands Control Acts of 1959 and 1961 transferred control of 
stool revenues to the state. Once the state could control their revenue source, they were 
able to exercise a greater deal of political control as well, revoking many of the chiefs’ 
powers of local government and judicial functions, limiting them primarily to ceremonial 
duties and settling petty disputes between subjects.448 Chiefs who resisted the authority of 
the state too publicly risked losing important stool revenues or even destoolement from 
above by a number of legal provisions made available during colonial rule.449 
This peek beneath the surface already reveals that Ghana’s paper democracy in truth 
functioned in highly undemocratic ways long before some of its institutions were done 
away with altogether. Institutions that were meant to constrain the state were dismantled, 
ignored, or most frequently, repurposed for nondemocratic ends. Nkrumah’s government 
repeatedly utilized electoral victories to assist the accumulation of power to one man. 
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Nkrumah could use his personal popularity along with the invocation of democratic 
language to undermine constraining institutions. This was used to circumvent or change 
the constitutional provisions for democratic institutions, to vest greater power in the 
newly created office of the Presidency, and to formalize the one-party state that already 
existed in practice under the lifetime leadership of Nkrumah. The regional assemblies the 
opposition fought so hard to obtain were the first victim of the CPP’s electoral popularity. 
All five were captured by the CPP in the post-independence elections; all five obediently 
passed the bill to dissolve itself, which was unsurprisingly approved by the CPP-
controlled National Assembly.450  
The independence of each component of government at the national level was 
systematically undermined or placed directly under the authority of the executive; this 
was done fairly easily with a strong electoral majority.451 Each institution could then be 
subverted to extend power, rather than constrain it as it was meant to do. The National 
Assembly (Disqualification) Act of 1959 disallowed anyone detained under the PDA in 
the last five years from running for election again; for sitting Members of Parliament 
selected by the executive for detainment under the PDA, their seats would be declared 
vacant and they would be replaced.452 The legislative branch, under such conditions, was 
hardly likely to constrain the executive, since they could be summarily removed for 
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trying. The new constitution ushered in with the 1960 elections gave the executive branch 
the authority to legislate, though this was hardly necessary either. By that point, the 
Assembly operated more as a tool for Nkrumah than a restriction on his personal power. 
Voting down a government (executive)- proposed measure was never really a question, 
and debates, when they were held, were scripted in advance.453 MPs who dared deviate 
would be personally chastised by Nkrumah, would risk losing their seat and under the 
new laws, their freedom. A law requiring that MP’s also hold regular jobs reinforced 
Nkrumah’s ability to reward and punish loyalty in the legislature, since the principal 
employer in Ghana was Nkrumah himself through his control of the civil service as well 
as the expanding network of state-owned enterprises.454 Parliament was dominated by the 
party Nkrumah headed, the instruments of state power were used to oppress both 
outsiders and within-party dissenters, and the vast economic resources at his disposal 
supported the system at every level. The additional power granted the executive, like 
many of the constitutional provisions introduced in 1960, merely formalized the 
President’s ability to preside over organizations he essentially owned already.  
The judiciary system was similarly subordinated to the executive’s will, effectively 
toppling another pillar of democracy: the rule of law. The Judicial Service Act of 1960 
gave the president the power to appoint and remove the judicial service from the High 
Court all the way down to the district level. Just in case a judge dare act contrary to the 
president’s wishes, a subsequent Amendment allowed him not only to dismiss the judge, 
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but also to declare the judgement of the case with which he disagreed to be “of no 
effect.”455 When the Chief Justice acquitted three of five men accused of treason in 1963 
(Nkrumah’s Foreign Minister, Information Minister, and the former secretary of the 
CPP), Nkrumah dismissed the Chief Justice, declared the ruling null and void, and 
announced that the court’s decision would not affect the continued detention of the three 
acquitted men.456 
Cases could be moved on his orders from district courts to the Special Criminal Division 
of the High Court (where they couldn’t be appealed); furthermore, the president could 
now criminalize anything he chose, as well as make the jurisdiction of the Special 
Criminal Division of the High Court whatever offenses he specified.457 In other words, 
the president could declare something a crime, choose the court in which it would be 
tried, disallow appeal, appoint or dismiss the judge at his pleasure, and annul judgements 
with which he disagreed. Later, juries of twelve were added to the Special Criminal 
Division High Courts. In functioning democratic systems, juries act as a representation of 
society and a form of checks and balances within the court system. Here, jury members 
were sourced from loyal followers to ensure it would instead function as an additional 
form of centralized power.  
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A contemporary newspaper account describes the rapid change as follows:  
When Nkrumah led the country to independence from Great Britain seven years 
ago, Ghana possessed the most efficient civil service in Africa, the best schools, the 
most enlightened lawyers, some of the proudest conservatives, the most ardent 
revolutionaries. There was a free press, and independent judiciary, a freely elected 
Parliament. Never was Nkrumah’s popularity so high. In Ghana today, the only safe 
expression of dissent is silence. The press has been muzzled.458 Judges may be fired 
and court verdicts reversed at Nkrumah’s pleasure. Parliament is a rubber stamp for 
Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party.459 
The author of the article interviewed Nkrumah’s former colleague in the UGCC, J.B. 
Danquah, three days before he was arrested under the Preventive Detention Act. 
Considering Danquah died in prison the following year, he would have been one of the 
last to see him outside of prison before his death.  
As it turned out, the institution itself in each of these cases mattered little in terms of its 
constraining ability without an independent source of power behind it to force 
compliance upon rulers. This wasn’t unique to Ghana: throughout Africa during the same 
time period, democratically-elected rulers were amassing sufficient power to rig or 
dispense with elections entirely.460 Focusing overmuch on institutions over underlying 
power dynamics can obscure their true nature and delay the recognition of paper 
democracies as what they really are. As one government after another fell throughout 
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Africa in the following years, Ghana’s included, the superficiality of “democratization” 
began to reveal itself. Elections were held, democratic institutions were erected, but they 
had no teeth. The popularity of the first ruler and his resulting electoral victories initially 
created the context in which despotic governance could thrive. The legacy left by 
Ghana’s early years as a democracy was a central government headed by a leader with no 
national-level restraints. It was his popularity that permitted Nkrumah’s gradual 
assumption of all governmental powers until no checks and balances remained to contest 
his personal will.461 His extensive control of the fortunes of followers and opposition 
alike eliminated effective resistance. But the level of popular support for the coup that 
ultimately ousted the once-beloved Nkrumah was indicative of how unaccountable, 
untransparent, and unrepresentative the “democracy” had become during its short life.462   
The relationship between representativeness and accountability of government, and 
democratic stability is, if it exists, decidedly complex.463 This dissertation could stop 
here, satisfied with having demonstrated the roots of Ghana’s lack of democratic 
accountability, the true nature of its quasi-authoritarian state, and the importance of an 
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altered definition of democracy. But I believe I would be remiss to exclude a discussion 
of the link between the political-economic system as it operated in post-independence 
Ghana and the political instability that characterized the following decades. That the 
opposition had no democratic outlet for seeing its interests represented should by now be 
obvious. The closing of the political space and the marginalization of any political 
inclinations that diverged from Nkrumah’s left no alternative save a seizure of power. 
The alienation of security forces as part of the bid to rid the executive of checks and 
balances turned out to be a critical piece of the later coup. The branch of the police 
responsible for internal security (including preventive detentions) was disintegrated in 
1964 and replaced by the president’s personal Security Service, removing the last 
vestiges of impartiality, and setting later events into motion: two of the organizers of the 
coup that later deposed Nkrumah were leaders of the Ghana Police Special Branch at the 
time of its disintegration.464  
However, the successful seizure of power by the (increasingly large) group of sidelined 
members of a once-impartial security apparatus could probably not have been achieved 
without the widespread support of the population. Most work distinguishes between coup 
leaders and the masses, but the reasons each gives for its participation or support are 
remarkably similar. All are rooted in the state’s control of the political and economic 
systems and the link between them. The primary reasons given by leaders of the coup 
were the economic disintegration and out-of-control corruption that Nkrumah presided 
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over, as well as the dismissal of members whose personal loyalty to Nkrumah was 
questioned.465 The public saw the problem in a similar light. A poll conducted by Norman 
Uphoff revealed that of the reasons Ghanaians were happy about Nkrumah’s overthrow, 
economic causes topped the list, followed by corruption.466 The regime’s control of 
economic resources and their resulting political allocation left a large chunk of the 
population excluded from the economic benefits derived from attachment to the state. 
Robert Dowse goes so far as to say “it is hard to think of any interest in Ghana that 
immediately stood to lose from the coup, apart from those employed by the government 
on state projects and the various officials and agents of the party.”467 The economic 
conditions and resulting dissatisfaction with the regime created a context in which the 
military could intervene with the support of a population experiencing “mass 
pauperization” under the mismanagement of a wildly irresponsible and unconstrained 
elected government.468 
With regard to both the political and economic aspects of the coup, the state sowed the 
seeds of its own demise. The fusion of party and state was pushed from the beginning as 
an alternative to competing parties, which the CPP argued would divide the loyalties of 
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the civil service.469 Within the party, it was run as tyrannically as the government was 
becoming. Dissention or any divergence from Nkrumah’s commands were punished by 
expulsion from the party. CPP candidates for election were to be appointed by party 
leadership; when eighty-one “rebel” members of the CPP tried to run for election against 
the chosen candidates, Nkrumah called a meeting and personally expelled them, claiming 
they needed to be “made an example of.”470 The party also provided “central leadership” 
to the institutions of governance, making the elected more accountable to the CPP and its 
leader than to the electorate.471 It became increasingly difficult to distinguish between the 
party and the state, which were inextricably linked through Nkrumah as both government 
leader and lifetime Chairman of the Party. By eliminating the separation of powers and 
the distinction between ruler, party, and state, the system was such that one could not be 
changed without overthrowing all the others. Democratic stability is reliant these checks 
and balances because it allows for the change of one without disruption to other 
components of the system. In Ghana, this system had become too dysfunctional to 
operate long before elections were done away with.  
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Ghana’s economic demise was likewise written into the system of political control 
exercised by the state, which had been adapted from the colonial era.472 For comparison’s 
sake, let us start with a tale of two economies. In the first, new equipment is introduced 
that is more efficient at harvesting agricultural products. It is more advanced than the 
current methods but not so far apart that it is unrecognizable. It is developed using mostly 
parts and technologies already locally produced for other things. Farmers see this and 
find it more economical than manual labor, since they can produce more with less. Sales 
of the new piece of equipment spread and as it multiples, so do local manufacturers of the 
several parts that go into it. The laborer who no longer works the field moves into town 
and takes a job with a local manufacturer of parts, which, as technology spreads, becomes 
a larger manufacturer who employs more people who are increasingly moving to 
populations centers and shifting to a burgeoning manufacturing sector. This migration is 
facilitated by the new ability of fewer farms, run by fewer people, to produce enough to 
feed many. The commodification of land not only accompanies but enables this process. 
This also births mechanic shops to fix broken equipment and equipment salesmen to 
supply more. As production becomes increasingly efficient, food security increases, 
allowing people to pursue other jobs, as their time is freed from the constraint of 
producing food for their families’ sustenance. Merchants start to produce and trade a 
greater variety of goods, for which there is greater demand now that households have 
greater surplus to spend. Producers of equipment parts have developed the skills and 
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knowledge to produce component parts for other machinery, and new methods begin to 
arise for producing manufactured goods. The productive capacity of equipment develops 
alongside its demand, and increases in productive efficiency in turn gives birth to 
industries that supply the necessary equipment, producing machine parts, equipment, and 
components for manufacturing. The cost of production decreases while the availability of 
products increases, in the context of a demand that is growing with a shift from agrarian 
society dominated by subsistence production to an industrial society characterized by the 
division of labor and surpluses of time and money within households. Each new industry 
or increase in efficiency births new opportunities and new industries to supply inputs, 
feeding an increasingly complex economy. Gradually, each increase in efficient 
technology becomes more complex, until production methods hardly resemble the 
original, if at all. This process, though it sometimes experiences significant leaps, spans 
centuries.  
In the second economy, agricultural production starts at the same point, with most of it 
done by individual or family farms using early tools and relying heavily on manual labor. 
This method of production makes sense for a system of production in which small plots 
of land are harvested separately, which was generally the system that still dominated 
Ghana when the colonial era drew to a close. Overnight, the state commands the 
economy to produce industrial goods on a large scale to supply small domestic markets 
using large, advanced, highly technical, efficient technologies. This they build at large 
public expense without the supporting industries to supply them or the outlet industries 
for their products. The industrial project is severely mismatched to the structure of the 
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agriculture sector, which is decades (if not centuries) from being capable of supplying 
inputs and raw materials needed for that sort of industrial capacity, or for supplying 
sufficient food for the urban population required to support an industrial economy.  
The lack of indigenous entrepreneurship is often invoked as a persistent cause of 
economic failure (this story was first trumpeted by a state that had a clear interest in 
seeing it fail, though the story has persisted). But in the second economy, indigenous 
entrepreneurs, even were they encouraged, are asked to produce at an efficiency that 
requires skipping the technological innovations of steps two through one hundred forty 
seven, find a place in a market that is missing the complementary components that 
develop in steps five through one hundred fifteen, and somehow come up with the capital 
required for the equipment that would be needed at step one hundred seventy three. Most 
of the necessary inputs would have to be imported for the rapid industrialization project, 
inevitably leading to a balance of payments crisis, which could only be managed by 
attempting to limit imports.473 Limiting imports, however, meant shortages of necessary 
components to make the new factories productive. Furthermore, because the technology 
and equipment were dropped into a context where current methods of production were 
centuries apart, there was also a shortage of personnel capable of running them. There 
were few repair shops, spare parts manufacturers, equipment operators, or managers who 
had developed a lifetime of experience in an industry. This can actually result in 
economic decline rather than growth, due to extreme mismatch between new industries 
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and the level of industrial development of existing commerce. Killick’s research suggests 
this is exactly what happened in Ghana: he finds that both forward and backward linkages 
in the economy actually fell between 1960 and 1968.474 The products state factories did 
manage to produce came at a high cost: without the domestic markets to absorb them or 
the supporting industries to supply them, the bills to keep state industries running 
continued to pile up.475  
The predominantly political purposes of the state-owned factories meant that even were 
managers and operators available, they were appointed through political channels. 
Financing, equipment, and other necessary inputs were likewise state-controlled and 
politically-allocated. State factories thus received favorable treatment; this helped along 
the disintegration of private industry, which was finding it more difficult to secure 
necessary inputs or to compete with factories who could sell at a loss and still remain 
intact. The more severe shortages became, the greater the incentives to offer bribes 
(“commission”) to secure necessary materials. This meant an increasing amount of 
surplus (which in urban industry, was only being generated in the rapidly shrinking 
private sector) was being diverted to investment in a political network that can secure 
basic supplies, rather than being reinvested in productive ventures. The more resources 
were sunk into securing political connections, the more it fueled the rise of a non-
productive bourgeoisie whose basis of wealth was rooted in siphoning off productive 
resources.  
                                                          
474 Killick, A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana, 202. 
 
475 Killick, A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana, 176-178. 
208 
 
Ghana’s Seven Year Plan suggests that there were those in the government who 
understood the need for a longer-term perspective on economic development, though 
even that mentioned no more than a twenty-year timeframe. The plan recommended 
starting with simpler manufactured goods, later working in heavier industrial 
production.476 This path would have been slower, more gradual, and more organic, but it 
wouldn’t have met the political objectives of the regime, and so it was never heeded.477 
The bulk of the state’s energies were geared toward creating an insta-industrial society, a 
project Nkrumah saw as tied to political survival.478 In the global West, economic activity 
had shifted from predominantly agricultural to heavily industrial as it developed 
economically. The world’s wealthiest capitalist democracies were also industrialized 
economies, leading to a tendency to equate industrialization with development and 
agrarian economies with infancy.479  
Statesmen such as Nkrumah were not alone in emphasizing the industrial economy as the 
key component of economic development; this emphasis also dominated development 
economics. Development economists argued that industrialization is a precondition for 
agricultural progress because it generates demands for agricultural goods, thus 
stimulating the development of agriculture. Industrial activity, they also point out, leads 
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to more forward and backward linkages (the mechanism of economic growth) than 
agriculture does.480 The failure of this recommendation to yield results in Ghana, among 
other underdeveloped economies, suggests its logic might be flawed. It neglects to 
mention that the multidirectional linkages are not as predominant in agriculture in part 
because it involves raw materials that grow from the land. In other words, agriculture is 
the starting point. It also overlooks that a society must be food secure before it can shift 
to a largely urban, industrialized system. If industrialization precedes agricultural 
development, the food to support a growing urban population must be secured from 
foreign sources able to produce it in higher volumes at lower cost. Food security 
stemming from large-scale production creates the conditions that facilitate 
industrialization. Production must be large enough in scale and efficient enough in 
technique that a shrinking rural population can produce enough to feed a highly 
urbanized, highly industrial society. The necessary increase in agricultural productive 
efficiency requires certain social and economic transformations that neither the colonial 
nor post-colonial state could permit to occur without losing some degree of political 
control. The move from peasant to commercial production and local to trans-local 
merchant economies transforms the socioeconomic structure of society in a way that 
permits organic industrialization, but only after incremental developments that take place 
over the gradual elapse of time. The European states did modernize their economies and 
experience rapid growth during the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century, as 
Nkrumah and his advisors recognized. But the transformation of social structures that 
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facilitated commercialization and later, enabled industrialization, had taken place in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Over 200 years of development lay between them.  
Ghana’s industrialization project was undertaken without the requisite changes in the 
rural economy, with both political and economic consequences. The scattered nature of 
production meant that the manufacturing end of agriculture production faced major 
problems with collection, transportation, and storage, resulting in fluctuating prices and 
intermittent shortages. An urban, industrial economy is based on cheap and reliable 
sources food. It relies on the ability of a small percentage of the population to be able to 
produce enough to feed the rest, which is the support base for industrialization and 
related urbanization.481 When industrialization and urbanization were pushed forward 
after independence without this support base, it instead created greater food insecurity, 
eventually perpetuating the very economic problems they were attempting to resolve.482  
The consequences of skipping so many steps in the rush to industrialize were mass 
migration before industries developed sufficiently to provide enough jobs to absorb them; 
and urbanization without increases in agricultural consolidation and efficiency to support 
urban demand for food. Rapid industrialization without agricultural development had 
political consequences as well. The manufacturing sector relies on a number of raw 
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materials from the agriculture sector for inputs,483 in addition to a cheap, reliable supply 
of food. When the domestic agriculture sector can’t provide this, industry becomes more 
dependent on the state for access to foreign markets, foreign inputs, and legislated price 
controls, all of which work to further discourage domestic agriculture production.  
Since the state was determined that mechanized agriculture be confined to state-owned 
farms, massive amounts of modern machinery were imported for their exclusive use, but 
they faced the same issues as were being experienced in the urban industrial sector. 
Technology inappropriate to the level of development was imported, and most of it sat 
idle, while the small farmers still cultivating the land with premodern equipment 
outstripped the production of the massive state farms.484 Food shortages arose and prices 
went up as a result. When the state responded by legislating price controls on food below 
the cost of production, state farms could operate at a loss, sustaining themselves by 
accumulating large debts, which would have to be paid (unsurprisingly) with surplus 
appropriated from the cocoa producers.485 State-owned farms didn’t need to operate in 
the green; they could continue to drain the cocoa economy until its resources dried up. 
Private producers could go nowhere but out of business. Excerpts from the Seven Year 
Plan suggest Ghana had experts who recognized the importance of agriculture, since it 
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had an entire section on the importance of agricultural production and its relation to the 
rest of the economy.486 But this was largely ignored in light of political needs. Private 
agriculture production was used primarily as the cash cow for state-building, and on the 
state farms, political concerns as usual trumped economic ones.487  
Increasing output was no longer a viable option, since it would require either widespread 
improvement of techniques and mechanization (which was not economical on small, 
scattered farms) or an increase in labor (which was unlikely since urbanization was 
already occurring, decreasing the rural labor supply and increasing the urbanites who rely 
on rurally-produced food). The intractability of this problem came down to the mutual 
determination of the state and the traditional elite to retain systems of land tenure that 
disallowed private accumulation. The free peasant had access to land through customary 
tenure, but not ownership of it. Farmers seeking to expand their productive capacity 
would need to be able to consolidate land in order to make large-scale, capital-intensive 
production possible, but because it isn’t owned, it can’t be sold. Often, it can’t even be 
leased because it’s broken up into scattered allotments, each of which would require the 
consent of dozens (if not hundreds) of interested kinsmen. Those with a claim of access 
to an allotment of land don’t want to give it up without compensation, but since they 
don’t own it, they have no claim to the actual compensation. Many parcels are too small 
to produce much over subsistence plus a small side crop for local markets or the state 
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cocoa system, but without the ability to sell the land to a neighbor who wants to run a 
commercial farming operation, the peasant, whether he wants to be or not, is stuck with 
land that nobody can make very productive. Even if vacant, a scattered, noncontiguous 
arrangement of land is unusable for a commercial-scale operation. Even if contiguous 
land is secured, the uncertainty of losing the land to an unexpected dispute militates 
against investing in productive capacity. Eventual economic stagnation has been 
embedded in the land system since the colonial state decided it was more politically 
expedient to institutionalize it that way.  
The only solution remaining to the state was to keep squeezing the only exporting sector 
of the economy, the cocoa producers. Since the system prevented greater efficiency, 
output would need to be increased, but this created a situation that only encouraged long-
term stagnation. The increase in output in 1965 contributed to a decline in the world price 
of cocoa. This could never be fully recovered, since Ghana was no longer the world’s 
only cocoa producer: cutting back production at that point would only result in losing 
market share. Furthermore, increasing output without improving efficiency or cost of 
production resulted in price decreases, but the cost of producing remains the same. This 
means profit margins actually decrease, generating incentives against greater 
production.488 As the first decade of independence drew to a close, the state’s ballooning 
bureaucracy and the new elite emerging from it were being sustained by a resource base 
destined to dwindle.  
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By disallowing the accumulation of capital, the state wrote its own economic demise. 
Capital accumulation remains the backbone of economic development; where a rising 
capitalist class has the power to compel rulers to protect wealth in exchange for a portion 
of it (in the form of taxes), capital can accumulate, and the economy grows. If, instead, an 
unconstrained state can forcefully extract wealth, the economy’s surplus is redistributed 
rather than accumulated, and will eventually dry up.489 Evidence abounds that forceful 
extraction, rather than the taxation bargain, was at work in post-independence Ghana. Yet 
despite their position as the main resource base for the state, cocoa farmers struggled to 
get their promised inputs.490 The overvaluation of Ghana’s currency hit exporters the 
hardest, making cocoa farming increasingly unprofitable, but they were unable to bring 
sufficient pressure to bear on the state to change its policy.491 The lack of domestic 
constraints on state policy left no buffer between political expedience and economic 
needs, and created an environment unconducive to productive investment. Political rulers 
who are constrained, regardless of the mechanism of constraint, are more effective at 
inducing investment and growth, because the environment is more predictable in the long 
term. Recall that elections are not necessarily effective at producing constraint; this is 
likely why there is disagreement in the literature on the impact of regime type on foreign 
direct investment. Though the leadership has sometimes been characterized as bungling, 
the main problem was not that Ghana was economically illiterate, nor (as Nkrumah 
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repeatedly claimed) that they were crippled by foreign dependence.492 It was at least in 
part that political control consistently undermined economic productivity. The primary 
goal of the coup that brought down Nkrumah’s regime was to restore order and balance 
to the economy.493 By the time of the 1966 coup, naught but armed force could stay the 
state’s hand in economic policy.  
It is clear that the structure of the political-economic system both permitted and 
incentivized state policies that were economically disastrous. The question is why should 
economic failure cause the downfall of the political system? Economic stagnation is dealt 
with throughout the world in various periods of time without pulling down the political 
system on top of it. The answer also lies in the co-location of political and economic 
authority. The Ghanaian state was built on patron-client systems through which economic 
surplus was dispersed. The dominance of political officials was based on their ability to 
disperse economic benefits to the individuals and communities they “represented.”494 The 
fusion of ruler, party, and state facilitated unrestrained power to allocate the state’s 
resources for political ends; access to these resources was the basis of the political power 
of the state and its agents.495  
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Politics under this system was the only pathway to wealth, which was understood by the 
populace relatively quickly. The resources of the state, channeled primarily through the 
Cocoa Purchasing Company, were accessed by demonstrating political loyalty.496 As 
state-owned enterprises came to dominate the domestic economy, the state also became 
the largest employer.497 The state’s economic institutions came to be seen as the route -
the only route- to securing economic security and social standing.498 This changes the 
nature of collective demands on the state. The earliest political battles that preceded 
independence were about opposition to the power of the state: the merchants and lawyers, 
represented by the UGCC and subsequently, the NLM, agitated for greater constraints 
and separation of powers. By the second round of post-independent elections, it had 
begun to center on the allocation of state resources to particular groups. Cocoa farmers, 
who had once resisted the creation of the Cocoa Marketing Board, were now reduced to 
petitioning the state for a greater share of the surplus they had themselves created. The 
price of cocoa became the main issue in politics.499 This change was significant; it 
marked a shift in the relationship between the state and its resource base from opposition 
to dependency.  
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Instead of pushing for limitations of the state’s powers, demands on the state now 
involved the use of the coercive state apparatus to confer economic benefits. This attitude 
toward the role of politics in economic life permeated Ghanaian society and politics. The 
CPP presented itself as an instrument for attaining good jobs, high cocoa prices, material 
benefits, and socioeconomic status, designing the political system around this promise.500 
Politics became an arena for squabbling over the economic spoils that stemmed from 
political power; political movements became avenues for economic advancement for 
politicians and citizens alike.501 Wealth came to be identified, even synonymous, with 
political power; the two grew increasingly intertwined as other paths to wealth were 
closed off and politics became the primary means for economic advancement.  
Even elections were brought into the service of state domination. Much has been written 
about the superiority of democracy for representing rural interests because of the power 
of the vote, but the more important question may be to what ends elections are used. In 
Ghana, the votes of rural farmers were secured by controlling their access to economic 
wealth, since the state dare not let them become independent.502 When the institution is 
subverted to control instead of constrain, it does little to secure the actual representation 
of their interests, which should be apparent in the way the system continued to live off 
the labor of the farmers. The state’s total domination of the economic sphere and 
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society’s resultant dependence on it had turned the inherent conflict between political and 
economic power into a mutually reinforcing system of control. As long as resources 
could continue to sustain it, the state’s mission to co-opt, control, or replace all sources of 
societal power held. The political system continued to support itself off the surplus of the 
rural economy until the finite nature of economic resources began to show.  
When the state bases its ruling authority on its ability to control and disperse economic 
resources, this also means its legitimacy is at stake when the resources inevitably dry 
up.503 The economic stagnation that resulted from the state’s determination to control all 
allocation of resources eventually led to its own downfall. Without some degree of 
separation between economic and political power, the political system (at least somewhat 
accurately) took the brunt of the blame for economic failure, and the system came 
crashing down. The military ousted Ghana’s first democratically elected president on 
February 24th, 1966, and a majority of the population actively rejoiced.  
The fall of Nkrumah’s government, accompanied in the same time frame by a number of 
African neighbors, laid bare what had been seething beneath the surface since they first 
welcomed “democracy” along with independence. The grounds on which the political 
system rested never had components of long-term stability: constraint, accountability, 
balance, rule of law, and ultimately, legitimacy. The last of these emerges from the 
others, which come about primarily as a result of the push and pull between opposite loci 
of power: the political and the economic. Long before the coup, it was clear the two were 
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not opposed, but aligned. Ghana’s political elite and her economic elite were not only 
mutually reinforcing, but often one and the same. This was not only the reason the 
government was so unconstrained; it was also the reason the population blamed the 
system for its economic miseries. 
The rapid deterioration of the state’s authority and legitimacy plagued the regimes that 
followed for decades. Post-independence Ghana built a state based on a type of power 
that was inherently fragile and hollow. It lacked layers of accepted authority and 
widespread, deep-rooted legitimacy to protect it. Rather, it was based on its ability to 
deliver material goods to its agents and supporters, and whip up popular sentiment when 
needed. It was inherently fragile because it was so dependent on the masses, a group 
historically known for volatility and a tendency to run to extremes when excited. The 
mass popularity that carries a ruler to power can carry them off again when the mood 
shifts; and the mood predictably shifted when the state ran out of resources to distribute. 
The mass movement that brought Nkrumah to power was decidedly populist in nature.504 
The lack of a large, growing middle class and a strong business sector meant the 
electorate was more concerned with immediate results than with stability and restraint.505  
Nkrumah and the CPP had used the institutions of the state to shore up simultaneous 
political and economic control. This had to be done through patronage networks because 
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it didn’t want to risk allowing the competition of interests to manifest itself in opposition 
to state power. The resulting transfer of resources from private to public meant that the 
resource base would deteriorate as surplus was channeled toward political use, which is 
by nature unproductive. When this caught up to them, there was no one to blame but the 
state, which had become synonymous with the party and behind that, the ruler. As 
resources were transferred from private to public, and private citizens watched state 
agents prosper as their fortunes declined, dissatisfaction slipped through the cracks of the 
party’s dominance and the ruler’s popularity. This dissatisfaction couldn’t find 
expression in the democratic system because it was rooted in economic frustrations under 
which the political system itself was the at the core. The state could not allow dissent on 
this issue, because it would mean fundamentally a challenge of state control over the 
economy, which was ultimately the basis of its power. It couldn’t respond to 
dissatisfaction in the context of democratic procedures without also giving breathing 
room to opposition forces that might undermine this. It could only respond through 
increasing political repression that came to characterize Ghana’s first democratic 
experiment: greater control of courts, control of the media, arrest of the opposition, 
restriction of civil liberties, and the continued extraction of the resources that funded it 
all. The building of the political system upon control of the economic system in this way 
undermined democratic accountability, liberality, freedom, and ultimately, stability.  
Institutional Entrenchment  
The military formed a governing council, the National Liberation Council (NLC), which 
handed power back to an elected civilian government three years later. For all that 
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governing military councils have been looked upon with disdain, there has not been a 
single one in Ghana that did not willingly hand power back to democratically elected 
governments after attempting to fix serious defects in the “democratic” system. The 
conversation tends to focus on the military as the perpetrators of authoritarian reversals, 
but given the evidence presented here, it seems both obvious that authoritarian 
backsliding was well underway before the coup, and feasible that the military’s hands 
were tied for alternate options as the only remaining institution with the power to do 
anything about civilian governments run amok with the country’s resources. Markovitz 
calls this type of coup a “proxy-rebellion,” carried out by soldiers but supported by the 
general population.506 The military council that ruled Ghana in the late 1960s undertook 
difficult measures to correct severe economic problems, overhauling a budget that had 
been spending far in excess of its resources for years, correcting the vastly overvalued 
currency that was harming agricultural production, and reducing de facto state 
monopolies and taxes in an effort to open up space for private sector growth.507   
In 1969, three years after the coup that overthrew Nkrumah, the new Progress Party (PP) 
was elected with Dr. Busia (back from exile) at the head. Marginal changes to 
government policy took place under the NLC and subsequent PP administrations, but the 
basic relationship between the state and capital remained unchanged. The debt situation 
improved markedly, with a positive balance of payments by the end of the military 
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council’s rule, though this was accomplished by limiting imports without enough growth 
in domestic or export industries to support long-term growth.508 Growth in domestic 
industry required capital investment, which indigenous business was still too weak to 
provide. Imported capital, however, had to be sacrificed in order to continue importing 
the equipment, parts, and other materials necessary to run existing industries. Everything 
could not be imported without resulting in severe balance of payments and debt crises. 
Nor could the state simultaneously balance its accounts and bring in new investment 
without the indigenous private business sector that Nkrumah worked so hard against. 
Moreover, indigenous ownership was preferred to foreign, and the new civilian 
administration felt it may be politically necessary to keep the failing state corporations 
under some form of domestic ownership. The biggest departure from Ghana’s first post-
independence civilian administration was the Busia administration’s desire to see the rise 
of an indigenous commercial bourgeoisie to fuel growth in the economy and stability in 
politics.509  
It initially appeared as though the new government would be an aid rather than a 
hindrance to the private sector. The reappearance of private newspapers, the formation of 
business-centric interest groups, and the appointment of businessmen to public boards 
concerned with economic policy suggested they might have a greater voice going 
forward.510 The civilian government that took over in 1969 was headed by a figure 
                                                          
508 Killick, A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana, 106-107. 
 
509 First, Power in Africa, 395. 
 
510 Esseks, “Government and Indigenous Private Enterprise in Ghana,” 26-28. See also Killick, A Study of 
Economic Policies in Ghana, 58. 
223 
 
associated with the group of merchants and businessmen who led the original UGCC. 
Both the NLC and the succeeding Progress Party government promised assistance to 
private enterprise, though substantive changes toward greater economic freedom 
remained limited, and the basic structure of the political economy was largely unchanged 
from the Nkrumah years.511 The state remained the largest sector of the economy, often at 
the expense of private opportunity, while the state-owned enterprises continued to operate 
at large losses.512 Land policy remained firmly in the hands of political authorities. Those 
changes that did occur moved greater portions of land from traditional to state control. 
Compulsory land acquisitions for state-owned plantations and government housing 
projects still occurred under the NLC; the subsequent PP government transferred foreign-
held freeholds to 50-year leaseholds, vesting the reversion in the state.513 Large-scale land 
acquisitions by the state continued to occur under successive governments, making the 
most fundamental resource for economic growth increasingly insecure.  
The public sector was still funded primarily through coercive extraction of cocoa surplus, 
rather than by the taxation bargain, the flailing capitalist class still being too minute to 
facilitate that shift. The power imbalance between state and society remained 
untransformed. The rise of the Progress Party was viewed by some as the triumph of the 
Ghanaian bourgeoisie,514 but their position vis-à-vis the state did not take on the quality 
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of a traditional bourgeoise class. Busia and the other PP leaders, many of whom once 
made up the core of the defeated UGCC, inherited a political system characterized by 
patronage politics, of which they were expected to take part if they were to survive. 
Political battles between parties and between the political elites came to center on who 
would control the resources of the state and the power of patronage it brought with it.515 
At least as significant as the habits of state employees and those with access to political 
power were the expectations of the electorate, accustomed to state patronage as the 
baseline of politics and pinning their hopes for the future on access to the resources the 
state distributes. Still facing systemic and persistent economic problems, the new civilian 
rulers stood little chance of meeting these demands; but with suffrage already suffuse, the 
very democratization of the population worked against the stability of civilian rule.   
Patronage, and its twin brother corruption, continued relatively unabated. Revenues used 
under the Ghanaian Business Promotion Act, ostensibly designed to support the small 
businessmen, instead went to former members of parliament.516 In another telling 
example, cocoa and timber production in the Ahafo area fostered local prosperity in the 
late 1960s. Resistance to the high level of surplus extraction developed around local elites 
(who had not collaborated with the state the way many other areas had) and found 
expression in the PP’s electoral platform.517 This tension between political and economic 
interests, however, did not survive elections, which centered not on government restraint, 
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but on the redistribution of the fruits of electoral victory to the new winners who now 
controlled the state apparatus. The “triumphant” bourgeoisie became just another wing of 
the state machine, to be rewarded or deprived depending on its electoral fortunes. 
Resources were still predominantly governed by access to political power. So long as the 
state determines access to resources, whoever captures the political machine captures it 
all. In Ghana, the bourgeoisie did not mold a political landscape characterized by a state 
that underwrites the rules governing economic interactions and an economic elite that 
counteracts the state’s ability to legislate for its own ends. Instead, it became just one 
more group jockeying for control of the resource pool and allocative powers that lie in 
controlling access to the state.   
The continued equation of political and economic power meant that the Busia 
government was under the same pressure to produce economic miracles if it hoped to 
survive. The same economic policies that resulted in the first balance of payment and 
debt crises were reintroduced to attempt to stimulate rapid growth in the economy. The 
state enterprises fared no better in terms of profitability than they had before, and 
continued to fulfill political functions, while demand for imports continued to rise from 
both the flailing industrial sector and the growing urban population.518 Import licenses 
continued to be politically allocated, and a commission of enquiry found that Nkrumah-
era practices of favoring political supporters continued under the PP government.519 
Within two years, the balance of payments crisis had nearly reached pre-coup levels, and 
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the government fell into severe debt again. Currency devaluation had to be instituted, 
which led to price increases and generated a great deal of public hostility toward the 
government.520 The second attempt at democracy ended in another military coup after 
less than three years. 
With the basic structure of the political-economic system unchanged, patrimonialism and 
related corruption also persisted.521 Economic disintegration and widespread corruption 
were once again the primary grievances of the second coup,522 a pattern that never 
disappeared from one coup to the next. The second military council, the NRC, was 
displaced by another military council, and in 1979, handed the government over to 
another democratically elected leader, which itself lasted only two years before the next 
coup. Each of these raised consistent issues with the democratic governments: leaders 
who run the state like a “one-man show,” economic mismanagement, and corruption.523 
While the country dealt with economic stagnation, the state continued to extract 
resources, and the relative fortunes of the politically connected was widely obvious.524 
Jerry Rawlings took power in the fifth and final military overthrow in 1981, a coup that 
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was once again about the “corrupt power” wielded by politicians and the economic 
problems it created.525  
The system perseveres because it is on a self-perpetuating feedback loop whose strength 
outstrips the interruption of intermittent coups. In early years, political and economic 
power had become tied together and mutually reinforcing. Wealth could only be attained 
through political connections, and so political power was used to accrue greater wealth. 
Wealth in turn generated more political power, and the closer to the center of power, the 
more wealth could be reached. Disparate interests that converged in the preservation of 
the system not only became highly entrenched, but increasingly powerful as time went 
on. When political and economic power are generated through separate mechanisms, a 
tension develops between the two that results in a relationship that is at times both 
conflicting and cooperative.526 In Ghana, political and economic power had become 
wedded: the location of one determined the distribution of the other. The relationship 
between them is more accurately called not cooperative, but collusive. Those whose 
economic wealth stems from access to political power had an interest not just in 
continued state ownership over economic resources, but in continuing to spend them 
unproductively and irresponsibly, leading to the economic crises that cause its own 
downfall. Changes in government leadership, even drastic ones, didn’t chip away at this 
because it didn’t change the locus of power, only the individual who held it. Whether led 
by an elected or military leader, the government was only the institution in which the 
                                                          
525 Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, 385. 
 
526 As noted in previous chapters, it is this relationship that generates constraining forces. 
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same power dynamics continued to operate.527 Either way, both political and economic 
power originated within the state, which continued to generate resources through its 
power to extract and use them to build up its political base.  
The same issues thus endured: lack of accountability and transparency, endemic 
corruption, and repeated instability. Little changed from one coup to the next for several 
related reasons. First, the problems were systemic, but the solutions were not. New rulers 
were elected and removed with few notable changes in overall patterns. Attempts to 
address corruption focused on prosecuting or removing individual violators but did little 
to change the incentives embedded in the system.528 Economic remedies were called 
upon to ameliorate the most immediate problems, but the incongruities in the economy 
that caused them remained. Economic institutions were used to change which group 
benefits from them but did nothing to address the inherent problems in the political 
allocation of economic resources.  
These economic problems were not addressed at their root because from both a state and 
society perspective, political and economic power were still one and the same. The new 
government followed the same pattern of using the state apparatus to serve the interest of 
the groups they embodied; the system was not changed, only the people who would 
benefit from it.529 Eventually, the state will max out its capacity to siphon off surplus 
                                                          
527 “Power doesn’t self-destruct; it adapts to its environment and tries to shape it.” Mamdani Citizen and the 
state, 179.  
 
528 Rawlings in particular was harsh on violators, resorting to confiscations, imprisonment, and even 
executions; but these issues persisted even under his administration and afterward. 
 
529 See also Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power. 
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from an inefficient economy to support its political network.530 When it does run out of 
money for its political supporters, it will fail; but despite widespread support for the 
coups that oust irresponsible governments, it is still the disparity in allocation, not the 
system of allocation with which the population takes issue. Criticism is primarily over the 
contrast between the wealth displayed by party leaders and that held by the general 
public, not over the political allocation of resources in general; complaints over 
corruption tend to focus not on the practice itself, but on the channeling of most of the 
fruits of corruption to too few.531 Rather than addressing the underlying system, regime 
change only brings new winners into the fold.  
Lastly, new constitutions were produced with each new democratic government, with 
new safeguards written in,532 but without an underlying change in power dynamics to fuel 
a systemic shift, the new rules mattered little. Patronage politics, and political and 
personal corruption were more institutionalized than the formal institutions; 
constitutional restraints couldn’t be invoked to enforce restraint upon political rulers who 
engage in these practices, because it was in the shared interest of the economically 
                                                          
530 The diminishing resources the state could use to hold together a ruling coalition is one of the key 
components Chazan identifies as causal in the state’s loss of legitimacy and power, ending in the Rawlings 
coup. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, 337-339.  
 
531 Bennett, “Malcontents in Uniform,” in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 303-
304; Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power.  
 
532 The new constitution under which the PP would operate after the first coup was suffused with 
constraints against absolute power and checks and balances between branches of government, as well as 
independent state officers designed to check government practices. Safeguards against further coups were 
also attempted in successive constitutions. Kraus, “Arms and Politics in Ghana,” in Welch, Soldier and 
State in Africa, 205; Luckham, “The Constitutional Commission,” in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and 
Soldiers in Ghana, 63, 79. 
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powerful to keep them afloat.533 The fundamental economic and political mechanisms 
that characterize the system went unaltered, continuing to spell out economic disasters 
and political upheaval. Each collapse was followed by a subsequent coup and new 
civilian government that, in no better position to solve endemic problems than the last, 
fell into the same patterns. With each handover, reversion to arbitrary rule quickly 
followed. Political appointees and employees of the state continued to live above the law; 
wealth, property and social status all flowed from the state and its political elite, patron-
client ties determined its dispersal, corruption ensued, and the military remained the only 
institution with the power to address it. So long as no other sector of society emerged 
with the power to limit the government, the cycle of economic collapse and political 
revolt continued. A leader at the helm with a more pragmatic approach to governance 
could no more find a place in this volatile political-economic environment than the many 
who tried and failed to expel corruption. Hilla Limann, president from 1979 to 1981, was 
known for eschewing catch-all solutions and ideological dogma, favoring caution and 
practicality in policy responses to Ghana’s problems.534 Restraint, however, is not 
rewarded by mass electorates facing problems of poverty, inequality, and economic 
stagnation. The political opposition, now with a freer hand than was ever enjoyed in 
Ghana’s early years, joined the chorus of student organizations, worker unions, and a 
handful of other rapidly mobilized (and politicized) groups demanding again, more 
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equitable distribution and more accountable government.535 The Limann administration 
lasted only two years before being displaced by the populist coup led by J.J. Rawlings.  
The leader of Ghana’s last military coup to date remained in office for nearly twenty 
years. Rawlings, whose picture is still found plastered on cabs, windows, and businesses, 
is widely viewed as a popular hero who brought Ghana through a difficult economic 
recovery period and set the stage for democratic governance. The military leader 
subsequently won the 1992 elections, which were accepted by the opposition and mostly 
regarded as having been fairly conducted. He was not without detractors but was 
surprisingly popular. Nearly everyone I spoke with had an overall positive impression of 
his character, and most remember the coup he led as a day of celebration in Ghana, 
viewing Rawlings as a “champion of the people.” Rawlings retired from politics at the 
end of his term limit and in 2000 and handed the reins of government over to the 
victorious opposition party, an event that elicited positive global attention. Research since 
has centered on the last two decades as a rebirth of democracy that has enjoyed greater 
stability and been accompanied by economic growth.  
It is tempting to join the current conversation by attempting to extrapolate the 
information gained from this interpretation of the historical record to make claims about 
contemporary Ghana. To do so would be to negate the understanding of causal processes 
that guided this dissertation. Peaceful elections have guided regime change since 
                                                          
535 Chazan, 315. 
 
232 
 
Rawlings’ 2000 handover,536 causing much speculation about what has changed and 
whether Ghana has consolidated its democracy. I am reluctant to say much on the topic 
because the twenty-six years that have passed since the last military regime converted to 
an elected one and the eighteen years since he actually left office are, in the larger 
context, very short periods of time. I will, however, make several observations about the 
contemporary time period, drawn primarily from in-country interviews during a seven-
week stay in Ghana in 2017.  
The first observation I will make is that some things have changed. Since the early 1990s, 
gaps have creaked open, allowing economic openings to be filled by private 
entrepreneurship.537 They face major obstacles, many created by state policy, some a 
byproduct of economic inefficiencies that simply take decades to overcome. The 
commercial chain from raw rural production to finished, marketable product is 
fragmented and inefficient. Farms are mostly small and scattered, and availability of 
inputs (seeds, fertilizers) varies from year to year and are often mistimed and politically 
allocated.538 This leads to five major problems in improving agricultural productivity: 
storage (which would be invested in by larger operations, but small farms must move the 
                                                          
536 Technically, the first peaceful elections were in 1992, though the sitting military dictator was elected 
and remained in office for another eight years. These elections, however, were generally regarded as free 
and fair, and so some now place the beginning of Ghana’s current period of peaceful regime change in that 
year.  
 
537 Every business owner I interviewed in Ghana started their business in this time period.  
 
538 Seed, for example: A Seed Technical Advisory Committee establishes seed production costs and fixes 
prices for private seed firms and growers. The certified seed price is a minimum, which buyers cannot 
undercut. Most observers think the price ratio is too low and does not offer strong incentives for private 
seed multiplication, particularly hybrids. Norman et al., “Mapping current incentives and investment in 
Ghana’s agriculture sector,” 23. 
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harvest quickly); transportation (roads are rough and sometimes impassable in rural areas, 
and severely congested in urban centers); unreliable supply (due to inconsistent input 
availability and insufficient production); collection (producers are scattered); and 
insufficient markets. Domestic commercial markets for agricultural products are limited, 
though their limited development is mostly a byproduct of persistent supply issues. Most 
food goods meant for immediate household consumption are bought and sold in the local, 
informal roadside markets. The formal domestic markets for food goods in the 
supermarkets and grocery stores require a more reliable supply, so have a preference for 
more efficiently produced foreign goods. Agricultural products that serve as inputs for 
further processing in a larger chain find few domestic buyers, while foreign buyers 
require a reliable low-cost supply that can be filled by more efficient producers who can 
take advantage of the economies of scale that come with consolidation. Solving the 
problems that would make Ghanaian producers a more attractive supplier is made 
difficult by the remaining factors listed above. Collection from a large number of small 
producers adds an additional cost of collection and aggregation. This is also a particularly 
burdensome process given the state of the transportation system, which slows the 
production chain. All of this intensifies existing supply problems. Even were these 
problems solved, unreliable supply due to inconsistency in yields would continue to 
dampen Ghana’s economy. The state is highly involved in the main determinants of 
harvest yield: seedling supply, fertilizer use, and the dispersal of necessary pesticides. 
These continue to be dispersed unreliably: agents (appointed by the government) who 
disperse supplies at local outposts ask questions designed to figure out your political 
leanings, and inputs are often used to reward politically loyal areas and punish those who 
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supported the opposition.539 These persistent issues in the agricultural economy are a drag 
on the entire economic system, not only undermining food security, but grinding 
production to a snail’s pace due to frequent shortages of raw materials that come from 
agriculture.  
The connection to politics on a larger scale is obvious to producers. Business owners and 
non-profit directors alike expressed the desire to see farmers less dependent on the state, 
pointing to this as the fundamental weakness in a system that subsidizes inefficiency and 
prevents capital accumulation, but continues to serve as a tool of political control.540 
Holding the government accountable under this system is “impossible” when it “holds all 
the resources.”541 Asked to rank the degree of farmers’ independence from the state on a 
scale of 1 to 10, everyone’s answer fell between 2 and 4; this was progress, however, 
compared to pre-Rawlings, which scored a unanimous 1.542 Said the founder of the Seed 
Trade Association of Ghana (STAG): “if someone could unite the fragmented value 
chain, the state could not stop us, because the farmers wouldn’t be dependent on the 
government anymore.”543 He began STAG in 2010 with the purpose of linking producers 
                                                          
539 Solomon (Bright Generation, Agribusiness Division, a non-profit operating out of  Kumasi), in 
discussion with the author, June 2017; Professor Tutu (Economist, University of Ghana), in discussion with 
the author, June 2017. 
 
540 Lucy Quinoo (Mel Consulting, Ltd., a consulting firm that works with farmers to link them with 
financing, facilities, and markets), in discussion with author, July 2017. 
 
541 Small cocoa farmer on the outskirts of Kumasi (identity withheld at interviewee’s request), in discussion 
with author, June 2017.  
 
542 Six of my interviewees were asked to contribute to the rankings; I chose those who were most involved 
in agriculture production and closest to the day-to-day operations.  
 
543 Kwabena Adu-Gyamfi (founder of STAG and Owner, Agri-Commercial Services, Ltd.), in discussion 
with the author, June 2017.  
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and distributors and improving the relationships between them. He only recently began to 
work directly on government policy issues and played a key role in the development of 
seed policies to support private, domestic production of improved seedlings and abolish 
the state-controlled price fixing system. This peaked my interest, since Scott Taylor’s 
work, which identified strong business sectors combined with state actors who perceive 
themselves as weak relative to their private sector counterparts as the configuration that 
results in effective state-business reform coalitions, suggested that Ghana’s case may bear 
further scrutiny since the early 2000s.544 I next asked the seed association leader how the 
new policies are impacting the seed industry; his answer was that it didn’t matter what 
the law was, because the law is implemented by people whose interest is in maintaining 
their position of power. The politicians hand out supplies to small farmers to get their 
votes. The government is able to manipulate the allocation of these supplies because they 
are predominantly imported. If the production of seeds is replaced by a private domestic 
industry, the politicians would lose this tool of political control. Though the law has been 
changed, in practice, the state has effectively locked out domestic producers, and made it 
difficult to import from overseas, requiring a special state-issued permit to do so.545 This 
has a significant impact on agricultural production in every subsector: using the correct 
seed variety, planting at the right time, and having reliable access to it are critical 
components of a reliable crop, yet the state-distribution scheme is notoriously insufficient 
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545 Brian (USAID Ghana, Agriculture and Food Security Division), in discussion with the author, June 
2017; Kwabena Adu-Gyamfi (founder, STAG and Owner, Agri-Commercial Services, Ltd.), in discussion 
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for these purposes. A small cocoa farmer on the outskirts of Kumasi built her own 
nursery because relying on the government meant not being able to count on seedlings 
when they were dispersed either too late for planting season, or being “consumed by 
politicians going into farming themselves, who have the political connections to secure 
them.”546 Larger businesses seeking to aggregate and process crops for a market have 
attempted to solve this problem by producing their own seeds, but distributing them to 
small-scale, scattered farms adds a significant cost to production, decreasing the 
competitiveness of locally-produced food.547 Interest groups and business associations 
such as STAG still have a difficult time making headway. The state continues to fear the 
formation of powerful groups outside their control, and though they are not illegal, it uses 
underhanded tactics to undermine their power; for example, when interest groups form in 
the cocoa sector, the government begins plans to integrate it into the state-run cocoa 
board rather than allowing it to operate independently.548 Large players from the private 
sector to build capacity and lead political change with the power of independent wealth 
behind them are still missing from the equation. 
The seed policies STAG lobbied so hard for were geared toward making production 
domestic, whether the company was foreign-owned or not, in part, to commercialize seed 
production without direct government interference through import controls. DuPont 
                                                          
546 Interestingly, this cocoa farmer was the cousin of a former civil servant I also interviewed, who in fact 
used his political connections to enter cocoa farming.  
 
547 Adu-Gyamfi, discussion, Tom Gambrah (Owner, Premium Foods, Ltd.), in discussion with author, June 
2017.  
 
548 Representative of TechnoServe (nonprofit organization that works to build the private sector), in 
discussion with the author, June 2017. Identity withheld at interviewee’s request. 
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Pioneer, an important producer of hybrid seeds for improved maize production, opened 
an office in Ghana and kicked off its local program by providing the first round free to 
farmers. The feedback was positive; quality and yield were high, and farmers saw the 
value in the improved seed variety. However, the farmers had been reliant on subsidized 
inputs for nearly a century, trapped in cycles of reliance on government-provided seeds, 
and few were willing or able to purchase the better variety directly from its producer. In-
country production never got off the ground; special permits to import seed were granted 
by politicians eager to maintain their exclusive access to farming inputs and the political 
power it brought with it. Seventeen phone calls spread over two months to DuPont 
Pioneer’s Ghana office went unanswered (my best guess is that they close shop and went 
back to importing if they could secure the state license). The political system of seed 
allocation went on unaltered.  
These are major obstacles to turning small enterprises into larger, more productive 
companies. A determined entrepreneur who could solve the fragmentation between 
producers, processors, and buyers in a non-state dominated sector would be a leader in 
economic change, revolutionizing productive efficiency even without expensive 
equipment. The widely held impression that Africa suffers from a dearth of 
entrepreneurship to lead economic transformation turned out to be patently false. This 
idea seems to be partly rooted in the fact that so few private individuals stepped forward 
to take over a number of failed state-owned enterprises when the state began selling them 
off. Few observers understood that many of them were not economically viable, their 
production capacity so large in the context of underdeveloped related sectors in both 
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directions of the value chain that they could not be run at a profit. Furthermore, the 
required start-up capital to run factories of that size would have been a prohibiting factor 
for most (if not all) private individuals in Ghana. Private entrepreneurship has instead 
sprung from the gradual withdrawal of the state from the economy, filling gaps from the 
bottom up and solving problems one at a time. I did manage to track down one purchaser 
of a former SOE, who took over a tomato production facility in 1997. The processing 
capacity is approximately 200 metric tonnes per day, though he is only able to process 
approximately 1,000 metric tonnes annually on his own fields with the small scattered 
farmers unable to make up his supply gap; the tomatoes that fill many of the urban 
supermarkets are imported to meet the gap, given an annual domestic demand of 400,000 
metric tonnes.549 
The idea that entrepreneurialism is deficient also seems to stem from the observation that 
most farmers do not necessarily think about their operations as potentially lucrative 
commercial endeavors, but as small family farms on which to produce just enough to get 
by. This was obvious in the differences between my interview with a leader in 
agribusiness and a small rural cocoa farmer. Both were kind and welcoming, but the 
former spoke of supply chain issues, logistical problems, financing and land acquisition 
barriers, and economic trends. The latter said she would share her balance sheet with me 
“if she could find it” (while force-feeding me the most flavorful soup I’ve ever tasted, all 
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the while insisting that I was eating it wrong; apparently, I was supposed to be dipping 
my hand all the way in to the soup).550  
But the rarity of exceptional entrepreneurial leaders is not unique to Ghana, nor to Africa; 
they are one in a million in any society. The expansion of Ghana’s economy is not held 
back by their absence, but by the dominance of small, scattered, non-commercially 
oriented production, which persists through systems of land and input allocation, and 
strong political incentives. There are areas in which determined business owners are 
prying open doors. Among the largest and most robust sectors is maize production, which 
has been produced by scattered smallholders, but collectively in large volumes, for nearly 
half a century. A large portion of the country’s farmers grow maize, and its production 
spreads across central Ghana, especially the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions. Though 
yield gaps still occur, this is one of the few agricultural products in which Ghana is nearly 
self-sufficient. That which is not consumed in households is mostly sold for animal feed 
or for processing in beer production. Premium Foods, started by Mr. Tom Gambrah in 
1994, is now one of the largest maize production and distribution facilities in Ghana. The 
market for his product is there: he provides a commercial-scale supply, primarily for beer 
production. With a reliable market for his product, he finds a way to work around the 
other problems. As I interviewed him over the course of three hours, I watched him pick 
up his constantly-ringing phone and solve one problem after another. He is a killer 
entrepreneur who seems to take pleasure in figuring out solutions, however much it might 
                                                          
550 When I couldn’t find transportation back to the city, she also housed me overnight and arranged transit 
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frustrate him. He solves problems within the context of limiting conditions, and he does it 
well; but the efficiency and growth of his operation are clearly hampered by systemic 
issues.  
Collection, transport, storage, and inconsistent yields are continuously problematic for 
Premium Foods due to the scattered nature of production and the inability to consolidate 
land. Tom solves this by collecting the harvest from smallholders scattered around the 
area using a system designed to ensure greater consistency. He supplies the farmers with 
necessary inputs, which they accept on credit, and in turn, they sell their harvest to him 
minus the value of the inputs he provided. In practice, it bears similarities to the state-run 
cocoa scheme, except that it allows for private accumulation of surplus and market 
mechanisms for determining price, and a choice in who he sources it from and to whom 
he sells it. It also has similarities to sharecropping arrangements, except for one key 
factor: nobody owns the land. Two major issues underlie this arrangement. First, it keeps 
smallholders locked in cycles of debt. Since they need to buy the inputs for the next 
year’s harvest on credit, they are perpetually beholden to the supplier of inputs. Second, 
there are incentives to cheat built into this system. When Premium Foods arrives to pick 
up the harvest, sometimes the farmer has sold it elsewhere and essentially pocketed the 
value of the inputs provided to them; a problem that multiple interviewees mentioned 
with regard to other sectors as well. This worsens supply gap issues in the agricultural 
economy that make Ghana an unattractive supplier for industry-essential materials.  
Guaranteeing a consistent supply to Premium Foods’ buyers could have been achieved by 
growing the maize himself, a project Tom tried to undertake by purchasing his own 
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farmland. The cost and risk of this endeavor turned out to be prohibitive. Acquiring land 
is cumbersome and difficult. In areas where land is allocated by traditional authorities, it 
is often unclear who holds the land, and if anyone has the authority to sell it. In areas 
where the land is held by the state “in trust,” you must deal with the bureaucracy. 
Anything over 200 hectares requires government approval at a cost of 32,000 cedis. 
Building infrastructure to irrigate or a dam to control flooding likewise required the 
approval of a select group of retired EPA personnel, each of which might demand 
payments. He estimated the total cost of non-productive investments (gaining the 
required government permissions) at several hundred thousand. The system is set up to 
direct money away from productive investment and toward the civil service that still 
controls a large degree of access to resources. It would make more sense, he reasoned, to 
be non-compliant, as long as he remained under the radar. It was the same story for the 
host of other permits he needed; sometimes, when its absolutely necessary to obtain the 
required permit and the required “commission” is not too high, he grudgingly pays it. 
When he refuses, his application is delayed for years; in one of these cases, he applied to 
register his product in 2006, and finally received it two weeks ago.551 
Ultimately, he decided to forgo the 13,000 hectares he needed to grow his crop and 
makes do with the outgrower scheme, which has become common practice in 
agribusiness, despite its inherent problems. Instead, he purchased 200 hectares, which he 
uses as experimental lab to grow his own seedlings that he can provide to outgrowers and 
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sell on the domestic market. He has somewhat improved his supply issues by working 
exclusively with farmers who have demonstrated long-term thinking and business 
acumen in their dealings with him, and who farm at least twenty hectares each.552 He no 
longer purchases from farmers who have been unreliable in the past; so far, he has been 
able to acquire enough product from these farmers to keep the business afloat, but 
maintaining supply is a constant burden. The next solution he is looking to implement is 
to provide harvesting and drying services to his farmers, which would be a mechanized 
operation. To make that sort of investment economical, he needs to grow larger. 
His plant on the outskirts of Kumasi, which was large, sprawling, and active as I arrived, 
has the capacity to do so; expanding comes down to securing a greater supply of inputs. 
To keep this growing, he needs farmers with larger plots of land who look at it as a 
commercial endeavor. Another severe need is for reliable, knowledgeable employees, 
which have been difficult to come by. He tells me that they have been rationalized out for 
decades. There was “no private industry to absorb the well-educated talent, so they went 
to work for the state, left Ghana, or became taxi drivers.”553 This comment fits what I 
observed during the previous six weeks in Accra.554 Many of my interviewees described 
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554 One acquaintance in particular was not an interviewee, but his experience was still revealing and seemed 
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returns, he wants to start his own business. Since the early 1990s, that may actually be an option. 
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politics as a lucrative business, even suggesting that going into politics was still the best 
way to make money.  
Though I have highlighted many systemic issues that inhibit growth and development, 
most of these problems would not even have been possible in any previous century. Some 
of the problems described may seem insurmountable, but all economic development is 
characterized by growing pains; the fact that modern-day entrepreneurs are facing them 
now actually represents significant change. Political changes have also taken place in the 
same time period. The most noticeable are that elections have been used to change 
government instead of coups, opposition parties have developed to introduce competition 
to electoral procedures, and the new regimes have not jailed opposition when they come 
to power. These changes have had some small constraining effects on government 
capriciousness. Most notably, policies have started to respond in some small measure to 
vocalized needs. The involvement of STAG in changing seed policy is a significant 
milestone, though major changes in the way the state operates have still not taken place 
and policies are often not implemented in the way they are designed.555 Those I 
interviewed were asked to give a rating on a scale of one to ten on government 
accountability before 1992 (the year Rawlings handed power over to the new elected 
government) and after 1992. Interestingly, all but one answered that it was a one before 
Rawlings and a five today, though they seemed uncertain whether this changed during or 
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after Rawlings’ tenure.556 This change in perception was attributed primarily to greater 
responsiveness to people’s needs as a result of electoral competition. They explain the 
minuteness of the change in their rating of the last twenty-six years by the state’s 
continued use of economic resources to control votes with no accountability for the 
irresponsible allocation of critical resources.  
Though it has occurred too incrementally and close together in time to sort out the causal 
order with any confidence, improvements in governance have overlapped with increasing 
economic independence. The time frame in which the state began loosening its hold on 
economic power and opening space for private sector growth also coincides with Ghana’s 
longest period of democratic stability. Significant economic policy changes were 
imposed during Rawlings’ long term in office.557 Many of the state-owned enterprises 
that were stifling growth in their respective industries were sold off or shut down, and 
small to medium sized enterprises have begun to crop up in the space.558 In the mid-
1980s, private small-scale businesses began to flourish, creating employment at a rate of 
6.5 percent per year, making it the fastest growing sector of the economy in terms of 
employment.559 Though the government continued to exercise arbitrary power, 
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confiscating or demolishing a handful of successful Ghanaian businesses,560 the overall 
trend toward private sector activity beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
notable.  
As the state’s stranglehold on the economy has loosened, the private sector has found 
elbow room where opportunity, though risky and full of obstacles, can be found, as 
evidenced by the experience of the business-minded individuals I interviewed. Ghanaians 
can increasingly thrive economically outside the state’s tributary system, giving rise to a 
small group of entrepreneurs who speak most forcefully about the need for government 
accountability.  Business owners with whom I spoke were by far the most passionate 
about reigning in corruption and state accountability. Identifying these as the greatest 
risks for private business, they vocalized the need to limit the state’s ability to arbitrarily 
make laws, selectively enforce them, and control the supply of inputs. However, small 
farmers and urban workers with whom I spoke tended to emphasize the need for the 
government to disperse resources more equally.561 This marks an important distinction, 
and one that may impact the ability of the smaller group of business leaders to make 
headway against the tide of mass elections. Owusu points out that this popular demand 
for state paternalism almost invariably breeds corruption in contemporary Ghanaian 
society, yet it remains persistent.562 It is exceedingly difficult for entrepreneurs to secure 
                                                          
560 These were owned primarily by political actors, who were accused of having achieved their success 
through corruption. Arthur, “Promoting a Local Entrepreneurial Class in Ghana,” 437-438. This fits with 
Rawlings’ determined battle against corruption throughout his rule. 
561 Several interviewees mentioned that there was no real pressure from the population to change the system 
because most small-scale farmers want state assistance.  
 
562 Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, 18. 
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the necessary guarantees (especially secure property rights and freedom from arbitrary 
political interference) in this context.  
One politically active business owner asserted that what Ghana needed was a strong 
middle class whose income is not dependent on the government and who are thus 
incentivized to see the system corrected rather than perpetuated.563 His wish seems 
unlikely to be fulfilled in the near future, given the long-developed structure of the 
Ghanaian bourgeoisie. However, a new conversation is taking place in society over what 
the government can and cannot do, something that did not characterize earlier periods of 
post-independence Ghana.564 The government can no longer do as it pleases without 
facing public disapprobation. People say that the state has no right to do certain things; 
this is far apart from the immediate post-independence era where the belief that the state 
not only can, but must, do everything, was prevalent. This important underlying shift in 
attitudes may be evidence that society is more empowered that it once was and that small 
changes in the balance of power may be underway as independent economic security 
becomes more viable.  
The second overall observation I will make is that a lot has not changed. Bates credits the 
economic turnaround as well as policy changes more favorable to rural interests with the 
advent of competitive elections, though greater favor toward rural producers actually 
                                                          
563 Kwabena Adu-Gyamfi (Founder, STAG and Owner, Agri-Commercial Services, Ltd.), in discussion 
with the author, June 2017. 
 
564 Several of the interviewees mentioned this, and it came up once or twice in conversations with locals 
(mostly cab drivers). 
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began under Rawlings in the 1980s.565 More favorable treatment, the argument goes, is 
due to the need to compete for rural votes, which account for a large percentage of 
Ghana’s electorate.566 This may ultimately have such an effect, but for now it is minimal 
at best. Of greater significance than the timing of these changes is what this “more 
favorable” treatment really looks like for farmers. Several interviews with cocoa farmers 
on the outskirts of Kumasi suggest that this “increased support” for farmers is mainly in 
the form of buying votes with the selective dispersal of inputs.567 This strategy retains 
farmers’ dependence and continues to offer opportunities for politicians and civil servants 
to skim off the top. Despite the move to competitive party politics, agriculture has 
declined rather than grown and food insecurity remains problematic. The suggestion that 
policies and their implementation have actually been more representative of collective 
interests has not materialized in this case.  
The ability to periodically change the ruling party with competitive elections has, 
however, created an outlet for socioeconomic frustration. Hope that the next 
administration will be better accompanies every election cycle,568 but the same issues 
                                                          
565 A number of significant policy changes geared toward economic opening were instituted under 
Rawlings. Some were macro-level economic changes as a part of structural adjustment, but his 
administration also instituted private sector initiatives that included support for rural farmers and small 
businesses. Arthur, “Promoting a Local Entrepreneurial Class in Ghana,” 428-429. 
 
566 Bates, Markets and States, 21. See also Harding, “Urban-Rural differences in incumbent support.” 
 
567 This was brought in most of my interviews as one of the most frustrating aspects of government control 
of resources.  
 
568 Several interviewees expressed hope that the incoming administration would be less corrupt, and that it 
would no longer be “business as usual.” The others pointed out that this was said about every new 
administration since Nkrumah, but noted that since democratic elections returned, the atmosphere is still 
hopeful in the early years, until it is not. 
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seethe beneath the surface. Existing theories on democracy contend that democratic 
elections make the state more responsible and accountable because they can be voted 
out.569 The fact that this has not stayed the state’s hand to any significant extent 
throughout Africa remains unexplained. Patronage and corruption are still strong 
determinants of political and economic power in Ghana today, which continues to block 
pathways to growth. State spending still dominates economic activity and crowds out the 
private sector in finance;570 government contracts are among the most lucrative business 
opportunities, and are generally awarded to political connections, who are then expected 
to send lavish gifts and monetary rewards to the state agent who awarded the contract.571 
People with connections to members of the ruling regime call into question the rule of 
law. This was apparent when my group arrived in Ghana to find our rooms were not 
available because college students with powerful parents had decided they didn’t feel like 
moving out, and security could do nothing about it. We had to scramble for alternate 
lodging. The cocoa sector still buoys the system, and its importance as a source of power 
and wealth for the ruling party is evident. Ostensibly, the state still claims cocoa money is 
for providing inputs and infrastructure for cocoa farming, but the facts call this claim into 
question. The claim is that 70 percent of the price goes back to farmers, but this includes 
                                                          
569 See North, Structure and Change, 27. 
 
570 State monopolization of available financing was the most common complaint I heard from producers 
and processors. 
 
571 George Haizel (Owner, GKH Ltd.), in discussion with author, June 2017. The retired civil servant and 
current cocoa farmer I also interviewed was not hesitant to tell me of the cars, computers, and other 
financial rewards that came to him from awarding government contracts, on which his wealth and status as 
an upper-class Ghanaian was built. 
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the cost of subsidized inputs that are unreliably and politically allocated; farmers 
typically receive less than half of the global market price at any given time (the actual 
percentage fluctuates with market prices), and cocoa money is often used for government 
projects in other sectors.572 It also fuels the corruption problem: rumors abound that the 
cocoa board funnels money to the president’s political party. Last year, the state 
borrowed more from foreign creditors than it ended up needing to buy the years cocoa 
crop, but the gap between the amount borrowed and the amount needed had already 
disappeared into the bureaucracy. Two separate interviewees with political connections to 
the president’s party confirmed that the rumor was likely true.  
Domestic investment is low and there are few manufactured goods produced in country. 
The middle class in Ghana didn’t stem from productive economic activity but they have 
taken hold, and it is from this class that demand for imported goods comes. Foreign 
business was ubiquitous throughout the country, but its presence was predominantly in 
marketing goods manufactured abroad to the wealthier citizens and expats. Direct 
investment was much more difficult to locate. This is because the role of the bourgeoisie 
in Ghana’s history was reversed. Rather than driving growth and economic exchange, a 
large portion of the middle class lived off the economic surplus siphoned by the state 
while worsening balance of payment issues by driving demand for imports. Once this 
course was set in the early years after independence, it became increasingly difficult to 
disrupt. The private sector is gaining footholds as entrepreneurs enter the market, but the 
economy is still highly reliant on the state sector. Politicians visibly hold the 
                                                          
572 Retired high-level civil servant and cocoa farmer (name withheld), in discussion with author, June 2017.  
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preponderance of wealth and latching on to the state remains the best way to change 
one’s economic status. Minority and opposition parties complain that it takes a long time 
to “get their chance.” When I asked specifically their chance at what, the reply was “the 
chance to get money so that you can build a house or have a business. Politics is how you 
get that.”573  
Though it is beginning to open along the margins, the system is still held together 
primarily by state largesse. As long as development and growth continue, it will survive, 
but if the state mismanages the economy sufficiently to run out of the resources again, 
then it may very well collapse again. Though four subsequent changes in leadership 
without a coup is promising, it is probably too soon to draw firm conclusions about 
political stability except that it probably still relies to some degree on economic stability. 
Governing qualities that make elections meaningful are still largely missing. 
Representativeness, accountability, transparency, responsibility: Ghana still seems to be 
in search of these from its government, and with each new administration that delivers 
more of the same, citizens seem to grow wearier of cycles of hope and disappointment.  
Major pillars of the socioeconomic structure remain unaltered. The state-dominated 
system of cocoa extraction that supports the bureaucracy and its dependent bourgeoisie is 
still the state’s primary base of resources. New policies to revamp the agriculture sector, 
such as the “Planting for Food and Jobs” program are unlikely to ignite much change 
                                                          
573 Quote is from above; the same was reiterated by a number of interviewees, who also said “you expect to 
make money if you go into politics,” and the “best guarantee of a good life is to get a job with the 
government, with political connections.” 
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without addressing the structural issues.574 The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that 
dominated the economic space largely remain idle, though they have at least ceased to 
drain the economy. This hasn’t necessarily entailed privatization of the economy: in 
many cases, the state still owns the controlling share after they “privatize,” and continues 
to appoint the leadership. One local economics professor, whom I spent many hours 
interviewing, confided on my way out that he was retiring this year. When I asked what 
he planned to do next, he said the new president was an old friend of his, and he would be 
giving him one of the SOEs to run, so he must learn about that industry. Political 
connections still play a large role in determining economic opportunities.  
Approximately 20 percent of Ghana’s land remains under state control,575 and there is 
little effective constraint on how they dispose of it. State-administered land (primarily 
located in urban centers and northern Ghana) is also used as a patronage resource. The 
politically connected can gain access to land through state appropriation. In urban areas, 
the government may declare a part of town as the cite for a new housing area. People may 
apply to live there, but it is granted to whomever pays the official in charge of running it, 
who may also keep a portion of the project himself. Political favorites are sometimes 
granted multiple housing units to dispose of as they see fit, which becomes another 
source of income. In other cases, the land is appropriated, but never developed. By 2000, 
                                                          
574 The implementation of this program seems to serve primarily as a means to get more farmers to buy 
inputs at government-subsidized prices, which does nothing to reduce their dependency, but does continue 
to serve the interests of the politicians and administrators of the program. Discussed extensively in 
interview with Kwabena Adu-Gyamfi (Founder, STAG), June 2017. 
 
575 Larbi, Antwi, and Olomolaiye, 9. 
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the state held close to forty percent of the land in the capital city of Accra, but the 
majority that went undeveloped was granted to others rather than reverting back to their 
owners.576  
Rural land over which the state has direct control is handled similarly. The state declares 
a piece of land vacant or unproductive and appropriates it, determining the compensation 
itself rather than paying a fair market value. In the early independence years, this was 
done on a large-scale for government use; today, much of it is allocated to private actors, 
but still largely within the context of political relationships. Acquiring land for 
commercial uses often requires either political ties or large payments, both official and 
unofficial, to state agents with a hand in the allocation process. Often, politically 
connected members of the bureaucracy secure state-held land for themselves when they 
are looking to retire from public life, entering the ranks of the rural landholding elite. 
Given the insecurity of private ownership, there is little incentive to turn around and 
resell it; instead, some of them use it to enter agriculture production as a second career 
and new source of income.  
Most of the remaining 80 percent of Ghana’s land is held under the customary land 
tenure system,577 though the state plays a significant role. It is from the state that the 
chiefs are granted the authority to dispose of customary land, with the approval of the 
Lands Commission, which dictates what type of sales and transfers may be made from 
                                                          
576 Larbi, Antwi, and Olomolaiye, Compulsory Land Acquisition in Ghana. 
 
577 Ministry of Lands, Forestry, and Mines, “Administration of Rural Lands,” 1. 
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stool lands.578 The money that the political elite from both the traditional and modern 
sector stand to make from this arrangement vests both with a mutual interest in retaining 
the basic operation, whatever formal institutional changes might be made. Much of the 
debate over land reform is couched in terms of a fight between traditional and modern 
authority, though this is only a fraction of the truth, just as it was during the colonial era. 
It can be more accurately described as a tenuous but long-lasting alliance of interests 
between the state and the traditional political elite. The colonial state once shored up 
political control of the countryside by vesting authority over land in the chiefs but making 
them reliant on the colonial government. Centuries later, ties between the modern state 
and the traditional political authorities are still based on this system that upholds political 
authority and access to wealth through control of important resources.579 Moore notes 
that it is cities that produce the impulse for change, but it is the countryside that 
determines the nature of social changes: the key question is whether in the course of 
agricultural commercialization, it alters the structure of rural society.580 Studying the 
nature of traditional society that still dominates much of the countryside is thus important 
for understanding political outcomes in Ghana; but perhaps more important is 
understanding why certain elements of the old structure have remained, and why the 
modern state might have had a stake in keeping it this way. 
                                                          
578 Larbi, Antwi, and Olomolaiye, 3. 
 
579 Amanor, “The Changing Face of Customary Land Tenure,” chap. 3. 
 
580 Moore, Social Origins, 47-52. 
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These dual systems of land-holding leads to fragmentation of land and uncertainty over 
who can actually sell it, helping to lock in the pre-modern structure of rural society. The 
Land Administration Project (LAP) was ostensibly designed clarify land ownership by 
registering customary land rights, allowing for greater transparency, security, and the sale 
of land. Like many of the state’s projects, implementation strays far from its stated intent. 
The new institutional rules are subsumed into existing power structures in a way that 
enhances, rather than curbing, political power. Administration and registration is 
conducted through customary authorities, who are in practice able to exercise a good deal 
of discretion in disposing of land. The state recognizes the chiefs’ authority to sell 
customary land, though it may be occupied by peasant producers or village members. 
When these sales are made, the proceeds go to the chief who made the transaction, 
though it is rarely registered with the state. This is to the benefit of the traditional 
authorities, since they will not have to pay tax on undeclared income from the sale, but it 
significantly increases land insecurity for the purchaser.581 
Most of Ghana’s land is allocated politically, and the process is controlled by the political 
elite, whether traditional chief or state bureaucrat. Either way, the ownership and 
authority over land does not rest with those who make it productive.582 Neither the 
peasant user nor the commercial leaseholder has much control over their hold on land. 
                                                          
581 Quan, Ubink and Antwi, “Risks and opportunities of state intervention in customary land management,” 
in Ubink and Amanor, Contesting Land and Custom in Ghana, 193. 
 
582 Prospects for change are likely dependent on a change in the interests embedded in the current system; 
Douglass North’s sweeping account of Structure and Change in Economic History concludes that “the state 
will encourage and specify efficient property rights only to the extent that they are consistent with the 
wealth-maximizing objectives of those who run the state.” 33-34. 
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Lands are typically acquired for commercial use not by outright purchase, but by the 
paying of rent, bribes, or tribute for extended leases to whomever controls its allocation. 
This system is primarily used to accumulate more wealth and power to political officials. 
Commercial operations who manage to navigate the political system, pay the requisite 
bribes or “commissions,” and acquire a piece of land still do not often enjoy the transfer 
of secure rights to the land. They are constantly at risk of arbitrary reneging on the 
contract by way of reinterpretation of customary tenure rules, and there is no effective 
system of accountability in either the modern or customary sector.583  
The last major observation I will make about contemporary Ghana is that critical issues 
are in flux right now. Limited markets for land have partially developed under this 
system, but its discretionary sale by political authorities not directly connected to the land 
has the effect of dispossessing whomever resides on the land under customary access. 
This process has been painful for peasant producers who live off the land, particularly 
because they do not see any of the proceeds from the change in ownership; they are 
merely forced out. However, this may mark the beginning of the commodification of land 
that will ultimately permit consolidation by commercially-minded agriculture operations. 
Much like the Enclosures in 18th century England, it led to landlessness and social 
upheaval, but the long-term impact was to change the conditions which allowed for 
capital accumulation and agricultural modernization. The peasant class in Ghana is under 
threat by these developments, but the same changes are forcing open economic space that 
                                                          
583 Amanor and Ubink, introduction to Contesting Land and Custom in Ghana, 14-15, 23. See also Ubink, 
“Struggles for land in peri-urban Kumasi,” chap. 7 of Contesting Land and Custom in Ghana. 
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has not existed since the entrance of the colonial government onto the political scene. The 
continued central role of the chiefs and their link to the state threatens to be a stumbling 
block, but as land increasingly shifts to private individuals through chiefly sales, the 
ability of political authorities to control its allocation will gradually erode. Who 
ultimately ends up with control over productive land and how this transforms the 
socioeconomic structure of the countryside and the production of food will likely 
determine the political and economic trajectory of the next century. If these are in fact the 
early stages of a gradual transformation to market allocation, it will undermine the 
patronage system that has chipped away at democratic accountability and help to 
constrain the arbitrary use of political power.  
The reason for extreme insecurity in land today is not simply (as a good deal of literature 
and Ghana’s politicians purport) that old institutions have endured, but that they are 
currently changing. It is possible that Ghana is currently in or approaching a critical time 
period wherein the decisions made at this point in time will have far-reaching 
consequences into the next century. Land is perhaps the most important of these 
decisions. Population changes are putting significant pressure on the system such that 
something will have to give. The current system of agricultural production cannot sustain 
continued urban migration and population growth, which the state is well aware of. 
Urbanization, which is already well advanced, is currently being supported primarily by 
importing food, but any exogenous shock to this system will likely be excessively 
disruptive. Food security in Ghana will require significant shifts in systems of 
production: greater mechanization, productivity, and efficiency can achieve this, but only 
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if the consolidation and accumulation of land permits it. The change this demands would 
disrupt the entire political-economic system: the tax base, the support system of a large 
portion of the middle class, and the tools of political control that have been used by the 
state for decades. Strong forces militate against this change (namely, the co-dependent 
and exploitative relationship between the state-sponsored bourgeoisie, the rural political 
elite, and the peasant class), but the more entrepreneurs like Tom Gambrah fight for the 
economic space to grow, the more it strengthens the hand of small but important, long-
dormant groups. An alignment of rural-urban interests over food security may yet lie in 
the future, and the class who can provide it may quietly be on the rise.   
For now, most economic activity is in the informal sector, taking place on a small scale in 
local markets. Individual vendors line the streets of every town and city, selling food, 
clothing, and household goods within a short distance from their homes. Grocery stores 
and malls in the major cities cater predominantly to the expatriate population and middle 
to high ranks of the civil service who make up most of the middle to upper classes. Goods 
that fill these shops are almost exclusively foreign-made imports, since most of them are 
not made domestically, or cannot be obtained reliably from a commercial-scale operation. 
The majority of the state’s tax base comes not from a strong commercial or industrial 
sector, but from cocoa, which has long-term problems that foreshadow eventual 
deterioration.584 Since most economic activity is in the informal sector, the state cannot 
tax it. This has political implications, since direct taxation has an important historical 
                                                          
584 These include aging trees not being replaced due to the capital investment required, yields decreasing as 
the land wears out, more profitable crops taking the place of cocoa for the more business-minded 
producers, and fewer of the next generation entering it. George Haizel (Owner, GKH Ltd.), in discussion 
with the author, June 2017. 
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relationship to political representation. The expense and difficulty of getting licenses and 
permits makes it easier to be non-compliant or to remain in the informal sector. This has 
a negative impact on growth, since in order to stay under the radar, a business needs to 
stay small enough to not attract attention. The parasitic relationship between the economy 
and the state must turn decidedly to a symbiotic one driven by productivity. Productivity 
can drive long-term growth, change the tax base, and ultimately shift the state-society 
relationship from a coercive-dependent to a mutually beneficial one.  
The way Ghana’s postcolonial bureaucracy operates bears some resemblance to pre-
capitalist Europe, but there are small signs that this is shifting as economic space opens 
up in the private sector, suggesting that it may be on a path more similar than previously 
believed. In England, for example, administrative offices were appointed by the monarch 
and customarily used by the appointees to enhance the state’s wealth as well as the 
agent’s own. Personal enrichment was often frowned upon when it came to light, but the 
use of those resources to enhance the power of the royal household was considered 
entirely appropriate. The system of politically allocating society’s available resources 
was taken as given. Resources were dispersed according to political loyalty, because the 
main source of political and economic standing was the ruler himself. Wealth was 
directed toward loyal supporters of the crown and rescinded from those suspected of 
disloyalty. Ghana’s social structure bears even closer resemblance to 17th century pre-
revolution France. The emerging bourgeoisie at the time was heavily dependent on royal 
favor and sustained by squeezing the limited economic surplus produced by a 
preindustrial society. Various forms of keeping agents loyal and dependent were used, 
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including land grants (or grants of revenues from the lands), and allowing corruption to 
provide income. This didn’t begin to change in either place until a sizeable group of the 
political elite began to develop a source of economic wealth that lay outside the scope of 
the ruler’s benevolence. Gradually, socioeconomic advancement became possible 
through avenues other than political appointment. Bureaucratic structures shifted from 
patrimonial to impersonal, as access to economic resources also became increasingly 
detached from the royal household. This process took approximately three centuries. In 
between the two lay a popular coup fueled by anger over the mismanagement of fiscal 
crises, the decadence of the ruling classes in the context of poor economic conditions, and 
the rise of a popular dictator who had himself elected ruler for life, and whose regime 
was remarkably oppressive given its democratic pretensions.585   
Ghana’s bourgeoisie has played a similar role since its founding, living off the surplus 
produced by rural production. Without a strong industrial class from which to draw tax 
revenue, these resources were limited, and alternate forms of indirect compensation had 
to be used to bind the bourgeoisie to the new state. Grants of land revenues were 
employed to secure the compliance of chiefs. Corruption became a commonly accepted 
means of supplementing wealth for members of the bureaucracy. Since the elite have 
been dependent on the state for their position, their interest is in preserving the patron-
client system that supports it, rather than in developing constraints on the state’s power to 
interfere arbitrarily in economic life. If Ghana’s economic elite were to become 
increasingly independent from this system and wealthy enough to provide a more 
                                                          
585 The implicit comparison with Nkrumah here is made to Napoleon Bonaparte.  
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attractive alternative for sourcing state revenue, this would change the relationship. The 
position of propertied classes in the political system depends on from where their 
socioeconomic status comes—from political ties or from independent production. An 
independent productive class has an interest in government that is accountable, 
responsible, transparent, predictable and constrained. The ardent wishes of the small 
group of agribusiness professionals reveals that this interest does exist in Ghana, but they 
are still vastly overpowered by the much larger group of the politically-connected upper 
class. The former group lacks the power to constrain arbitrary rule by political elites, 
because the state is not beholden to them as the primary source of income. The latter 
group has a great deal of power, but its interest lies in upholding the current system that 
allows agents of the state to control resources. Several local observers described the 
agribusiness sector in Ghana as “poised to take off,” but it has been so poised for years, 
hampered by vested interests in preventing change,586 the inclination to lock out the 
private sector where a political institution has a stake, and the continued impact of 
politics on industry; these vested interests mean that while observers and stakeholders 
“can continue to provide analysis, nothing actually changes.”587  
There are, however, emerging conditions that may eventually shift some key overlapping 
interests from within the existing system. One of my interviews was with a former civil 
servant who set up his own cocoa farming operation after retirement. It is not uncommon 
                                                          
586 Mainly, state control of agricultural inputs as a patronage resource. Additionally, the state continues to 
soak up the majority of financing available and the alignment of interests between the state, the importers, 
and the urbanites works to undermine domestic production. 
 
587 Brian (USAID Ghana, Agriculture and Food Security Division), in discussion with the author, June 
2017.  
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for senior civil servants to start looking to private sector opportunities as they near the 
end of their careers. Their positions in the bureaucracy allow them the access to resources 
and political know-how to navigate the system in the beginning, but if they become 
independently productive, which they are incentivized to do once they have retired from 
public service, it may engender a radical transformation in the relationship of the 
economic elite to the state. As they move from the public to the private sector, the source 
of their wealth shifts from state-provided to independently accumulated as their reliance 
on state-provided inputs dwindles. Though they are initially reliant on their connections, 
since they are starting out with more resources than the average small farmer, their 
operations will likely be less dependent on the government-provided inputs such as seeds, 
fertilizer, and financing as time goes on. Those who make their ventures productive will 
develop an incentive to push for protection from state encroachment on their now 
privately acquired property. Protecting their productive resources will become more 
rational than investing in patronage relationships, especially if their access to the state can 
be overturned rapidly with a change in regime. If they eventually become productive 
enough to provide the state with a resource base, it reverses the balance of power between 
the political and economic elite. In exchange for providing a portion of their wealth to 
finance the state, they can extract concessions from the state that protect them against 
arbitrary appropriation. Securing private property rights will become mutually beneficial 
to the class of entrepreneurial elite as well as to the state if they wish to protect an 
emerging tax bargain.  
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Land, and how it is resolved, will continue to play a key role. The fact that this is 
occurring in amidst elections, however, may be a hindrance moving forward. The 
commodification and alienation of land is producing insecurity for a large peasant and 
smallholder class, who have the vote, and are not likely to acquiesce willingly to the loss 
of their main resource. Furthermore, the chiefs still command a good deal of respect, and 
other work has suggested that they are highly influential in voting choices.588 Though 
chiefs still enjoy high legitimacy and social power, their authority over land is their 
primary remaining source of political and economic power. They represent another 
entrenched group of powerful actors whose interests are not likely to realign in the 
changing economic system. However, the ability of the chiefs to sell land outright and 
profit from the sale, though it provides an immediate economic benefit, may ultimately 
undermine their position. This wouldn’t be the first time in Ghana’s history this occurred: 
in the early 20th century, the widespread sale of land by chiefs permitted the emergence 
of traders, producers, and laborers over which they no longer had control.589 This led to a 
steep rise in destoolments until the colonial state stepped in with their plan to “re-
institutionalize pure native tenure.”590 
The conflict between classes in decline and those in ascendancy is characteristic of 
changing societies.591 Bates’ work makes clear that market mechanisms and coercive 
                                                          
588 Ubink, “Struggles for land in peri-urban Kumasi,” chap. 7 of Contesting Land and Custom in Ghana. 
 
589 Grier, “Underdevelopment, Modes of Production, and the State in Colonial Ghana,” 34. 
 
590 Grier, 33-34. 
 
591 Of his relationship with the state bureaucracy with which he’s come into contact, one business owner 
said the civil service seems to view the private sector as an enemy, because it is undermining the role the 
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relations of production continue to coexist and combine in contemporary Ghana. But this 
is not a unique historical case: during the long transition from feudalism to capitalism in 
western Europe, distinctive features of capitalist relations were originally rooted in feudal 
society, including the commodification of labor and the alienation of land. These two 
systems, though typically discussed as distinct categories, coexisted and even mixed for 
long periods of time. In the first phase of capitalist development identified by Pierre-
Phillip Rey and summarized by Beverly Grier, capitalism continues to depend upon 
precapitalist modes of production, even tending to reinforce them while they remain the 
dominant system of production.592 This description of the early phase of capitalist 
development aptly describes the current situation as seen through the eyes of Ghanaian 
entrepreneurs I interviewed.  
Though commercialization and capitalist development is often discussed as a feature of 
colonization, since it introduced cash crop production for international markets, this 
process was entirely incomplete under colonialism. The indigenous population could not 
participate in the capitalist economy except as a source of raw materials and labor better 
categorized as coerced than commodified. The commercialization of cocoa, which still 
dominates the economy, was set up by the colonists not as a capitalist system of 
production, but as one based on a social order that works against local capitalist 
development. This was followed by a post-independence era that maintained many of 
                                                          
state used to play as the producer, designer, referee, owner, et cetera, and they are trying to hold on to their 
position. Tom Gambrah (Owner, Premium Foods, Ltd.), in discussion with author, June. 2017. 
 
592 Pierre-Phillip Rey, Colonialisme, Neo-Colonialisme, et Transition au Capitalisme (Paris: Maspero, 
1971), quoted in Grier, “Underdevelopment, Modes of Production, and the State in Colonial Ghana,” 23. 
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these features of colonial society for that very reason: that they prevented the emergence 
of indigenous capitalists. The origins of the transition to a capitalist economy underway 
today in Ghana can probably be more accurately traced to the late 20th century. There is a 
good deal of evidence that capitalism was well into early stages of development in Ghana 
prior to and throughout the 19th century, but that colonization disrupted this.593 Likewise, 
state building processes, including taxation systems and legal property rights, were 
underway by 1800.594 With increased economic activity fueled by trade with the British, 
they also began to display the beginnings of checks on arbitrary rule: constitutional 
reforms made their way into politics, the council constrained chiefly prerogative, and 
capitalist development enriched new groups that were becoming increasingly 
independent from the central authority.595 The political and economic interests of the 
colonial and post-colonial states in maintaining certain aspects of pre-capitalist 
production endure today.  
This has had a lasting impact on the level of development, producing a paternalistic state 
with the power to determine the economic outcomes of individuals from the small farmer 
to the urban elite. Politics, under circumstances of deprivation and state control of 
economic resources, becomes a scramble for money and access to the resources that are 
increasingly limited rather than increasingly widespread. Trapped in cycles of economic 
                                                          
593 For a succinct account of capitalist development that preceded the colonial era, see especially Grier, 
“Underdevelopment, Modes of Production, and the State in Colonial Ghana,” 26-32, or Rodney, How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa.  
 
594 Warner, “Sovereign States and their Prey,” 513, 516-517. Warner’s 1999 article, “Political Economy of 
Quasi-Statehood,” suggests that this was also the case in other colonized areas outside of Asante. 
 
595 Warner, “Sovereign States and their Prey,” 516, 520.  
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crisis, with the legitimacy of the political system hanging precariously in the balance, 
state and society lock themselves into mutually destructive patterns of dependency and 
exploitation. These systems tend to pull back, despite changes at the head, revisions to 
law, or the frequent use of “sticks” in the form of prison (and under Rawlings, even 
death) sentences to change behavior. They will likely continue to endure until new 
possibilities enter the scene in the form of economic opportunity, a development made 
more difficult by the fact that the system itself militates against growth.  
Yet these opportunities are increasingly in evidence today. They are not gifted by the 
largesse of the central state nor imported by the altruism of an international community; 
they are being forged by the resolve of local entrepreneurs to fight for their survival in a 
system built to block them at every turn. Still a small group, still weak against the forces 
of entrenched interests, they are nevertheless identifiable, and quietly gaining strength. 
They often escape the attention of political scientists because they source their strength 
not through the type of direct political engagement we tend to observe, but by their 
determination to build something they can call their own. They hold the key to Ghana’s 
political and economic future, whether they know it or not.  
It is important to acknowledge how long it will take to observe the outcomes of changes 
that are only in stages of infancy right now. Historical time periods are rarely well-
understood by their contemporaries. Just as Moore undertook his study several centuries 
after the chain of events was set into motion, and just as this work looked at the 20th 
century impact of choices rooted in the 19th, the significance of changes taking place right 
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now, and their relations to earlier developments, will hopefully be studied by scholars of 
the 22nd century and beyond to draw out the full meaning of events.  
Conclusion 
The original theory proposed that post-independence democratizations have been weak 
and unstable largely because they are missing critical pillars of democracy. These include 
accountability, transparency, representativeness, and restraint. It was theorized that these 
important qualities never developed because underlying power structures that supported 
the authoritarian state had not changed, and it was suggested that this was at least partly a 
result of state design. However, little was known by the author about how history had 
unfolded in the areas of interest, so an inductive, theory-building study of a single case 
was undertaken to identify whether these variables were present and how they were 
linked to one another in a state whose history was representative of a somewhat typical 
pattern of political instability for the continent. Figure 4 shows a causal diagram of the 
significant components as they were linked through history. The order and timing follow 
a historical trajectory, showing where events culminated in an important juncture at 
independence, and what followed from it. The diagonal path from top left to bottom right 
outlines the underlying socioeconomic structure and related developments; the diagonal 
path from top right to bottom left follows the political events that took place in this 
context. The two cross at independence, wherein the structural conditions, the inertia of 
history, and the political calculations of key actors interacted to set the course that 
followed. The analysis chapters abide by the same structure in terms of the timeline and 
the order in which it was covered.  
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Figure 4 
Causal Diagram  
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The historical study of Ghana from colonization to the present era has revealed that many 
of the theoretical suppositions put forth are highly relevant to this case. The structure of 
rural production has had a lasting impact on the configuration of urban-rural and state-
society relations in ways that have consistently undermined democratic governance. 
Answers to the questions asked at the outset: why democratic governance didn’t take root 
after the first elections; why democracy hasn’t been deep, exhibiting all the qualities of 
representative government, have been at least partially found in the development of 
Ghana’s agriculture sector and its relationship to politics.  
Conclusions about the future can only be tentative because, as I pointed out in the last 
analysis chapter, Ghana appears to be in the midst of a historical period of change in 
which outcomes are still being determined. Not enough time has yet passed for the 
development theorists or their detractors to draw final conclusions about Africa with 
regard to modernization theory or to its future. Still, a number of related propositions 
relevant to the present era can be extracted from this historical study as the case unfolded, 
and are detailed below.  
(1) Agricultural development has been highly dependent on the state. The only fully 
developed commercial chain in agriculture, cocoa, is under state control. The rest 
of the agriculture sector varies in terms of the degree to which it is 
commercialized. Most of agriculture production, particularly products meant for 
immediate human consumption, are grown on small family farms for subsistence, 
sometimes with a small surplus destined for local, informal markets. Few sectors 
produce enough in terms of quantity and reliability to support a fully 
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commercialized value chain. The few exceptions, where commercial-scale 
production provides raw materials for processing into a finished product, is 
characterized by a highly-fragmented production chain, prevented from unifying 
by government interference. Patronage networks, corruption, and political control 
of land blocks would-be commercial leaders from solving these problems. The 
continued weakness of the agriculture sector is rooted in land tenure systems that 
prevent commercially oriented farmers from being able to consolidate enough 
land to make mechanization viable or borrow off the value of the land to make 
capital investments. This also prevents the transformation of rural society, locking 
in pre-modern modes of production. Alongside migration of the youth from rural 
to urban areas, this perpetuates food insecurity, as well as dependence on 
imported food goods and state interference.  
 
(2) This was a deliberate strategic choice made by political actors at key points in 
time. This system of land allocation and agricultural production was cemented 
during the colonial era. Though modern-day political leaders often point the 
finger at traditional society, without the introduction of the modern state, which 
confirmed and altered existing institutions, it is possible that this would have 
shifted naturally over time much as it did in Europe. By codifying traditional land 
tenure systems into law, the colonial government institutionalized the existing 
social structure in a way that supported its economic domination. This was 
handed over to a post-colonial state that had a strong interest in retaining a system 
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that provided it with its primary domestic resource base and a means of bringing 
the countryside under political control.  
 
The additional value in retaining this system from the state perspective is that it 
divides societal actors, preventing them from possessing sufficient resources to 
constrain state actions that are harmful or contrary to collective interests. Groups 
with potential power have either been destroyed, brought under the patronage 
system of state dependence, or have never been able to gain enough traction to 
mount a genuine challenge to the system. The post-colonial regime was able to 
repress what opposition existed with relative impunity, and opposition parties that 
have formed in the post-colonial era have been generally subsumed into the 
existing system, characterized by state-society relationships of dependence, 
extraction, and coercion.  
 
(3) The socioeconomic status of individuals is largely determined by the state, rather 
than by private efforts. Politics and economics are closely bound, even equated 
with one another. Individuals in favor with the regime are granted wealth and 
social status, and those who are not find it difficult to earn it without the support 
of political connections. Important economic resources are politically allocated, a 
system on which state authority and legitimacy was based during the project of 
consolidating state power. The closer one’s position to the state, the greater their 
access to economic resources. New middle to upper classes emerged from this. 
Entry to this class was primarily determined by access to political resources. 
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Instead of economic development giving rise to an increasingly powerful class 
whose interests clashed with and constrained the state and on whose economic 
resources the state relied, this class was built on the extraction of resources from a 
weak and scattered group of rural dwellers. The interests of the most 
economically powerful group were both aligned with and dependent on the most 
politically powerful: the state. Instead of restraining state policy in the economy, 
its interests were in encouraging irresponsibility, leading to overspending, 
misallocation, nonproductivity, debt, and eventually, economic crisis. These 
incentives underlie a system that encourages collusion and undermines 
accountability. No group is both able and willing to hold the state liable for its 
actions, limit its arbitrary use of power, or keep it operating within the confines of 
written law.  
 
Alternate explanations do exist for Ghana’s economic problems.596 Domestic 
explanations tend to either highlight cultural factors or poor policy and economic 
mismanagement. Though compelling, these explanations lack some depth by 
neglecting structural factors that have pushed patterns toward certain directions, 
resisting change for relatively long periods of time, even when policy has been 
sound. Alternate explanations that use a global level of analysis, such as 
dependency theory, call forth structural conditions that militate against change, 
but likewise neglect domestic factors. They have also thus far been unable to 
                                                          
596 For further discussion of the various schools of thought on Ghana’s economic decline, see Chazan, An 
Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, 179-191. 
272 
 
account for states in the global periphery who have successfully industrialized, 
and to my knowledge, no systematic comparative study has yet been undertaken 
to examine the interaction of international and domestic factors in states that have 
joined the ranks of the advanced economies in the last century and those that have 
not. The third approach, which has been the least studied, generally falls under the 
category ‘Marxist.’ It was the first to introduce social classes into the equation but 
has run into problems with Ghana’s failure to form cohesive social classes that fit 
the traditional categories. While borrowing from the Marxist emphasis on the 
importance of class development, it is this very failure, and the aberration from 
the typical patterns that this dissertation investigates. 
 
(4) This incentive system created two irreconcilable problems: first, it wrote its own 
economic demise by channeling the surplus from the productive economy to 
nonproductive classes, quickening the descent into economic stagnation. The 
state’s absolute control over both political and economic power sowed the seeds 
of its own downfall. It perpetuated the fragility of the base on which its rule was 
built, because its control over people depended on a finite supply of resources. 
This kept rural elites from emerging as a distinct class to challenge the power of 
the state per its design, but it also undermined economic development, which 
ultimately eroded the resource base on which its political power is based.  Second, 
it fed the proliferation of patron-client relationships, corruption, and the 
exploitation of politically weak groups. All of these played a significant role in 
the overthrow of the regime.  
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(5) These choices created structural constraints over time, which encouraged path 
dependence. Behind agent choices are powerful structural incentives that connect 
history over long periods of time. Early choices about how to structure the 
political-economic system generated incentives that militated toward their 
perpetuation. The extraction of rural resources to fund the new state’s 
consolidation of power further entrenched socioeconomic relations in the 
countryside. This strengthened existing power imbalances, keeping rural voices 
weak and fragmented, and economic development highly dependent. Overcoming 
the constraints now in place is difficult or near-impossible because as the state-
building project birthed new classes from that dependence, powerful incentives 
developed in maintaining things as they are. The most significant and possibly 
most powerful of these is the state-generated bourgeoisie whose very existence 
depends on state resources and who themselves are the gatekeepers of political 
and economic power. This has had a negative impact on political outcomes 
through its subversion of democratic functioning and even stability.  
 
This brings up several points in the literature that bear reexamination: the way we think 
about democratic concepts and institutions, as well as the applicability and complexity of 
modernization theory. The literature on democratic institutions, which tends to focus on 
the particular form or set of rules that defines them, is incomplete. Democratic 
institutions, whatever the form, can be used to constrain power or to increase it. Which 
way they operate is determined by the underlying balance of power more so than the 
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specific rules employed to govern them. When the government leads the setup of 
“democratic” institutions, it twists their logic. Rather than being institutions of constraint, 
they become mechanisms for control. Institutions that operate to constrain the state 
emerge when the balance of power shifts away from it. This shift must be large and 
decisive enough to disrupt existing political and social forces that have enjoyed favored 
positions for long periods of time. Kohli notes that most state institutions persist because 
they enable the powerful to pursue their interests; institutions that hinder the powerful 
seldom survive.597 Liberal democracy is a rare exception, but where it has survived, it is 
because the interests of the powerful, both political and economic, are balanced. Even 
Europe’s representative assemblies were originally erected by the state in order to 
enhance its power (particularly its power to tax). They did not perform their constraining 
function on the ruler until control of economic resources shifted decidedly from monarch 
to the emerging bourgeoisie and the rural landed elite. The mistaken belief that these 
institutions were the causal force behind democratic governance is part of what ultimately 
led Ghana in the opposite direction.598  
This is not to say that the way in which institutions are erected doesn’t matter at all. The 
design of institutions does influence the way in which they operate, but this design is 
primarily determined by power dynamics at the time of the institution’s creation. For 
example, the battle over regional assemblies designed to constrain the power of the 
central state was lost by the opposition at independence. The assemblies were 
                                                          
597 Kohli, State-Directed Development, 411. 
 
598 “By introducing into the country the party political system, the foundation stone of parliamentary 
democracy was laid.” Nkrumah, Ghana, 108.  
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reintroduced later in weaker form (significantly, by the departing colonial rulers, not the 
opposition). However, these institutions can still be subverted to serve the purposes of 
whatever group or individual is most powerful. One of the first acts of the new 
assemblies was to undermine its own constraining functions.  
Much has also been attributed to weak state institutions. A closer look at Ghana suggests 
that the institutions of the state are not necessarily weak, but misused. Corrupt state 
leaders and the institutions they use to feed that power have been strong in many ways, 
but the limiting institutions of the state do not function to limit them. The office of the 
President, for example, is considered to be a strong one, but constraining institutions such 
as courts, constitutions, and representative assemblies are either ignored or instead used 
to the opposite purpose.  
This suggests that the existence of democratic institutions cannot suffice as a measure of 
the quality of democratic governance without examining how they actually operate in 
their own context. This mistake has led to measurement problems in the literature on 
democracy, because the effect has been taken for the cause. Przeworski and his 
colleagues are correct in claiming that the institutions of democracy can appear at any 
level of development, but what isn’t said is that the ability to check the arbitrary rule of 
government cannot. Democratic institutions that arose from a change in power dynamics 
in previous centuries were in the most recent century built arbitrarily. Had this been 
understood, the failure of these institutions to restrain capricious governments would 
have been expected rather than wondered at.  
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The literature on democratic consolidation has gotten something right: that in 
unconsolidated democracies, survival depends on what it delivers in terms of inequality 
and poverty reduction.599 This is why the separation of political and economic power is 
so critical to democratic stability. Economic performance varies over time, and individual 
or group fortunes rise and fall even within that. When political and economic power are 
co-located, this becomes problematic for two reasons. First, because when political and 
economic power are co-located, there is nothing to balance the unchecked rule of the 
other. Second, because there is often little the government can do to prevent the rise and 
fall of economic fortunes. Even scholars who question the applicability of modernization 
theory in Africa concede that democracy is more likely to be stable in wealthier 
countries, particularly while they are enjoying more rapid growth.600 This dissertation 
suggests a reason why this is so. The form of democracy practiced here is not based on 
constraining rulers, but only on making them responsive to people’s demands. The 
political mechanisms of resource allocation are perfectly acceptable by this logic. So long 
as the economy is growing and prosperity meets expectations, this can continue, but the 
political system is likely to fail as soon as it is not. The regime is held responsible for 
economic outcomes of which it may or may not have real control, but because it is seen 
to direct both the political and economic spheres, its legitimacy is constantly at stake.  
By definition, a consolidated democracy would survive both market fluctuations and 
variance in the performance of specific regimes. Arbitrary rule in Ghana was 
                                                          
599 Schneider and Maxfield, “Business, the State, and Economic Performance,” in Maxfield and Schneider, 
Business and the State, 20. 
 
600 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. See also Van de Walle, Africa’s Range of Regimes, 7. 
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characterized by discretionary state intervention in markets and the use of this authority 
to generate political resources to consolidate state power.601 A limited democracy would 
not be able to intervene arbitrarily, as it would be constrained by a combination of 
constitutional procedures it is fully expected to abide by and the power of opposing 
groups whose interests are not tied to the state’s. This has a direct link to the taxation 
bargain between the state and the economic elite. The development of a tax bargain is 
only possible with sufficient economic growth and private wealth accumulation. It works 
to separate the interests of the political and economic elite, and it is this opposition that 
constrains and limits rulers. This was not possible in Ghana because resources were 
controlled and allocated by the state itself. Instead, the political and economic elite are 
joined by mutual interest in a highly oppressive taxation system, politics selects the 
winners and losers in society, and the competition for political office is all or nothing. A 
vote is not just for political representation, but for the determination of economic 
outcomes. To some degree, this can be partially true of western democratic systems, but 
limitations exist that preceded the development of electoral democracy (most 
importantly, property rights). It is these limits that force constraint on the state, reduce 
capriciousness and uncertainty, and lend stability to the system. When political and 
economic power are instead subsumed under a single controlling authority, there are few 
sources of power that lie outside the political system, and short of military force, no 
effective means of forcing limitations on the state. A limited democracy characterized by 
                                                          
601 This resonates with Schneider and Maxfield’s assessment that pervasive discretionary state intervention 
weakens property rights and exacerbates political uncertainty, although it may temporarily reduce market 
uncertainty. Schneider and Maxfield, “Business, the State, and Economic Performance,” in Maxfield and 
Schneider, Business and the State, 13. 
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government constraint arises from the divergence of political and economic power; the 
co-location of the two encourages absolute power and arbitrary rule, even under 
technically democratic institutions.  
Elections are only the low-hanging fruit; the linchpins of stable democracy are these 
systems of constraint and accountability. Ghana has institutional democracy, it has 
elections, but it lacks the accountability, transparency, and representativeness that makes 
democracy profound. Definitions of democracy that neglect these pillars are part of what 
has led modernization theory to be prematurely rejected in Africa. Scholars have 
concluded that transitions to democracy can occur at any level of development because 
many countries in Africa became democracies while they were poor.602 These new 
democracies that in practice operate more like autocratic governments, characterized by 
personal, arbitrary rule confuse the literature because they defy simple categorization. 
These “democracies,” though they may hold elections, are beneath the surface still 
unaccountable, capricious, arbitrary, untransparent, and unrepresentative of its citizens’ 
interests. Mutually supporting pillars of democracy—rule of law over rule of man, checks 
and balances, limitations on arbitrary power—were systematically undermined through 
the use of majority will expressed through mass elections.603 Democracies defined 
primarily by elections without fundamental constraints and limitations has led to notably 
undemocratic outcomes that suppress minority interests, produce capricious, unrestrained 
                                                          
602 Van de Walle, Africa’s Range of Regimes, 7. See also Bates et al., “The New Institutionalism,” 11-12. 
See also Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. 
 
603 Once these were gone, Nkrumah no longer needed elections either, and so he did away with them. It was 
only then that the extent of Ghana’s non-democratic-ness was fully recognized. 
279 
 
rulers, and create unstable political environments. If the term is clarified to take this into 
account, it becomes clear that certain critical components of democratic governance are 
still missing. Elections may have appeared in Ghana at independence, but democracy in 
any meaningful sense of the word did not. Taking into consideration also that the entire 
continent is still economically underdeveloped by comparison to the western world, it is 
possible that economic growth and democratic governance are still causally related in that 
order, but these transformations have not taken place yet. Either way, it is probably too 
early to tell. The new hypothesis is that democracy is improving in Africa, and economic 
growth is also improving, but the amount of time that has passed is far too little to draw 
any meaningful conclusions. The problem can still be revisited only in terms of decades, 
despite the fact that the overarching relationship between economic and political 
development was only identified in Europe after several centuries.  
Some trends are possible to identify as they stand now. The Ghanaian study makes three 
things clear: that the “democracy” doesn’t function very democratically, that the 
independent bourgeoisie is weak, small, and dependent on a much larger bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie, and that the position of that class is a key enabling factor in the state’s 
capriciousness. This brings back into the discussion at least one piece of Moore’s version 
of modernization theory: no bourgeoise (at least, no independent bourgeoise), no 
democracy. If not a redefinition, then at least a clarified categorization of democracy is 
needed to make this relationship clear. The use of “democracy” use as a catch-all term for 
polities that hold elections should be abandoned entirely. At least two clear types of 
democracies can be identified: limited democracies and mass democracies. Qualitative 
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differences in the way the two operate are striking enough to require distinct 
categorization. 
The relationship between economic development and democracy is indirect and complex. 
Agricultural production plays a key role in how both economic and political development 
unfold, and the structure of rural relations has important implications for political 
outcomes. In some ways, this has not changed since Moore wrote Social Origins. Bates 
notes that the emergent social order throughout Africa has resulted in a good deal of 
suffering on the part of rural producers. Moore was forthcoming that in any process of 
modernization, the peasantry suffers, even violently; he recounts the ways in which the 
forces of modernization decimate an entire class of rural dwellers. Trying to prevent this 
painful transformation has led to suffering in other ways, locking in cyclical stagnation 
and permitting exploitation by political forces in the capital. Economic growth is as 
destabilizing to the existing system as stagnation is; the question is whether the instability 
leads to patterns of change, however disruptive it may be, or whether it is on a negative 
feedback loop. The pathway of Ghana’s future is under construction now, as important 
social and economic forces begin to emerge from beneath strong and long-lasting cycles 
of dependency. Who will ultimately control the process of modernization is the real 
struggle underway today, and how this comes out will have important implications for 
political relations, representativeness and accountability of governance, and the survival 
of democracy in the future.      
The advent of competition in elections since the 1990s has, for now at least, stabilized the 
most extreme forms of political volatility (such as coups). This, combined with sustained 
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economic growth, may eventually herald an age of prosperity and democracy. Still, 
Esseks worries that the prospect of a perpetually weak indigenous private sector in Ghana 
will spell the inability to sustain opposition against the powers of patronage politics.604 
His fears are not unfounded: patronage and corruption continues to dampen private 
investment and growth, locking Ghanaian society in to existing power relations. Rather 
than meaningful challenges to the system, politics degenerates into battling for access to 
the resources still generated by that system. Investment and growth continue to be 
hindered by the unreliable behavior of policymakers who are still relatively 
unconstrained by domestic business interests, making Ghana an unattractive location for 
the type of long-term foreign investments that fueled the prosperity of, for example, post-
colonial America.605   
I would argue that a democracy consolidates when two conditions emerge: when a rough 
balance between two key groups, business and the state, is achieved,606 and when 
government underpins the economic system, rather than directing it (the second condition 
follows from the first). This would mean that the political system enforces law, 
guarantees rights, and adjudicates disputes, but its role as head allocator has diminished. 
It becomes more stable when it shifts toward a forum for competing groups rather than a 
source of power to be used to the benefit of whomever controls it and discarded when it 
                                                          
604 Esseks, “Government and Indigenous Enterprise in Ghana,” 28. 
 
605 For example, the railroads, canals, and much of the infrastructure that connected the American West 
were largely financed by foreign investors. Mead, “Lucid Stars,” 9. 
 
606 This work has focused on the consequences of a balance that favors the state too heavily, but it is also 
possible to go too far in the other direction. A handful of powerful corporations can be as great a danger to 
liberty and democracy as the state if they are likewise unaccountable to any restraining influences.  
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doesn’t provide enough. It isn’t the removal or retrenchment of the state that would solve 
this problem, but the state in its proper role as the proprietor of political power. Because 
the Ghanaian state lacks political power based in legitimacy, it uses its control of 
economic resources to retain its position; this is reinforced by widespread expectations 
that the state should provide economic security.  
Haggard and Kaufman are correct that economic factors play a greater role in long-term 
stability than in the emergence of (on-paper) democracy. This is because the very cause 
of the patrimonial state and the corruption and instability that follows from it is rooted in 
the lack of economic security. Economic development is what consolidates democracy, 
because individually held wealth and the economic security it brings produces the 
incentives and desire for stability, predictability, the rule of law, and constraint in 
political life, and the power to build a government that embodies those characteristics. To 
enable the type of development that reinforces democratic stability, the state’s use of 
political power must underpin rather than undermine economic activity; namely, through 
the enforcement of reliable property rights. This has not yet been possible in Ghana 
because two conditions have not been met: first, a state with a monopoly on political 
power, by which I mean the right to set and enforce law. Second, private individuals who 
hold the preponderance of sources of economic wealth, sufficient to have the bargaining 
power to induce the state to make laws favorable to investment and accumulation. This 
cannot occur without a strong business class that has a stake in stability and security of 
property. Absent this constraining influence on politics, Ghana’s own history has shown 
that mass democracy can and will carry politics in extreme and even violent directions.  
283 
 
The state’s role as head allocator has diminished somewhat since the Nkrumah years. 
Since the 1990s, there has been a greater degree of separation between the rulers or party 
and the state itself, due to the onset of competition in elections. This also chips away at 
the ties between political power and economic resources, if only in a barely observable, 
uncertain, and incremental fashion. Ruling factions still use state power to garner and 
redistribute resources to political supporters, but they are constrained by two important 
developments. Rawlings’ long rule provided the breathing space in its later years for 
private sector growth and the development of opposition groups that could stand in 
competitive elections. As the private sector began to develop, attitudes toward private 
wealth and entrepreneurialism also shifted.607 Market mechanisms replaced political 
mechanisms of resource allocation in a number of areas, including currency valuation, the 
exchange rate, and import licensing, which reduced the raw political power of the ruling 
elite. The reduction in the coercive power available to whomever rules the state enabled 
the growth of competition, which serves to increase constraint and reduce instability. 
Government interference in the agriculture sector, and political allocation of resources on 
the micro level continues to resist change, but entrepreneurial efforts at replacing this 
system are gaining momentum.  
The introduction of competitive elections has also helped the separation between state 
and ruler along, because however the group in power uses its position, it will be time-
limited by competition from opposing groups. If modernization theory seems to be 
                                                          
607 This was evident during my visit to Ghana in conversations with everyday citizens; several people made 
the comment “now it is okay to make money, you can be rich and proud instead of rich and having to be 
ashamed.” 
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working in the reverse direction in Africa, it is because the competition of interests 
between groups, though largely characterized by regional or ethnic factions, has acted as 
a constraining force on the state. This is no guarantee that it will be enough to open the 
space for durable economic prosperity to emerge, so long as politics remains centered on 
the distribution of resources to competing groups. However, the balance between these 
competing groups has provided a source of stability in the political system that may 
enable longer term investment if it is seen to be more reliable than in the past. 
Furthermore, if this balance is maintained such that most groups are unable to secure 
enough long-term patronage resources from the state to make it the most viable and 
reliable source of wealth, it will make more sense for society to turn increasingly to 
private sector production.  
Since the 1990s, the ability of patron-client linkages to deliver long-term benefits to its 
participants has weakened, allowing more room for private economic activity than has 
existed in at least the last 100 years of Ghana’s history. There are signs, once hunted 
down, that private economic development is occurring, albeit slowly. This tends to create 
independent power, which generates pressure (credible pressure) for greater constraint, 
reliability, and continuity in the state, something for which emerging business leaders are 
already agitating. This process, however, is likely to be every bit as slow as it was in 
Europe. Powerful interests still endure in keeping systems operating exactly as they are, 
and until land becomes secure, it will not only continue to dampen growth, but it leaves 
the political elite holding all the trump cards. Until these enduring systemic issues are 
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overcome by changing social forces, the search for representativeness, accountability, 
and responsibility in government is likely to remain elusive in the foreseeable future.  
Directions for Future Research. One possible avenue for future research is a comparison 
that at first glance, seems counterintuitive, given the numerous discrepancies (among 
others, significant differences in geography and time). However, Ghana and her sister 
colonies do share one significant common trait with the United States: a history as a 
British colony and source of raw materials for more advanced economies. Comparison of 
Ghana’s post-independence years to the time period immediately succeeding the 
American Revolution may bear more fruit that previously imagined. America entered 
independent statehood in an era where the economies of Europe, particularly Great 
Britain’s, were vastly superior in terms of productive capacity and technological 
advances. Much of the new democracy’s early economic policies were centered on trying 
to avoid exactly the circumstances in which much of Africa now finds itself: stuck in the 
role of the provider of raw materials for the more advanced economies, with its upper 
classes as the market for the manufactured goods of the developed world.608 Other 
components of the American economy in the early 1800s are remarkably similar to post-
colonial Africa: lack of infrastructure and dependence on foreign financing and foreign 
export markets were characteristic of the years after America’s independence from Great 
Britain. Widespread frustration with these circumstances manifested itself in electoral 
politics that also encouraged capricious behavior on the part of the state; politicians 
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occasionally played on this popular resentment but were largely unable to do anything 
about it.609 It was the constraining influence of indigenous business leaders, concerned 
with America’s reliability and reputation as a sound location for investment, that stayed 
the state’s hand.610 The fact that the vote didn’t initially include non-property-holding 
citizens may have actually played a significant role in building the long-term economic 
viability and political stability of the American state. A comparative study that examines 
the differences in both circumstances and key decisions of the critical post-independence 
time period could shed light on influencing factors.  
Another possibility for comparison is to states that have undergone political and 
economic modernizations more recently and under more similar global circumstances. 
There are modern states that have successfully industrialized under state direction, 
joining the ranks of economically developed countries. South Korea, Japan, and possibly 
Brazil come to mind. Both Peter Evans in Embedded Autonomy and Atul Kohli in State-
Directed Development concur that state participation in economic development seems to 
be a requirement in the 20th century and beyond. But both point out that variance in the 
way states construct their participation in the economy leads to vastly different outcomes. 
Evans distinguishes between predatory and developmental states, arguing that state 
power is not the sole cause of predation, since developmental states have organized civil 
society, and ultimately supported private development.611 Development has been 
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successful in these cases, where the state gave primacy to economic growth in partnership 
(but not collusion) with private individuals. However, he also notes that this path has 
been rare in history, with most late-developing states following the same path as Ghana, 
and later identifies external constraints imposed by international conflict and U.S.-
occupation as being significant factors in constraining some of the developmental state’s 
autonomy, which suggests that the level of predation may in fact still be causally related 
to the relative power of the state and its agents to do as they will.    
In Korea, Evans claims, the state’s successful industrialization project created its own 
rivals. A new class of private industrialists emerged, whose loyalty to the state that 
sponsored its development began to weaken as it became less dependent on the state and 
began to develop its own interests. This may be the decisive difference between the two 
paths: while Ghana’s early leaders feared the potential challenge to absolute political 
power that a successful private sector represents, states such as Korea prioritized 
economic development over political power. The result was successful economic 
modernization, which subsequently led to pressure for political change, but only because 
political and economic power did not remain co-located. Korea’s 1992 elections centered 
on the issue of government intervention in the economic sector.612 Although the 
“chaebol” class of business families, whose positions were to some degree entwined with, 
though not fully dependent on, the state, their position has shifted in recent years as a 
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wider array of business interests have risen out of industrialization.613 Kohli credits the 
growing power of new social classes such as this one with incremental (though 
significant) political changes: since capital-owning groups are independently powerful, 
their demands are respected by state elites, leading to a slow but steady shift in the nature 
of states.614 The absence of this class as a significant social force has been a key factor in 
both economic stagnation and political volatility in Ghana. The role of this class in the 
transformation of political-economic systems in other parts of the world during the same 
time period seems significant to this dissertation’s arguments. The contribution of this 
class toward responsible, accountable, responsive and stable governance is increasingly 
looking like a necessary condition, but to my knowledge, exactly what the changes are 
that Kohli is referencing, and how they came about, has not yet been undertaken as a 
serious case study in any of the states Kohli identifies as having undergone this 
transformation.  
The last suggestion for future research that I will make is the obvious comparison to 
states most like Ghana in terms of the other possible contributory factors such as culture, 
Africa are made difficult by the fact that by world standards, the entire region sits at 
similarly low levels of development, and this topic is deeply entwined with economic 
strength. Furthermore, previous authors have noted that throughout Africa, political 
conflict and disorder appears unrelated to many of the factors that vary across states: type 
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of colonial experience, size, number of parties, rate of development, and individual 
characteristics of regimes are all listed as variables that have not been shown to produce 
varying outcomes in Africa.615 However, there may be opportunities to examine certain 
components of the theory, such as land rights, if there are instances where property has 
been more secure for a long period of time. Alternatively, case studies with even more 
dismal democratic records could be undertaken. Comparatively speaking, Ghana has had 
a better record than most states in its neighborhood. For many states, authoritarian 
backsliding is still common, with African leaders altering their constitutions to remain in 
office, coups still occurring (though less commonly than once was the case), and little 
improvement on quality of governance measures.616 For now, however, comparison 
within Africa is unlikely to yield meaningful results until the passage of time has 
heralded greater change and long-term stability.  
  
                                                          
615 Zolberg, “The Structure of Political Conflict,” 70. 
 
616 Bates et al., “The New Institutionalism,” 11-12. 
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